Attachments
Crisis Group’s Daniel Akech on stirrings of renewed civil war in South Sudan
The South Sudanese army recaptured the town of Nasir on 19 April, in a setback for the opposition militia that had seized it in early March, amid the first stirrings of renewed civil war. The opposition stronghold in eastern Upper Nile state fell without resistance in the aftermath of a major battle the previous week in Doma, in nearby Ulang county, which caused heavy casualties, including a reported death toll of hundreds altogether. Known as the White Army, the ethnic Nuer opposition militia has loose links to Riek Machar, a former rebel leader who is currently first vice president. The Ugandan air force, meanwhile, has backed South Sudanese government forces against the rebels. Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, is a firm ally of Machar’s foe, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir.
It is unclear for now whether the recapture of Nasir will bring an end to the surge in conflict in the Upper Nile, but chances are that more violence is on the way. The White Army appears to have pulled back rather than face another costly battle. It may simply be a matter of time before hostilities resume, with more White Army militias mobilising nearby, especially in the Fangak area of northern Jonglei state, where they have been fighting government forces south west of Upper Nile state’s capital, Malakal.
Rising violence in the Upper Nile appears to have helped push South Sudan’s chronically factious politics to the breaking point. Long-time rivals Kiir and Machar had previously plunged the country into civil war in 2013, before signing an agreement in 2018 to form a coalition government. In late March, as fighting was getting worse in the Upper Nile, Kiir arrested key opposition figures, invited the Ugandan military to deploy to South Sudan on his behalf, placed Machar under formal house arrest in Juba and launched new attacks on positions held by Machar’s allies in several spots around the country. The war in neighbouring Sudan could also exacerbate the conflict in the Upper Nile: while Kiir has a loose connection to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, the Sudanese army might reconnect with opposition groups in the Upper Nile that have acted as its proxies in the past.
Other parts of South Sudan are also being shaken by fresh unrest. Force alone is unlikely to enable Juba to extinguish these flare-ups of discontent. Nor can Kiir turn to the traditional playbook of paying off rivals, due to a fiscal crisis caused by the breakdown of South Sudan’s main oil export pipeline, a result of the fighting in Sudan. Costly military occupation of Nasir and Ulang, predominantly Nuer localities, will only deepen resentment. Meanwhile, Kiir has declined mediation offers from African partners, even blocking outsiders from speaking to Machar directly. South Sudanese elites widely talk of resurgent civil war, even as they debate what shape and form it might take.