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The disastrous conflict in Sudan is pushing the country deeper into chaos. Work to halt it has never been more urgent. To get talks going, mediators may need to present a notional picture of what the post-war dispensation could look like.
What’s new? Sudan’s vicious civil war rages on, causing enormous human suffering, wiping away state institutions and exporting instability to an already troubled neighbourhood in the Horn of Africa.
Why did it happen? The main belligerents – the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces – came to blows in April 2023 amid a power struggle in Khartoum. Their war has since drawn in additional parties, as the principal players splinter and foreign countries ratchet up support for one side or the other.
What should be done? Although both the main parties have resisted peacemaking efforts, outside actors should keep working toward a ceasefire. They may need to tender a provisional vision for post-war governance that involves difficult compromises on national and military leadership, as well as decentralised authority, while preserving space for civilian party representation.
I.Overview
Attempts to halt Sudan’s disastrous war continue to sputter but have never been more urgent. The conflict, which erupted in Khartoum in April 2023 amid a power struggle within the military, has triggered the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, displacing nearly ten million people and pushing millions more into severe hunger. The Sudanese army, which holds itself out as sovereign, refused to attend August 2024 peace talks convened by the U.S. in Geneva. Its rival, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), controls large swathes of the country but struggles to govern them. Wartime atrocities lead many Sudanese to reject both main belligerents as future leaders. As multi-front fighting rages, Sudan is sinking deeper into chaos. Despite the obstacles, outside powers, notably Türkiye, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – with backing from Saudi Arabia and the U.S. – should lean on the parties to come back to the table and agree to a ceasefire. They may need to offer a notional picture of how government and military leadership roles will be allocated, and power split between the centre and periphery, in the post-war order.
After a year and a half of fighting, Sudan’s war has exacted a grim toll. Twenty-six million people – more than half the country’s pre-war population – are facing acute food shortages. Several urban centres, including much of the capital Khartoum, resemble wastelands. A prolonged siege in North Darfur’s largest city, El Fasher, has trapped more than a million civilians. Like Somalia, which fell apart in the 1990s, Sudan will export its problems to its neighbourhood and beyond, inviting external intervention, for years to come if the warring parties do not quiet their guns soon.
Left to their own devices, the two sides seem likely to keep shooting. Both have received copious amounts of foreign armaments, but neither has been able to deliver a knockout blow. Momentum has shifted a number of times. Prior to July 2024, when fighting slowed due to seasonal rains, the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, had the upper hand, having largely driven the army out of Khartoum and vast additional areas. Then, at the end of the rainy season, the Sudanese army launched offensives on several fronts, leaving the RSF on the back foot. In the first week of January, the army recaptured Wad Medani, capital of Gezira state, the country’s breadbasket, in one of its biggest victories to date. The war continues across much of the country, dragging in numerous other armed groups and local militias. Without either a clear victor or a peace deal, it could go on for years, which would be a catastrophe for the Sudanese people and a danger to the country’s neighbours.
Efforts to organise peace talks are faltering for several reasons, with key army commanders, including top leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, loath to meaningfully engage. Many of them still hope to regain control of Khartoum and compel the RSF to submit to the army’s authority. Burhan also rejects including the UAE, which heavily backs the RSF, in the peace process. A deal that bypasses Abu Dhabi looks unachievable, however, given the Gulf power’s direct involvement and regional influence.
The outside countries that have led or played a central role in ceasefire discussions should renew efforts to convene the parties for talks.
The outside countries that have led or played a central role in ceasefire discussions should renew efforts to convene the parties for talks (likely behind closed doors, at first, given the bad blood on all sides). Türkiye, which in December 2024 offered itself up as a mediator, appears for now well positioned to marshal talks. Both Abu Dhabi, which heavily supports the RSF (and should press it to engage), and the Sudanese army have accepted Ankara’s offer to mediate. Egypt, which backs the army, also has an essential role to play: it should rally behind the Turkish effort, as should the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
Getting the parties to the table is likely to require the mediators, currently led by Ankara, to offer a vision – in broad strokes, if need be – of how the country will be governed after the war ends. Much as Sudan’s citizens deserve to be rid of the army and RSF leaders, who have led the country into devastating conflict, these men will likely insist on arrangements that serve their interests. Ideally, they would step aside for the country’s sake, leaving negotiations to surrogates, but if not, the mediators will need to be pragmatic if they are to foster a deal that can stop the fighting. One way or another, there also needs to be room for civilians to gain representation in the post-war order, given how strongly Sudanese object to military domination, which, after all, has brought the country to this point.
Though there is little cause for optimism, perhaps the situation’s very bleakness offers some hope. All sides have reason to want the war to end. The RSF is bogged down on many fronts, with no path to outright victory and no ability to govern the territory it has captured. Moreover, it is reviled by many Sudanese, due to its wartime atrocities. The army, too, is widely reported to have committed serious abuses during the war. It will struggle to claw back legitimacy in RSF strongholds and many areas outside the riverine centre. On the battlefield, though the army is gaining, it is ceding more and more authority to the proxy militias and other allies it is relying on to fight. It will have difficulty recovering the whole of Khartoum, the prize at the country’s centre. Finally, though outside countries have divergent interests, the conflict parties’ biggest backers should also want to keep Sudan from splintering further. A quieting of the guns could preserve the chances of saving the Sudanese state while eliminating a source of regional instability and preventing greater human misery.