Attachments
Syria’s new order is in a race against the clock. The interim government must strike a delicate balance in dealing with the myriad challenges it faces. Donors should give it the help it needs, lest this promising project of state building descend into a fiasco.
What’s new? Syria’s interim government faces a difficult transition, with the country wracked by repression, civil war and sanctions. It has launched a political process that purports to reflect the views of broad segments of the population as part of a dramatic rebuilding of the state.
Why does it matter? Syria is living on borrowed time. The interim government is running out of funds, security forces are overstretched, poverty is deepening and insurgency is brewing at the periphery. Outsiders are meddling. Western sanctions deprive leaders of what they need to rebuild, while preventing fragmentation or a return to civil war.
What should be done? The interim government should pursue security, economic and governance reforms simultaneously, recognising their interdependence. Security for vulnerable communities – especially Alawites, who formed the former regime’s political base – is essential for stopping spiralling violence. Donors should ease sanctions and offer other support to give the transition a fighting chance.
I. Overview
Syria’s new order is in a race against the clock. Rejoicing followed President Bashar al-Assad’s ouster by the Sunni Islamist Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other rebel groups. Yet now the country is gripped by growing uncertainty over interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa’s political outlook and his perceived drive to monopolise power. He has sought to soothe nerves by trying to establish security and launching a transition ostensibly meant to produce a more inclusive government. Yet he faces mammoth challenges: wartime destruction, an acute cash shortage to pay state salaries, enervated ministries, disunited security institutions, simmering sectarian divisions, grievances built up over years of civil war, Western sanctions that forestall significant foreign assistance and damaging Israeli intervention. With Syria drifting dangerously, outside actors should give the new leadership the support it needs to begin rebuilding the country. The alternative could be state collapse, which would come at enormous cost to Syrians and to regional stability.
By overthrowing a hated regime, and shedding little blood during their final offensive, Syria’s new leaders earned enormous gratitude among many Syrians and in many foreign capitals – and with it both the benefit of the doubt and valuable time to set the country on a new path. Even if many Syrians view them with suspicion, given their jihadist origins and unknown ambitions, most have been encouraged by al-Sharaa’s public utterances, which are a marked departure from Assad’s mix of menace and stale sloganeering – hallmarks of his bloody, repressive reign. Syrians were heartened by the lack of widespread violence for some time after Assad fell. But, in early March, bloody clashes in Latakia, Tartous and Hama – accompanied in some places by massacres of civilians – showed they have ample reason to fear its renewal, which could take on a distinct sectarian dimension, generating chaos, new waves of displacement and even the division of Syria into cantons under the influence of foreign powers.
For reconstruction, Syria must acquire cash that donors may deny or condition on good governance and a degree of pluralistic political participation.
For his part, al-Sharaa must walk a tightrope strung between Islamist ideologues, some of whom look askance at his pragmatic discourse and forays into diplomacy, and the wider world. For reconstruction, Syria must acquire cash that donors may deny or condition on good governance and a degree of pluralistic political participation. In the meantime, al-Sharaa must strike a balance between acting swiftly to meet the population’s urgent needs – food, electricity and other necessities – and moving at a more deliberate pace to develop a political process with the broadest possible buy-in. He must also maintain security while ensuring accountability for those who attack civilians, whether the assailants are insurgents or aligned with the state. The danger that militias operating under the banner of state security forces will commit atrocities while fighting ex-regime elements was illustrated all too vividly in early March. Al-Sharaa must also cope with foreign actors’ meddling, particularly the Israeli’s army’s move into southern Syria.
Stumbling on any of these fronts could lead the new leadership into a vicious cycle of fighting off fresh insurgencies in response to insecurity, gaps in basic services, political exclusion and escalating abuse of civilians, followed by withdrawal of any prospect for significant outside support for rebuilding the country. Further impoverishment of the population might then give rise to new grievances as drivers of rebellion, which could in turn create openings for external players to pursue their own interests at the interim government’s expense. In that scenario, it would be difficult to envision a stable, or any, Syrian state still standing. The result could instead be long-term fragmentation and a return to civil war.
Damascus is hoping to get sanctions relief from Western capitals, as well as fiscal support from both them and Gulf Arab states; these represent the key sources of immediate assistance and the most potent source of future investment. Yet Western governments sceptical of HTS may attach strings to the easing of sanctions that are unrelated to their original purpose. If donors impose conditions that the new leaders cannot meet, they could consign Syria to even deeper economic misery rather than ameliorating it.
The way forward will surely be bumpy, but it will surely go better if the country’s leaders are as transparent as possible in their governance and admit room for improvement in everything from fostering broader participation to keeping a leash on disorderly elements among the new security forces. Beyond meetings already conducted with key donors, they should do everything in their power to give governments in the West and the Gulf reason to back them, lest they fail precipitously for lack of resources. Donors should make clear the conditions required for their support, which should include reconstruction of essential infrastructure, as well as for further sanctions waivers if not outright relief. Donors should also use diplomatic channels to discourage outside actors from exploiting Syria’s frailty for their own purposes. If donors decline to extend aid, or delay it unduly, this rare but promising project of state rebuilding in the turbulent Middle East could descend into yet another fiasco, with huge costs for human and regional security.