Attachments
The Syrian displacement crisis is one of the world’s largest refugee crises. The situation escalated during the Syrian Civil War (2011-2024), when millions were displaced internally and abroad due to war, repression, and economic collapse under Bashar al-Assad’s rule.
Assad’s regime deliberately used displacement as a weapon through sieges, chemical attacks, and the deliberate targeting of civilian populations. During the civil war, nearly 7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) lived in Syria, with most concentrated populations in northwestern Syria—Idlib, Aleppo, Hasakah, and Raqqa. Many IDPs lived in makeshift camps, bombed-out buildings, or government-controlled areas under heavy surveillance.
More than six million Syrians fled the country due to the conflict and sought asylum in over 130 countries, with the majority living in neighboring countries, such as Türkiye, Lebanon, and Jordan. By mid-2024, more than three million Syrian refugees resided in Türkiye, approximately 1.5 million resided in Lebanon, and more than three-quarters of a million resided in Jordan.
On December 8, 2024, nearly 14 years after the start of the civil war, Assad fled Syria as opposition forces successfully liberated the country. Assad fled to Russia with his family, where he was offered asylum. This brief builds on previous USCRI reports that examined post-regime transitions in other contexts and distilled lessons for addressing Syrian displacement.
Unsafe, Undignified, and Potentially Involuntary Returns
Over 2 million Syrians have returned home since December, including nearly 600,000 from abroad and 1.5 million who were internally displaced. Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), anticipates that even more displaced Syrians may return after the end of the school year. But what are Syrians returning to?
Syria remains in one of the world’s largest displacement crises, with over 13 million people —refugees and IDPs—unable to return home to safety, security, or basic supplies. Grandi warns that without adequate support to rebuild critical infrastructure, such as schools and homes, many of these recent returns may prove temporary, leading to continued displacement.
Upon return, both refugees and IDPs have found their homes severely damaged or destroyed. Essential services, including water, sanitation, electricity, roads, and sewage systems, remain in shambles. Public health needs continue to escalate due to a broken infrastructure and a lack of resources.
At the end of May 2025, hundreds of thousands of people in displacement settings in Syria lacked clean water, leading to cholera outbreaks with several deaths. More than 50 percent of children under the age of five with acute malnutrition were not receiving the care they needed. Urgent public health interventions are needed to address this crisis. In addition, more than 416,000 children remain at high risk of developing severe malnutrition. Approximately half of the maternity hospitals in northwest Syria had been closed due to global funding cuts. And between 50 and 70 percent of Syrian health workers had left the country.
Complicating safe returns further, unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war continue to put civilians at risk. By the end of May 2025, the World Health Organization had recorded more than 900 casualties from unexploded ordnance, including nearly 400 deaths.
For many who are unable to return home in a voluntary, safe, and dignified manner, other solutions are needed.
Resettlement Needs
On June 24, 2025, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released its 2026 Projected Global Resettlement Needs report, estimating the number of refugees who will require resettlement in the coming year to be an estimated 2.5 million in 2026.
Despite the ousting of Assad, UNHCR recognizes that even as Syrian refugees face mounting pressure from host countries and parts of the international community to return, large-scale repatriation remains unlikely in 2025 due to ongoing instability and insecurity in Syria. Refugee return and reintegration must be situated within a broader, regionally coordinated response. After more than 14 years of hosting displaced Syrians, countries across the region are experiencing increasing fatigue.
In Türkiye—home to the largest population of Syrian refugees—most Syrians are not formally recognized as refugees. Instead, they hold temporary protection status, which does not provide the same lasting protections as refugee status.
Türkiye has also implemented a "Go-and-See" pilot program, set to expire on July 1, 2025, which allows heads of households to visit Syria to assess conditions for return. However, re-entry to Türkiye is not guaranteed, as returning individuals must obtain a new visa, which may not be issued. Rising anti-refugee sentiment, economic inflation, and labor market competition have intensified pressure on Syrians to leave, raising concerns about whether returns under such circumstances can truly be considered voluntary.
