EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Almost a year after Sudan's government and one of three rebel factions signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), the humanitarian and security situation has deteriorated in the troubled western region of Sudan. Despite a recent lull, the post-DPA period has seen increased combat, including further government reliance on aerial bombardment and its allied Janjaweed militia. Civilian displacement continues while humanitarian space shrinks. If there is to be peace, the international community will need to coordinate better to surmount significant obstacles including Khartoum's pursuit of military victory and growing rebel divisions. Over the last year, the primary focus has been on overcoming resistance of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) to deployment of UN peacekeepers (or an AU/UN hybrid) so that civilians can be better protected; that remains essential but elusive, even after the NCP's 16 April acceptance of the UN heavy support package for the AU force, as does an effective ceasefire. Equally important, however, and the focus of this report, is revitalising the moribund peace process.
The DPA has failed because it did not adequately deal with key issues, too few of the insurgents signed it, and there has been little buy-in from Darfur society, which was not sufficiently represented in the negotiations. A lasting solution to the conflict can only come through a revised political agreement but there is no consensus on the way forward. In November 2006, after months of inaction, the AU and UN announced joint efforts to renew political talks between the government and the rebel factions that did not sign the DPA but there has been little progress, while concurrent initiatives by Eritrea, Libya, Egypt and others have created confusion.
Darfur is the epicentre of three overlapping circles of conflict. First and foremost, there is the four-year-old war between the Darfur rebel movements and the government, which is part of the breakdown between Sudan's centre - the NCP in Khartoum, which controls wealth and political power - and the marginalised peripheries. Secondly, the Darfur conflict has triggered a proxy war that Chad and Sudan are fighting by hosting and supporting the other's rebel groups. Finally, there are localised conflicts, primarily centred on land tensions between sedentary and nomadic tribes. The regime has manipulated these to win Arab support for its war against the mostly non-Arab rebels. International interests, not least the priority the U.S. has placed on regime assistance in its "war on terrorism" and China's investment in Sudan's oil sector, have added to the difficulty in resolving the conflict.
What happens in Darfur may well be decisive for Sudan as a whole, where calculations about its political future are affecting the preparations of all parties for the vital 2009 elections scheduled by the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The NCP insists, as it pursues its familiar divide-and-rule tactics, that the DPA remain the basis of any new talks and seems unwilling to consider more than a few small changes. The rebels demand the agreement be reopened, with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) calling for a radical restructuring of national governance as well. The major northern political opposition parties, which want a new national consensus on the country's direction, are trying to use the Darfur issue to isolate and pressure the NCP. The losers in the cacophony are Darfur's suffering civilians.
The haphazard, NCP-directed, Khartoum-centric effort to implement a fundamentally flawed DPA - most recently the formal launch of the new governing body for the region despite a lack of popular support - creates opportunities for confusion and conflict. The new peace talks that are necessary would be best served by freezing further efforts to apply the DPA's political and wealthsharing provisions. Likewise, the DPA's Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, a potentially important conflict-resolution mechanism, should not be discredited by attempting it now, as Khartoum urges, before the main flaws of the agreement are fixed.
The mediation team needs to engage in a carefully prepared process. Artificial deadlines weakened the DPA, and there must be realistic expectations this time about how long it will take. The mediators must take control of the process and design a framework for renewed talks that responds to the conflict's complex nature. Peace can be built on the constitutional framework established by the CPA, signed in 2005, but some CPA provisions - particularly on power sharing - need adjusting. The Darfur conflict increasingly undermines CPA implementation and the fragile relationship between the NCP and its minority partner, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Collapse of the CPA would lead the country to a new civil war. Regionally, there is need to integrate Eritrea's parallel initiative, while bringing Chad into the process to limit its capacity as a spoiler and encourage political resolution of its own internal conflict. The conference in Libya which ended on 29 April appears to have been a positive step towards a single, common approach.
To maximise prospects in a new round of negotiations the AU/UN mediation team should take a number of steps:
- Build international consensus on strategy,
particularly with the U.S. and China, to obtain leverage over the parties
to the conflict.
