The choices that the new Syrian authorities and outside powers make in the coming weeks will have a lasting impact on the post-Assad political order. It will be vital to choose wisely.
No one was ready for the Assad regime’s collapse. The breakneck speed of the rebel forces’ advance caught everyone by surprise, as did Bashar al-Assad’s abrupt departure for exile on 8 December 2024. Two weeks later, on a visit to Damascus, one could still observe disbelief mixed in with joy among the throngs celebrating in the streets. Some of the revellers were returning to the capital for the first time in years; others were arriving for the first time in their lives. Exhaustion was palpable, too, as was wariness of the challenges ahead – both among the crowds and in the presidential palace, where the former rebel leaders who launched the fateful offensive are working eighteen hours a day to set the course for Syria’s new era.
After more than thirteen years of war, the blitz that overthrew the regime took only eleven days, and the pace of events remains dizzying. Nonetheless, a clear theme has emerged in Crisis Group’s discussions with Syria’s new leaders and civil society figures in Damascus, as well as with regional, Western and UN officials: the decisions made in the weeks ahead will have a lasting impact on the Syrian political order.
Questions of Inclusion
A few days after taking the reins in Damascus, Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist group that had spearheaded the rebel offensive, installed a caretaker government composed mostly of the same figures who had led the group’s self-described Salvation Government in the north-western province of Idlib. Many Syrians, as well as regional and Western officials, worried that the interim cabinet’s makeup signalled an intent to monopolise power and perhaps even to impose Islamist governance throughout the country.
Speaking to Crisis Group, HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa (until recently known by his nom de guerre, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani) described the caretaker government’s appointment as temporary, a step the group had taken to ensure order and restore services as quickly as possible. He said he views the governance capacity the group attained in Idlib, and the trusting relationships forged among officials there, as major assets in the tumultuous early phase after the Assad regime’s downfall. He acknowledged that what HTS did in Idlib cannot serve as a model for Syria as a whole, given its much greater cultural and ideological diversity. But he argued that in this interim period, expediency outweighs the drawbacks of homogeneity in the caretaker government.
Yet those drawbacks are already becoming all too clear. Syrians of all political persuasions are wary of HTS’s origins – until 2016, it was affiliated with al-Qaeda and, before that, with ISIS. They see little of their country’s ethnic, religious and cultural mosaic reflected in the caretaker government. Many who appreciate HTS’s role in toppling Assad, and its success in averting a collapse of security and basic government functions since then, are also concerned by indications of ideological overreach. Interim officials have made comments alluding to limitations on women’s political role and rushed through changes to the Islamic education curriculum. The interim justice minister, it has been revealed, presided over the execution of two women charged with “corruption and prostitution” in 2015. Together, the jarring statements and unearthed misdeeds have drawn widespread criticism; they undermine the HTS leaders’ vocal declarations of commitment to protecting Syria’s diversity.
Further controversies are likely to emerge, as the caretaker cabinet – drawn from, and formed to govern, Idlib – takes responsibility for administering most of the country. In Idlib, it was mostly Islamist hardliners who rebuked HTS for its decisions. Now interim officials must attend to a far broader range of concerns. Adding to the challenge is that al-Sharaa himself, along with a small circle of trusted senior figures, has previously borne much of the burden of dealing with politically sensitive issues. The resulting bottleneck was a problem when HTS controlled Idlib alone; now the amount of work has increased exponentially.
The transitional institutions must be much more representative of Syrian society than the caretaker government.
The solution, say foreign diplomats, UN officials and HTS leaders alike, is inclusion: the transitional institutions must be much more representative of Syrian society than the caretaker government. But inclusion is a deceptively simple concept. No one really has a vision for what it would mean in practice. HTS knows what it wants to avoid: an explicit divvying-up of positions along ethnic and religious lines, the system widely perceived as having undermined governance while entrenching sectarianism in neighbouring Iraq and Lebanon. Many Syrians also recoil at the approach taken by the autonomous administration in the north east, run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This body has a diverse cast of nominal officials, but they wield little power. Real authority rests in the hands of cadres from a single Kurdish party.
To begin addressing this challenge, HTS should take two immediate steps. First, it should make personnel changes in the caretaker government to ensure that the cabinet has the competence and breadth of experience necessary to make sound decisions. The incidents of the last two weeks reflect the urgency of the issue – attempting to continue, even during a short interim period, with such a narrow governing body will exacerbate social tensions. It is also crucial that the caretaker government avoid taking divisive measures regarding cultural or religious issues.
