Attachments
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2729 (2024), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to 30 April 2025 and requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the Mission’s mandate every 90 days. The report covers political and security developments, the humanitarian and human rights situation and progress towards the implementation of the Mission’s mandate between 16 July and 15 October 2024.
II. Political and economic developments
2. After participants in the High-level Mediation for South Sudan, known as the Tumaini Initiative, signed a set of protocols (the Tumaini Consensus) on 15 July, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) withdrew from the delegation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity to the initiative the following day, citing concerns that the talks in Nairobi had strayed from their intended purpose and were undermining the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan.
3. From 22 to 25 July, the Chief Mediator of the Tumaini Initiative, Lazarus Sumbeiywo, and the government delegation met with the presidency in Juba to discuss aligning the initiative with the Revitalized Agreement. On 13 August, a brief signed by all parties to the Revitalized Agreement was submitted to the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, declaring that the parties had agreed that the initiative should complement, not replace, the Revitalized Agreement.
4. From 12 to 15 August, consultative talks were held in Rome, facilitated by the Community of Sant’Egidio, with opposition leaders who had refused to join the talks in Nairobi, citing security concerns. These included the Commander of the National Salvation Front (NAS), Thomas Cirillo; the leader of the South Sudan National Movement for Change, Alex Yatta; and the leader of the National Democratic Movement-Patriotic Front, Emmanuel Ajawin. The faction subsequently announced that they would not join the Tumaini Initiative as it aimed at reviving the Revitalized Agreement, which they had never supported.
5. On 6 August, the Chair of the National Elections Commission announced that voter registration and other pre-election activities could not start unless the Government allocated additional funds, and noted that only a fraction of the funds had been received. Similarly, on 12 August, the Chair of the National Constitutional Review Commission noted little progress owing to the lack of funds.
6. On 14 August, the presidency deferred to the electoral and security bodies for technical advice on the feasibility of holding the elections and formulating a realistic election time frame and budget.
7. On 16 August, the High-Level Standing Committee met with the electoral and security institutions and requested those bodies to provide an update on the implementation of their respective mandates, including outstanding tasks, and the timeline and budget required to complete them. Reports were presented to the National Transitional Committee on 29 August. On 10 September, the High-Level Standing Committee consolidated the reports from the relevant institutions and signed the finalized document, which was submitted to the presidency.
8. On 3 September, the Board of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism noted receiving “anecdotal” records of the Necessary Unified Forces deployment; however, the numbers were not specified. As at 19 September, the deployment remained at eight battalions and was limited to the army.
9. On 13 September, based on recommendations of the report from the High-Level Standing Committee, the presidency announced a two-year extension to the transitional period of the Revitalized Agreement, with elections postponed to December 2026. The lack of funding was cited as the main reason for the delay in implementing the Revitalized Agreement.
10. On 18 September, the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, commended the parties to the Revitalized Agreement for arriving at the decision by consensus. On the same day, the embassies of Canada, France, Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and the European Union delegation in South Sudan expressed their disappointment with the extension. On 19 September, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and UNMISS issued a joint statement calling on the Government to renew momentum in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement. On the same day, the African Union Commission called for concrete steps towards the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and urged all stakeholders to work collaboratively towards delivering transparent and credible elections. On 23 September, the Executive Secretary of IGAD called for renewed efforts and the allocation of adequate resources to complete outstanding tasks within the extended period.
11. On 7 October, at the direction of the President to consider all Tumaini protocols, the High-Level Standing Committee initialled a document containing their assessment and recommendations on aligning the Tumaini Peace Initiative with the Revitalized Agreement. The Secretary of the Committee, Martin Elia Lomuro, said the report focused on recommendations drawn from the Tumaini process, mainly on the power-sharing protocols that contradict the Revitalized Agreement.