In Lebanon, the already limited protection space is further constrained by a worsening economic crisis and renewed conflict, which have displaced both Lebanese citizens and refugees. Syrians, especially, face deteriorating access to basic services, rising rates of arrest and detention, restrictive residency policies, and an increasingly hostile political climate.
In Egypt, Syrians are impacted by instability in the broader region—particularly in Sudan and Gaza—which has led to more restrictive residency policies and worsened socioeconomic conditions for refugees. New entry requirements have pushed many to rely on smugglers, exposing them to heightened risks of trafficking and exploitation. In 2025, Egypt passed new asylum legislation transferring responsibility for refugee affairs from UNHCR to a newly designated government agency.
Iraq also adopted new policies in 2024 aimed at improving refugee protections, including provisions for legal status, employment authorization, and access to basic public services.
Jordan continues to allow Syrian refugees access to essential services such as healthcare and education. However, ongoing reductions in humanitarian aid threaten the sustainability of these services. In the absence of a national asylum framework, legal and administrative barriers persist for many refugees.
While many host countries have made significant efforts to support Syrian refugees, greater regional coordination and renewed international commitment are urgently needed to ensure displaced Syrians receive adequate protection and access to durable solutions, including resettlement and legal pathways to safety. Beyond regional coordination, countries around the world should expand resettlement pathways, not limit or suspend them.
Asylum Considerations
On June 20, 2025, the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) issued Interim Country Guidance for Syria. The guidance acknowledges that the fall of the Assad regime may have reduced the risk of persecution or serious harm for some individuals who previously sought asylum or international protection. It cautions, however, that not all claims submitted before Assad’s ousting should be considered obsolete. In many cases, threats stemmed from actors other than the Assad regime—such as extremist groups, militias, or other non-state entities—meaning that the risk may persist, or in some cases, may have worsened or evolved. The EUAA also highlights that new threats may emerge in post- Assad Syria, potentially justifying continued protection for certain individuals.
The guidance identifies three distinct refugee profiles: (1) individuals for whom the Assad regime was the sole actor of persecution; (2) individuals at risk from multiple actors, including the former regime; and (3) individuals at risk from actors other than the Assad regime. These distinctions underscore that the end of Assad’s rule does not equate to universal safety for all Syrians. Each protection case must continue to be assessed on its individual merits in light of evolving conditions on the ground.
Temporary Protections
While conditions in Syria remain unsafe for large-scale returns, many host countries have implemented temporary protection mechanisms to safeguard displaced Syrians. Türkiye’s temporary protection status gives beneficiaries a range of legal rights and access to services, including health care, education, social assistance, psychological support, and work authorization.
In the United States, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) allows certain Syrian nationals to remain and work legally while conditions in Syria prevent safe return. Although fewer Syrians benefit from TPS compared to Türkiye’s temporary protection program, the status offers critical relief from deportation and access to essential services.
While these mechanisms do not confer the same durable protections as formal refugee status, they are vital for enabling Syrians to live in safety and dignity during prolonged displacement. They also help avoid premature returns that could expose individuals to renewed harm, and they support access to services essential for long-term stability and self-reliance.
Recommendations
Following Assad’s ousting in December, UNHCR urged nations not to forcibly return Syrian nationals, warning that a rushed repatriation of millions could overwhelm Syria’s transitional government and undermine long-term reintegration efforts. Beyond institutional strain, premature returns could place vulnerable individuals at heightened risk of harm. To support a comprehensive regional response that ensures adequate protection and safe pathways for displaced Syrians and refugees, international stakeholders should:
- Continue to support voluntary, safe, and dignified return efforts grounded in international protection standards and informed by refugees’ own intentions.
- Expand access to resettlement and complementary pathways, including education, family reunification, and labor mobility opportunities.
- Assess Syrian asylum cases on their individual merits, regardless of any perceived improvement in conditions within the country.
- Donor governments should consider increasing humanitarian assistance funding. Less than 15 percent of the humanitarian response priorities were funded from January to June 2025.
- The U.S. Government should consider extending and redesignating TPS for Syria. TPS for Syria is set to expire on September 30, 2025.