- Work to unify the rebel movements, helping
the political and field commanders develop a common negotiation agenda.
Earlier rushed attempts have led to further factionalisation and difficulties
in negotiations. International efforts need to be unified and supported.
Pressure will have to be brought to bear on intransigent movements and
their supporters, and on the NCP to halt military efforts to disrupt a
- Broaden participation by creating a
formal group of representatives from key Darfur constituencies left out
of past rounds, including Darfur's Arab tribes, IDP communities, women's
groups and civil society. This will facilitate wider buy-in to a new agreement
and positively impact the eventual Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.
- Restructure the mediation process along the lines of the model that produced the CPA, including by forming a limited contact group of international partners, made up of the U.S., China, the UK, France, Norway, the EU, the Arab League, Eritrea and Chad, to support the core mediation team.
For negotiations ultimately to succeed, however, a fundamental adjustment is required in the international approach to Khartoum. Effective pressure is essential on all sides to abandon attempts to achieve a military victory but the NCP regime in particular will continue to wage war and defy international demands as long as it fears no reprisal. Its analysis of costs and benefits can realistically be expected to change only if punitive multilateral measures are imposed or otherwise made unmistakably credible. A U.S.-China understanding is central to this, which in turn requires Beijing to recognise that its legitimate interests and investments in Sudan are threatened by the continuation of the Darfur crisis and its impact on the CPA.
To the African Union and United Nations Joint Mediation Team:
1. Build international consensus on a new political strategy, particularly with China and the U.S., in order to acquire the necessary leverage over the parties to the conflict.
2. Give rebel unification time to succeed before resuming negotiations and support the process by providing logistical aid, coordinating and streamlining the multiple unification efforts and pressing the NCP not to attack unification conferences.
3. Create a contact group for negotiations, consisting of the U.S., China, the UK, France, Norway, the EU, the Arab League, Eritrea and Chad, and a framework to incorporate the multiple initiatives, including Eritrea's.
4. Broaden participation in new talks by holding a forum or creating a reference group of constituencies not part of past negotiations, including representatives of Arab tribes, IDPs, women's groups and civil society.
5. Prioritise a functioning and inclusive ceasefire agreement at the beginning of the new negotiations, ideally to be monitored and supported by the AU/UN hybrid force in Darfur, as well as an eventual UN mission in eastern Chad and a UN observer mission in the Central African Republic (CAR).
6. Set a realistic timeframe for the negotiations and resist imposing unrealistic, external deadlines.
To the National Congress Party:
7. Pending new negotiations, freeze implementation of DPA-established bodies, including the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), the power- and wealth-sharing commissions and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, and treat political appointments for DPA signatories as provisional.
8. Focus on keeping the ceasefire and disarming the Janjaweed and allow rebel unification to proceed so as to facilitate negotiations.
To the SPLM:
9. Continue to help unify the Darfur rebel movements, in coordination with international initiatives.
10. Work with the NCP and the Darfur rebel movements to find common ground on a political solution and in particular show flexibility on necessary revisions of the CPA's power-sharing provisions.
To the DPA's Non-Signatories:
11. Prioritise unification of rebel factions and development of a common negotiating position and return all political leaders to Darfur to help bridge the divide with military wings of the movements.
12. Publicly reaffirm commitment to a comprehensive ceasefire, to a peaceful resolution of the Darfur conflict which does not necessitate regime change and to working with the AU/UN initiative, including the Salim/Eliasson team.
To the Member States of the African Union and United Nations:
13. Support the joint AU/UN mediation as the sole international forum for pursuing a peaceful Darfur settlement and promote a political dialogue process in Chad and the CAR that brings in all opposition groups.
To the U.S., China and Other Members of the UN Security Council:
14. Cooperate to develop consensus for a new political strategy including application of punitive measures against those responsible - whether the Sudanese government and its members or the rebel movements and their members - for obstructing the peace process and violating international humanitarian law, including targeted sanctions already authorised by the Council.
To the United Nations Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union:
15. Appoint immediately new Special Representatives to lead the missions in Sudan (UNMIS and AMIS).
Nairobi/Brussels, 30 April 2007