Secondly, HTS leaders need to build trust with influential, talented Syrians from across the country’s cultural and political spectrums, including from the diaspora, and then move quickly to place these people in positions where they can help shape policy. HTS has experience with the first half of that equation, albeit on a smaller scale – as seen, for example, in the relationships it forged with Christians in Idlib. But it will now need to go much further, to involve an array of capable Syrians in the decisions that will define the contours of the transition.
Different Timelines for Different Challenges
What should come after these two course corrections? Having deposed the Assad regime with blazing speed, HTS is perhaps understandably tempted to approach the day after at full throttle as well. “We are going a thousand kilometres per hour”, al-Sharaa told Crisis Group in late December 2024, describing plans to hold a 1,000-person national dialogue conference in the following weeks. HTS envisions the conference as a platform for launching a transition on two tracks: dissolving its military wing and other armed factions, as part of preparations to integrate them into a new national army; and establishing committees to amend the constitution and fashion other instruments of future governance. Yet there is a tension between HTS’s desire to move quickly, on one hand, and its wish to build trust with Syrians and gain international support, on the other.
For Syrian and outside decision-makers weighing in on how to pace and approach the transition, it may be helpful to distinguish among three key tasks: integrating former rebel factions into a national military; determining the fate of the SDF and the north east; and reforming governance, including the constitution.
It would be a disaster for Syria if the post-Assad dispensation descended into comparable squabbling.
The first task – involving the military’s integration of former rebels from a range of factions – is one where moving quickly appears prudent. Throughout the war, factions aligned with both the regime and the opposition competed for territory and resources, sapping their own military effectiveness and fuelling an exploitative war economy. Many had external patrons. It would be a disaster for Syria if the post-Assad dispensation descended into comparable squabbling. Regional countries, too, would have much to lose from a reprise of wartime instability. But the more time passes, the more the good-will HTS now enjoys may dissipate, and the more armed groups may gravitate toward entrenching themselves outside state structures. Beyond incorporating former rebels, there is also the question of what to do with what is left of the old Syrian army, much of which melted away amid the rebel offensive rather than make a last stand in the regime’s defence.
The second job – reconnecting north-eastern Syria with the central state – will require much more time for separate negotiations among several parties. The Kurdish-led SDF and its autonomous administration govern a diverse population and control most of Syria’s oil and gas. The new authorities in Damascus aim to restore state control throughout the north east in the months ahead. The U.S. has hundreds of troops stationed in the region, as part of the coalition trying to stamp out ISIS, and it wants to safeguard the SDF, which for years has been its main Syrian partner. The SDF, meanwhile, remains deeply linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has waged a decades-long insurgency in Türkiye. Ankara sponsors Syrian armed factions that have been battling the SDF since 2018. It has also killed numerous SDF cadres, viewing them as part of the PKK, which it (along with the U.S. and the European Union) classifies as a terrorist organisation. In mid-December 2024, a Turkish-backed offensive pushed the SDF out of Manbij, a north-eastern city, with the withdrawal brokered by U.S. mediators. U.S. intercession has averted a similar move on the Kurdish-majority city of Kobani, at least for the time being.
An end to this messy saga is in sight, yet much could still go wrong. Ankara has engaged in a political initiative to conclude the conflict with the PKK. The opening is nascent, but significant: the sides have shown willingness to put the big issues on the table – including ending the PKK’s insurgency and expanding Kurdish rights in Türkiye. In neighbouring Syria, Ankara has a chance to achieve through negotiations what it has often threatened to accomplish by force: stopping Kurdish militants from using the north east as a rear base for attacks on Turkish soil. If dialogue moves forward, space will also open for the SDF to strike a deal with Damascus on integration within the Syrian state. Yet any clash between Türkiye and its allies, on one side, and the PKK or SDF, on the other, could derail the talks. So, too, could precipitous moves by other parties – such as a sudden U.S. decision to withdraw troops from the north east or an attempt by Damascus to seize ground from the SDF. All concerned will need to be patient if dialogue is to yield a peaceful resolution.
