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Crisis Group’s Alan Boswell on this week’s Sudan conference in London
Despite tamped-down expectations, Tuesday’s Sudan conference in London was a jarring reality check. Like other forums before it that tried to gin up a more unified effort to address Sudan’s two-year-old civil war, the conference brought together a mix of mainly Western, Arab and African countries with stakes in the Sudanese war, as well as relevant multilateral institutions.
Unlike the preceding Paris conference on Sudan last year, which raised over €2 billion for Sudan, this one did not seek donor pledges (although the UK and the EU, a co-host, did announce new aid packages for Sudan). Nor did the conference produce a joint communiqué: negotiations broke down amid a squabble among Arab powers on opposing sides of the war, leading to a co-chairs’ statement instead. Efforts to form a new contact group also fell short. The only hope many officials could offer was the possibility that the paralysis itself could prove galvanising.
Negotiations over the draft communiqué proved revealing. Competing amendments to one sentence proved unbridgeable. Egypt and Saudi Arabia backed language that called for respecting state institutions, an implicit reference to the Sudanese army and de facto government on one side of the conflict. The UAE, which is the main patron of the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF), rejected that line and instead wanted stronger language calling for civilian governance.
That diplomatic tussle exposed the hard truth that this conflict, which started as a power struggle between the pillars of Sudan’s military junta, has now become a regionalised proxy war. It pits Egypt and a host of other countries that back the Sudanese army (which is also the UN-recognised government of Sudan) against the UAE’s backing of RSF. Saudi Arabia, officially neutral, is now also closely aligning with the Sudanese army.
These dynamics have undercut any attempts at reviving peace talks over the Sudanese army’s repeated refusal to negotiate with the RSF – which the army says would confer on the RSF unwarranted legitimacy. There have not been official direct talks between the warring parties since late 2023.
In today’s fragmenting world, it is unclear which country or institution could bridge the external divides now tearing Sudan apart. The few outside countries which may have sufficiently broad influence (like the U.S.) have not made ending the war a priority. Even if they did, success would not be guaranteed. A U.S. push to organise peace talks last year in Geneva flopped when the Sudanese army skipped the event. Crisis Group has suggested the war will only de-escalate when the UAE (as the RSF’s main backer) and Sudanese army reach some thaw. Several concerted backchannel attempts along those lines have failed. Such efforts must continue.
The UK deserves credit for spending its diplomatic capital toward refocusing efforts on ending Sudan’s war, despite the Sisyphean nature of the task. The fear is that the world will turn its back on the ugly war instead.