Attachments
In September 2024, South Sudan’s government postponed elections until 2026.1 This and other violations of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) reinforce the country’s deep divisions and continued, widespread violence.2 After a devastating civil war (2013-2018), politicians, generals, and communities have lacked a unifying identity or incentive and have focused on shoring up their political power, undermining their rivals, and diversifying their economic holdings. As South Sudan’s oil fields dry up, wealth and sustenance are carved out wherever they can be found, often violently.3 The central government in Juba deprives national institutions of funding, neither state nor rebel forces are committed to integrating into a unified military, and state officials at all levels exploit their positions to fund expensive lifestyles and large patronage networks.4 Politicians have long plundered South Sudan’s main source of wealth, its state-owned oil company, Nilepet, to fuel their wars and wealth, and the country remains economically destitute.5 Across South Sudan, violence has become more geographically dispersed as armed groups have fractured. Between 1 January 2013 and the signing of R-ARCSS on 12 September 2018, there were conflict events in 718 distinct locations, compared to 1,720 between 13 September 2018 and 17 January 2025 (see maps below). Given these realities, the peace process could hardly address South Sudan’s myriad, local-level contests over borders, resources, and political positions.