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South Sudan

Report of the Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Response to the Crisis in South Sudan

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Evaluation Summary

An Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) was conducted in South Sudan in April 2015 under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Transformative Agenda for the global reform of humanitarian action in large-scale emergencies. This was the first such evaluation of a response to a conflict situation and complex political emergency.

Widespread internal conflict in South Sudan began between rival government factions in December 2013. The conflict escalated rapidly as ethnic dimensions emerged and as the fighting spread geographically throughout the north-eastern states of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei. The situation has severely impacted the civilian population with the displacement of 1.5 million people.

A landlocked country in north-eastern Africa, South Sudan gained independence from the Sudan in 2011 following decades of civil war that cost 1 million lives and halted national development progress. Although South Sudan had been taking tentative steps towards stabilization and recovery prior to the onset of the current crisis, development indicators were among the worst in the world and in several states the proportion of children affected by acute malnutrition had reached emergency thresholds. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) remained in place due to sporadic local conflicts and remaining tensions with the Sudan.

Based on the standard terms of reference for the evaluation, a team of five evaluators was tasked with addressing the following four key questions:

  1. Did the inter-agency response meet the objectives set out in its strategic plans and were these objectives appropriate?

  2. To what extent were national and local stakeholders involved and their capacities strengthened through the response?

  3. Was the assistance well coordinated and did it successfully avoid duplication and fill gaps?

  4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance applied?

The main methodological tool employed was a common evaluation matrix designed to answer the four questions and related sub-questions and used by each of the evaluators as a guide and a means of recording evidence. Each team member was assigned an area of specialization to ensure that certain themes were covered in greater depth. Geographically, the evaluation team visited 6 out of the country’s 10 states, individually or in sub-teams of two. The specific locations were chosen to provide a broad cross-section of different situations, including one state that is relatively unaffected by direct conflict but where agencies are responding to chronic food insecurity within the overall response framework. Evaluation techniques included interviews with all stakeholders, including humanitarians, community members and other key informants, as well as examination of response data (especially cluster data), literature review, focus group discussions and direct observation. Accountability to Affected People (AAP), a major initiative under the Transformative Agenda, was a particular area of focus.

One major constraint was that two team members were in Upper Nile during a resurgence in the fighting there and effectively lost several days of field work due to security restrictions. Another was that a number of clusters could not provide adequate monitoring data for 2014. Overall, the lack of outcome data in certain sectors meant that the team was not always able to draw concrete conclusions regarding the achievements of the response. The magnitude of the South Sudan LevelThree (L3) Emergency response, which involved more than 150 agencies and a range of locations spread out across vast and remote areas, meant that the evaluation was necessarily broad and summative. Based on a limited, albeit triangulated, set of response activity snapshots, the evaluation also undoubtedly involves some bias. Considerable reliance was therefore placed on examining the response-wide data held within the clusters. This data turned out to be quite patchy in some cases, however, particularly for 2014.

Notwithstanding these constraints, the evaluation concluded that the main response objectives related to saving lives, providing protection and supporting livelihoods were appropriate and have generally been fulfilled. The evidence supports the claim that the response averted any major public health catastrophe, including famine. Working in collaboration with UNMISS, the HCT response reached 100,000 people with life-saving protection in Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites. Excellent and innovative work in support of livelihoods was conducted and will form a strong basis for future expansion in this sector. These achievements were made in a country that is notoriously challenging from a logistical point of view and where there were significant security risks. Strenuous fundraising efforts, led by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), raised US$1.27 billion in 2014, 70 per cent of the requested funds, which represents an excellent result relative to most other emergency appeals.

At the same time, the response was slow to deploy in the early months of 2014, which undoubtedly resulted in preventable deaths and suffering. Not enough attention was paid to the spirit of the humanitarian programme cycle (HPC). Response plans were written primarily as fundraising documents rather than as truly strategic documents against which progress could be measured and regular course corrections could be made. Complex and time-consuming coordination structures were present in Juba, but the coordination presence outside of the capital was very light. The severe shortage of experienced coordinators and leaders, especially outside of Juba, was the single biggest weakness in the response and had major side effects for programme coverage and quality.

Despite some excellent practices by a few agencies, the general level of AAP was disappointing and there was a lack of leadership in this area by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). National nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) could have played a greater role in the response. Although they cannot always match the technical standards and logistical capacity of international agencies, national NGOs bring a number of other important qualities, such as local knowledge, staying power and cost consciousness that will become increasingly attractive. The response took a balanced and appropriate approach to working with national and local authorities, seeking to collaborate and support those elements that demonstrated a commitment to humanitarian efforts and could put politics aside.

The Transformative Agenda has not had a major impact on the South Sudan response, and the evaluators see little value in maintaining the L3 status under current circumstances. The crisis is now clearly becoming protracted and therefore requires a complete review and revision of strategic purpose. The emergency is merging with the long-term pattern of conflict and underdevelopment in South Sudan and a key lesson has been that there is no clear choice between relief and development (or resilience, recovery, etc.). Inter-agency operations in South Sudan would benefit from a fresh paradigm that can nimbly move between these approaches. In any case, funding is already waning, so hard choices must be made in regards to the way forward. A proper strategic planning process should be initiated that includes more voices, particularly those of affected people, who largely survive by their own efforts and often have more insight than humanitarians realize. Investments in better analysis are also needed, especially in relation to food security and to boost sustainable logistics infrastructure and capacity.

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