Other political developments
12. The Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly passed legislation on financial management and transitional justice. These included the National Bureau of Statistics Act 2018 (Amendment) Bill, 2024; the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Act 2012 (Amendment) Bill, 2024; the Pub and Disposal of Assets Act, 2024; the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission Bill, 2024; the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing Bill, 2024; and the Compensation and Reparation Authority Bill, 2024. It also ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. With regard to the National Security Act 2014 (Amendment) Bill, 2024, which retains contentious provisions that give the National Security Service powers of arrest, Mr. Kiir did not take action to withhold assent to the Bill, despite calls from some political parties, civil society and the international community. On 13 August, the spokesperson of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly said the Bill had taken effect.
13. During the period, Mr. Kiir made new appointments in key government positions, including the Minister for Presidential Affairs, the Deputy Minister for Interior, the Deputy Governor of Western Equatoria, the Governor of Warrap and the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau of the National Security Service, among others. Seven days after the initial appointment, Mr. Kiir revoked the appointment of Akol Koor Kuc to the governorship of Warrap. Mr. Kiir also rotated the Commander of the Presidential Guard, known as the Tiger Division.
Regional engagements and developments
14. As part of the efforts of South Sudan to restore peace and stability in the Sudan, on 18 July Mr. Kiir met with the Deputy Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo, in Juba. On 16 September, the Chair of the Transitional Sovereign Council of the Sudan and Head of the Sudanese Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, visited Juba for bilateral discussions, including on resuming oil exports from South Sudan.
15. On 24 July, Mr. Kiir visited South Africa to discuss with Mr. Ramaphosa the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, the Tumaini Initiative and bilateral relations. On 11 August in Kigali, Mr. Kiir attended the inauguration of Paul Kagame as the President of Rwanda following his re-election and discussed regional peace and stability as well as bilateral relations with him. On 26 August, Mr. Kiir travelled to Nairobi to attend the launch of the campaign of the former Prime Minister of Kenya, Raila Amolo Odinga, for the Chairpersonship of the African Union Commission.
16. From 1 to 8 September, Mr. Kiir attended the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing and held bilateral talks with the President of China, Xi Jinping.
17. On 17 September, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Djibouti, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, visited South Sudan to discuss issues affecting the region as well as bilateral relations.
18. On 14 October, Sudanese and South Sudanese government officials, after a meeting in Port Sudan, announced that the oil pipeline was repaired and technically ready for the resumption of oil exports from the Upper Nile oilfields.
Economic situation
19. During the reporting period, the South Sudan pound (SSP) remained unstable, fluctuating between SSP 5,000 to the United States dollar and SSP 4,000 to the dollar in the unofficial market owing to low foreign currency reserves held by the Bank of South Sudan. This was a continuation of the drastic decline since January, when the exchange rate was SSP 1,200 to the dollar, a depreciation of 258 per cent. The appreciation to SSP 4,000 to the dollar in September was attributed to interventions by the Bank. On 15 October, the official rate stood at SSP 2,954 to the dollar, leading to a gap of 46 per cent between the official and unofficial exchange rates
20. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, annual inflation continued to increase, reaching 107.3 per cent in July, compared with 1.6 per cent in July 2023. Food was less accessible, with prices for staple items like sorghum, wheat, oil and flour rising sharply. According to the Sustainable Development Report 2024, the cost of the minimum expenditure basket increased from SSP 122,235 in December 2023 to SSP 410,314 in September 2024. The proportion of the population living on the $2.15 per day increased from 41 per cent in 2011 to 79 per cent in 2024. This exacerbates gender inequality and women’s vulnerability to sexual and gender-based violence as a result of economic stress, limited access to resources and lack of support services.
21. On 25 September, the Minister for Finance and Planning presented the draft 2024/25 budget to the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly. Planned expenditure is SSP 4.2 trillion ($1,651 million) and revenue is projected at SSP 2.3 trillion ($893 million), resulting in a fiscal deficit of SSP 1.9 trillion ($758 million, or 46 per cent) with oil revenue reduced 70 per cent since the pipeline rupture. The draft budget prioritizes salary payments, agriculture and the provision of basic social services. Fiscal and monetary discipline will be required, including transparency in oil revenue and exchange rates