Attachments
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the crisis began in March 2011, Syria has been ravaged by conflict - both international and internal – further exacerbated by the February 2023 earthquakes, the ongoing climate crisis, a continuously declining economy, and various other regional stressors. Poverty continues to rise, with the potential for further shocks and stressors in the coming years. Meanwhile, the complex political and security landscape could increase pressure from neighbouring countries for Syrian refugees to return, even when the conditions are not yet conducive to a safe and voluntary return, as recently seen in Lebanon, where rising violence has led to a new wave of people fleeing the country, including Lebanese and Syrian families. Alongside heightened protection risks, this could further escalate social tensions in an environment already strained by resources and high numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs). In 2024, 16.7 million people require humanitarian assistance, the largest number since the onset of the crisis.
The Syria crisis remains a protection crisis, representing the world's second-largest displacement emergency, with 7.2 million IDPs. Violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) have been documented across areas experiencing active fighting since 2011, and hostilities continue to be reported in parts of Syria, while the protracted socio-economic situation continues to exacerbate existing vulnerabilities that drive protection risks. The conflict in Syria has exacerbated a spectrum of protection risks, including enforced disappearance, torture and inhumane treatment, attacks on civilians and other unlawful killings, assaults on civilian objects, restrictions on humanitarian access, the presence of explosive ordnance, restrictions on freedom of movement, siege conditions, and forced displacement, among other pre-existing risks. 7 The socio-economic crisis has exacerbated the vulnerability to protection risks such as child abuse, gender-based violence (GBV) and a deterioration of the mental health and psychological well-being of Syrians. Child protection risks are especially prevalent, with more than 6.4 million children in need of child protection services in 2024.
As public infrastructure and services are on the brink of collapse, compounded by energy shortages, prolonged electricity blackouts, inefficient governance of basic services, sanctions, funding shortages, and a weakened public sector, Syrian society is grappling with severe economic hardship intertwined with existing protection risks. Poverty has reached alarming levels, with over 90 percent of the population affected. Limited income opportunities and livelihoods are pushing individuals and communities to the edge of destitution, overshadowing their hopes for stability and progress. Extreme poverty and prolonged, unaddressed trauma heighten risks of child marriage, the worst forms of child labour, and other violations against children.
The persistent exposure to protection risks, alongside other stressors, has significantly diminished Syrians’ capacity to absorb, adapt, and recover from shocks—key elements of any resilience-building process. Given the risks and stressors are shaped by such a complex web of internal and external dynamics, it is essential for the caretaker government, transitional government and the future Syrian government, as the primary duty bearers responsible for protecting civilians, to lead efforts to reduce Syrians’ exposure to these risks and stressors, with the support of donors and the larger aid community.
Syrian communities commonly report that their increased exposure to protection risks stem from their inability to meet their basic needs, including food, shelter, healthcare services, access to education for children and functioning public services, including water and electricity infrastructure. To effectively support Syrian communities, early recovery and resilience-building programmes must address the intersection of these needs with the protection risks Syrians face. A holistic response is essential for the recovery of the Syrian population.
Unfortunately, early recovery efforts in Syria are often politicized and conflated with reconstruction which donor governments link to achieving political settlement. Before December 8th, 2024, funding remained insufficient, with the peace process stalled and no political solution in sight.
Traditional donors had limited their engagement with the former state authorities until a political resolution was reached, limiting the aid provided - particularly in the areas of resilience and development. As a result, the humanitarian response remained focused on addressing basic needs, without adequately tackling critical protection threats, as needs continued to rise.
Despite these challenges, humanitarian actors in Syria have increasingly expanded their early recovery efforts, transitioning from emergency assistance to more sustainable interventions aimed at achieving long-term outcomes. Early recovery programming aims to break the cycle of aid dependency by building their resilience to adapt and recover from shocks, such as by improving public sector functionality and promoting income-generating activities. To achieve this, a shift from short-term interventions to a long-term approach is necessary, applying programming through a ‘resilience’ lens to foster sustainable outcomes.
Addressing protection risks is crucial for the effectiveness of early recovery programming in Syria. However, discussions on early recovery programming so far in Syria have paid limited attention to protection concerns. For example, without protecting housing, land, and property (HLP) rights, people cannot fully exercise their right to adequate housing. Without civil documentation, people will struggle to access services and exercise their rights to inheritance. If GBV continues being pervasive, women will face limited, and potentially unsafe access to the labour market, along with long-term emotional stress. If children are forced to work to access additional income for the household, they will remain vulnerable to exploitation and be denied an education.
This paper argues that protection must be at the forefront of early recovery programming for it to be sustainable, principled, and effective in strengthening the resilience of Syrian communities. This approach requires the support of the humanitarian actors to strengthen the connection between protection and early recovery and integrate it more effectively into programmes. These efforts must be spearheaded and coordinated by the humanitarian leadership within the country. Donor governments must increase their funding for early recovery, while the caretaker Syrian authorities must facilitate access for the implementation of quality protection programming.