By Jesse Marks , Hardin Lang | May 2, 2025
Executive Summary
Syria’s transition has reached a moment of great fragility. The jubilation of Assad’s overthrow is still tangible. But the hard realities of the road ahead are now sharply in focus. The country’s ongoing humanitarian and displacement crisis continues to affect millions of Syrians. Large segments of the population remain abroad or subsist in internal displacement camps. The communities from which they fled remain devastated with few if any services.
For over a decade, the United States provided the bulk of the foreign assistance that served as a lifeline to millions of Syrians and helped stabilize communities across the country. Now, the Trump administration has largely cut that lifeline while keeping in place a punishing sanctions regime. Together, these policies threaten to upend Syria’s transition.
Across Syria, aid experts estimate that roughly $237 million in U.S. aid was cut, bringing humanitarian operations to a crawl. While the administration has reportedly moved to restore some of this funding, aid agencies have yet to receive new money and translate it into a resumption in programming. Medical systems are collapsing under fuel and medicine shortages. Food and water distributions have slowed or stopped entirely. Aid officials warn that the collapse in services could drive new waves of displacement across borders or force premature returns to destroyed and insecure areas.
Since December, the UN estimates that 1.4 million people out of an estimated 14 million displaced Syrians have returned to their areas of origin. This includes an estimated 1 million internally displaced people and 370,000 refugees from neighboring countries. Many found their homes in rubble and their communities gutted by years of war and economic collapse. Meanwhile, over 600 civilians have been killed by landmines and UXOs, many of whom were families attempting to return to their homes.
For those dispossessed by regime-linked demographic engineering, there are no viable mechanisms to reclaim land or property. As sectarian tensions persist, the risk of renewed conflict remains. With no credible framework for safe, voluntary return in place, the prospect of sustainable reintegration remains bleak.
Meanwhile Syria’s humanitarian coordination system is in flux. The interim government is piecing together an emerging national framework to guide aid efforts – at times leaning on policies instituted initially by the Assad regime. The United Nations is transitioning from a “Whole of Syria” model with delivery hubs both inside Syria and in neighboring countries to a cluster system run entirely out of Damascus. Finally, the NGO-led aid coordination mechanism in the northeast of the country has been largely defunded by U.S. aid cuts. The resulting situation is sidelining key actors and undermining efforts to deliver to communities in need.
Meanwhile, comprehensive U.S. sanctions remain in place, exacerbating economic distress, blocking recovery, and contributing to a worsening liquidity crisis. A more targeted approach is needed—one that distinguishes between punitive sanctions on individuals and broader country-level economic restrictions. Easing restrictions on humanitarian transactions, essential goods, and private-sector investment would reduce suffering and bolster U.S. standing. Sanctions relief, if carefully calibrated, could preserve U.S. leverage while offering a lifeline to a country on the brink—advancing both strategic and humanitarian goals. The European Union is already reassessing its sanctions framework to open space for engagement. Without a parallel shift in U.S. policy, American sanctions risk becoming the principal obstacle to international recovery efforts.