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The Complicated Reality of Syrians’ Return

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By Samuel Davidoff-Gore and Susan Fratzke

For the more than 5.1 million Syrians who have been displaced abroad—many for more than a decade—the fall of the Assad regime is a seismic moment. It brings tantalizingly close the long-held dream of returning to a free Syria. It is also a moment of hope for the international humanitarian community, which has in recent decades seen a dwindling number of displacement crises come to a resolution.

At the same time, some countries that are hosting significant numbers of Syrians see opportunity in the change of regime. In the years since the 2011 start of the Syrian civil war, some of these countries began to see the continued presence of displaced Syrians on their territory as a political liability. Since the downfall of Bashar al-Assad, Prime Minister Najib Mikati of Lebanon, where Syrian refugees comprise one-third of the population, has called for Syrians to return, citing a strain on Lebanon’s resources. In Austria, which hosts 100,000 Syrians, the second highest number in Europe behind Germany, the chancellor announced the country will provide a “return bonus” to Syrians who return to the country and is working on a plan to return Syrians with criminal records.

But the hopes of both Syrians and their hosts must be tempered by the reality on the ground: Syria remains unstable, much of it destroyed or damaged by the conflict, and unable to support an influx of repatriating citizens. For many Syrians, conditions on the ground in Syria are too fluid to know whether and when return will be safe, let alone desirable. In addition to uncertainty about who will control different parts of Syrian territory, returnees will face massive housing shortages, infrastructure gaps, and limited livelihood opportunities, particularly in the agricultural, construction, and industrial sectors. While there has been a surge in Syrians rushing back to Syria following al-Assad’s ouster, many of these trips are likely temporary ones, to celebrate, and more importantly, check on conditions. It is unlikely on-the-ground realities will be stable enough in the near term for individuals to consider permanent repatriation. Depending on each Syrian’s personal experience and their own analysis of the benefits of return, movement back to Syria may not be a possibility or a desirable outcome.

Host countries may also find it more difficult than they might like to encourage Syrians to leave. Many Syrians have lived in Europe long enough to receive long-term residency or naturalization, which gives them a right to continue to reside there without needing to maintain refugee status. As of December 2023 (the most recent data available), nearly 180,000 Syrians held long-term residency in EU countries, and more than 300,000 had taken EU citizenship since 2013. Less secure are the more than 780,000 Syrians in the European Union who still hold refugee status or subsidiary protection. For those whose refugee claim was based on fear of persecution at the hands of the Assad regime, EU law may permit governments to decline to renew this status or to consider revoking it.

Guardrails around Return

Yet European states are likely to find it hard in practice to effectuate returns to Syria. Loss of status must be evaluated on an individual basis to ensure each individual’s circumstances would not constitute refoulement, which will take time. Moreover, a loss or change in status does not necessarily lead to return—voluntary or enforced. Governments may not be able to return Syrians due to conflict, other forms of persecution, or extreme povertywithin Syria, meaning that individuals who lose refugee status may still qualify for subsidiary protection or another status. Family unity, which is protected under the European Convention on Human Rights, may also prevent removals (for example, if one family member has long-term status or citizenship but others do not).

The situation of Syrians in neighboring countries is likely to be even more complicated. The least secure status is held by those living in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. The roughly 4.5 million Syrians living in these three countries either do not have a refugee status based in law or have one that can easily be revoked by a political determination. Critically, Turkey and Lebanon have forcibly returned Syrians in the past and may have even greater willingness to do so post-Assad.

Competing Incentives

But host countries may want to consider their own interests when contemplating returns. Given the length of time Syrians have been displaced, many have fully woven themselves into the fabric of their adopted communities. Among Syrians in Germany, for example, almost two-thirds of those employed work in occupations considered critical, such as health care, transportation, logistics, or food production. Many of these fields face significant labor force shortages.

Promoting large-scale returns to a post-conflict zone also runs the risk of destabilizing whatever Syrian governance structure emerges at a time when both Syria’s neighbors and governments in Europe have a keen interest in reducing tensions and potential for conflict in the Middle East. A push for rapid return is thus unlikely to be in anyone’s best interest.