As for the third transition task – reforming governance – here, too, a deliberate pace will be crucial. Building trust will be essential to enabling the interim leadership and other influential Syrians to address complex and potentially divisive questions. Al-Sharaa has already pushed back the timing of the national dialogue conference, which had first been slated for early January; delaying it further would be preferable, in order to afford more time for the preparations necessary to ensure diverse, meaningful participation. Perhaps more importantly, the follow-up committees charged with fleshing out reforms must have ample time to incorporate qualified Syrians from a variety of backgrounds, as well as space to ensure that all their perspectives on sensitive cultural and religious issues are heard.
It would also be useful to coordinate this process more directly with the UN. The UN’s Office of the Special Envoy for Syria can work with Damascus to help ensure that the follow-up committees are capable, diverse and supported by those with relevant technical expertise. It can support the authorities in clarifying the transitional framework, in order to allay concerns among Syrians and outsiders that they are acting arbitrarily. Importantly, it can also serve as a liaison between the new authorities and the Western and regional states that are signalling they will condition sanctions relief, reconstruction aid and access to help from international financial institutions on an inclusive political transition. The UN is best placed to reassure these states that such a transition is progressing along a positive trajectory, which would give them the political cover they need to start assisting Damascus in earnest.
Between Justice and Vigilantism
While comity reigns in the capital, tensions are higher in Syria’s coastal and central areas, where the sectarian aspects of the war’s political divides are rawest. It was largely the Assad regime that left this legacy, due to its use of collective punishment throughout the war and its reliance on soldiers, intelligence agents and paramilitaries drawn disproportionately from the country’s Alawite minority and supplemented by foreign Shiite militiamen. The armed opposition’s turn to Sunni Islamist militancy, particularly between 2012 and 2016, exacerbated the problem, providing grist for the regime’s sectarian fear-mongering. But communities viewed by the regime as pro-opposition were subjected to the most systematic brutality of the conflict, with a civilian death toll estimated in the hundreds of thousands.
As a result, demands among Syrians to punish war criminals resound amid anxiety – particularly among Alawites – that groups the regime exploited as cannon fodder will pay the price for atrocities directed by senior officials who have fled the country. Stark polarisation is already evident in conversations and on social media, with some insisting on swift, extensive retribution and others apprehensive that calls for transitional justice will give way to indiscriminate violence. Documented instances of overtly sectarian vigilantism and humiliating treatment are sharpening those fears and providing fertile ground for disinformation campaigns aimed at depicting the new Syrian order as an existential threat to minorities. Armed groups and individuals, by most accounts separate from HTS, have engaged in frequent killings, kidnappings and looting, targeting minority individuals. The overstretched HTS forces often have been unable to prevent these acts, leading to the risk that locals will take matters into their own hands.
Coping with these competing pressures will remain a complex challenge for the country’s new authorities, but there are immediate steps they can take to reduce tensions. First, they can outline a more transparent, institutional approach to transitional justice, including by specifying whom they are arresting, on what grounds and in what courts the accused will be prosecuted. Secondly, they can act more decisively to stop vigilante violence and punish any abuses that occur. Integrating former rebels within unified forces and clarifying that only the state is authorised to pursue criminals will aid this effort. Thirdly, they can deepen outreach to community leaders for guidance on the threats or needs particular to given areas, as well as begin to diversify the recruiting pool for local security forces. Fourthly, they can expand upon the amnesties already offered to rank-and-file soldiers by laying out a reconciliation process for more senior Assad-era officers who are not implicated in egregious crimes. During the war, HTS leaders showed that they have a knack for reaching understandings with former foes. Doing the same with select members of the Assad regime’s military could assuage fears and help reduce the risk of insurgency emanating from former regime elements.
Terrorist Designations
Due to its previous affiliation with al-Qaeda, the U.S., the UN Security Council and European states have sanctioned HTS under various counter-terrorism authorities. Washington’s designation of the group as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO) is the most consequential of these measures. Because the designation criminalises the provision of “material support” – a broadly defined term of art that can cover everything from a cup of coffee to expert advice – HTS’s FTO status makes it legally radioactive, severely constraining the ability of outside actors to work with it. Now that HTS is the driving force of Syria’s political transition, this and other terrorism designations threaten to hurt everyone in the country by deterring the outside investment and engagement that Syria desperately needs.