Achieving a Win-Win for Syrians and their Hosts

While much of the decision-making regarding the future of Syria must be done by Syrians themselves, the international community, including states that are the primary hosts for Syrian refugees, has a critical opportunity to support the emergence of a safe and viable Syria that can facilitate the repatriation of all Syrians who want to return. In the migration realm, this includes making well thought-through policy decisions that balance Syrians’ desire to remain and to return.

First, host countries must recognize that the departure of Syrians is likely to be a long-term phenomenon. It took nearly ten years from the end of the Balkan conflict for half of the 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Bosnia and Herzegovina to return to their homes; it has similarly taken years for Ivoirian refugees to head back to Côte d’Ivoire, with some displaced in 2002 only returning in 2022. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in its most recent guidance, noted that Syria is not yet safe for return, and that repatriation should only occur once security, humanitarian, and societal challenges are addressed. States should be well aware of how long it will take for that to occur.

Host governments also need to reassure Syrians that there is stability in their status over the short term. While it is reasonable to suspend asylum adjudication until information about Syrian country conditions is updated—a step already happening across Europe—nebulous announcements that there soon will be a reconsideration of refugee status is unwise without context about its connection to return. This could set off unnecessary panic, with unintended consequences such as refugees deciding to withdraw from society and hide from authorities or choosing to move to another country where they think they may not be repatriated. Instead, if states are planning on revisiting status determinations, they should clearly outline what would happen to Syrians who lose their status, what the timeline for review would be, and what the criteria will be for enforced returns, if it comes to that. International guidelines can help states identify what information should be provided to potential returnees. It is also important that politicians not make promises to their populations that they cannot keep—if courts are likely to halt deportations to Syria, for example, then policymakers should not promise the contrary.

When returns do happen, countries of asylum will need to ensure that they are done in a way that enables returnees to reintegrate in a sustainable way. States may wish to consider allowing individuals returning to a post-conflict zone to make preparatory trips to Syria to check security conditions, secure housing, or find work. This facilitates a smoother transition. At present, however, some countries will cancel an individual’s refugee status if they return home for even a short visit, on the grounds that this disproves their fear of return. Instead, countries may want to consider how to allow for some level of circularity that allows for Syrians to move back and forth while preparing for return, with the understanding that these “go-and-see” visits may reinforce perceptions that Syria is not yet safe for return. Allowing for some level of circularity or facilitating expedited access to permanent residency would also give Syrians the ability to maintain socioeconomic links to asylum countries, while facilitating financial and knowledge transfer back to Syria.

Sustainable return is also enhanced by the provision of reintegration support, and donor states should consider givng this assistance not only to the Syrians they hosted but also those living in Syria’s neighbors. This can include individual assistance such as direct cash grants as well as community livelihoods initiatives that target both returnees and existing residents. In the future, broader capacity support for the Syrian government and its institutions to reconnect repatriates with national systems and social services, such as one-stop shops that bring together multiple ministries and agencies to support returnees, could also be useful. But this support must be robust and durable—a one-time 1,000-euro “return bonus” will not go far in helping Syrians reintegrate.

Finally, if host countries want return to be sustainable, they will need to make investments in the stability of Syria, including by continuing—and in fact increasing—their development support to Syria and its neighbors (as the European Union has already started to do). Syria needs significant infrastructure, governance, and public service support, contingent on the new government demonstrating an intent to govern fairly and inclusively, to stabilize the country and to make sure it is equipped to handle returns and reintegration. Similarly, Syria’s neighbors will continue to require support to maintain the refugee populations that will remain, either due to their fear of safety in Syria or unwillingness to return. There is also the likelihood that Turkey and Jordan, in particular, may serve as a temporary staging ground for displaced Syrians from other countries before they enter Syria, and as a result should receive donor state support for these transitional populations.

Whether and when Syria will be safe and desirable for voluntary repatriation remains to be seen. The most optimistic scenario is one where Syria has an inclusive, stable, democratically elected government. But countries of asylum need to prepare for less optimistic outcomes as well, which will preclude involuntary returns. By planning for both possibilities, countries of asylum will be best positioned to support the Syrians who wish to return and provide a safety net lest that prove impossible.