HTS has already redressed the primary factors behind the designations, the first of which was imposed by the U.S. in 2012, when the group was operating under the name Jabhat al-Nusra. It broke from ISIS in 2013, and then from al-Qaeda in 2016, subsequently fighting and dismantling affiliates of both organisations in Idlib. As hardliners left or were pushed out, HTS also changed its behaviour on the battlefield (for example, by ceasing bombings in civilian areas) and in governance (for example, by protecting minority populations in areas under its control and gradually returning property seized by rebels during the war). None of the above means that HTS became liberal or democratic. But the group did appear to cut the ties and stop the actions for which it had been designated a terrorist group. This history is important, because it means that policymakers considering removal of the terrorist designations can judge a years-long track record, in addition to HTS’s present conciliatory words.
Sanctions should be a tool for encouraging behaviour change, rather than a life sentence without parole.
Policymakers agree that sanctions should be a tool for encouraging behaviour change, rather than a life sentence without parole. In early 2021, Crisis Group published a piece outlining a way to put that logic into practice: through specifying criteria that, so long as they were met, could lead the U.S. and others to conditionally remove terrorist designations. These ideas, which were not adopted, have only become more pertinent.
The U.S. could lead the way. The incoming Trump administration could detail what HTS and its leaders would need to do to get U.S. terrorism designations rescinded and then quickly assess whether the group has complied. The criteria should focus on terrorist activity, leaving other concerns (such as authoritarian behaviour and the inclusivity of the political transition) aside. The U.S. would surely place great emphasis on whether the group is eschewing violence against civilians and links to international terrorist groups, while preventing Syrian territory from being used for transnational militant operations. If open sources are any guide, HTS has already largely met these criteria.
To move forward, U.S. officials could also pursue firm commitments from HTS leaders that the group will guarantee compliance by foreign fighters and factions who have fought alongside it or allied with it; that it will use its power to prevent vigilantism or other violence against civilians; and that it will continue to battle ISIS. Were HTS not to keep its word, Washington could reimpose the rescinded designations at any time so long as legal requirements are met.
Thinking through Western Sanctions
Western capitals have two other major sources of leverage over the new Syrian authorities – the non-terrorism sanctions that continue to stifle the country’s economy and the choice to offer support for Syria’s reconstruction. To nudge the new authorities toward reform while minimising unintended economic damage, Western states should distinguish between these two levers and specify policy principles for each.
First, the U.S. and European states should provide rapid relief from sanctions imposed on the Assad regime. Syrian society should no longer be asked to bear the immense economic consequences of the former regime’s crimes, and policymakers should work as quickly as possible to uphold that principle. In practice, given the technical and political complexity of sanctions, governments could pursue rescission in phases. Immediate measures providing relief, such as the six-month general licence allowing transactions with the Syrian government and the energy sector issued by the U.S. on 6 January, are a positive first step; the Trump administration should provide further, immediate relief by issuing additional licences for other important domains, such as banking, and extending the existing general licence indefinitely. European states should follow suit. But such partial measures only marginally reduce the sanctions’ economic fallout. To enable the scale of investment that Syria needs, these countries should work steadily to remove the sanctions entirely by the end of 2025, setting clear, realistic benchmarks for Syria’s new leaders to meet as the conditions for the rollbacks. Actions by Syria’s new authorities demonstrating that they have eschewed violent repression, taken steps to safeguard equal rights for all Syrians, and do not support destabilising activity in other countries could be at the core of the standards Western governments set. As they lift the sanctions, they could maintain leverage by making clear their readiness to halt the process, or impose new penalties, if Damascus reneges on its commitments.
Secondly, Western states should use reconstruction aid to encourage continuous commitment to inclusive governance and space for civil society. They should begin to provide such support once more inclusive transitional bodies are formed. But assessing inclusion is tricky, particularly for foreign bureaucracies, and it will get trickier once Syria moves beyond the clear landmarks of the interim period. The best and most knowledgeable advocates for inclusion will come from the vibrant civil society Syrians have developed within and outside the country, and the West should condition future support for governing institutions on whether the authorities uphold the freedoms of speech and association necessary for civil society to perform that function. Syrian activists are deeply engaged on key questions of governance, and they have already pushed back effectively when HTS has erred. For example, their outcry about proposed changes to the Islamic education curriculum prompted speedy clarifications from the interim education ministry and private acknowledgement by HTS leaders that significant personnel changes are needed to avoid further mishap. In short, Western governments should not interfere in debates among Syrians, but they should use their financial leverage to help civil society play a vital role in building a Syria that offers all its people the rights, opportunities and protections they have lived without for too long.