Attachments
Letter dated 25 November 2024 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council
The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2731 (2024) have the honour to transmit herewith the interim report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2731 (2024). The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) on 1 November 2024 and was considered by the Committee on 14 November 2024. The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the interim report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.
(Signed) Michael Gibb Coordinator Panel of Experts on South Sudan
(Signed) Mayank Bubna Expert
(Signed) Thomas Dubois Expert
(Signed) Yury Vidakas Expert
(Signed) Valerie Yankey-Wayne Expert
Summary
South Sudan is one of the most food insecure countries in the world. Nearly three quarters of the population requires food assistance, while famine looms in several parts of the country. The conflict in the Sudan has forced more than 830,000 people to seek shelter in South Sudan and reduced the Government’s oil revenues by almost 70 per cent.
South Sudan leaders have struggled to manage and respond to these compounding crises, with the political process in Juba largely consumed by competition for power, positions and control of dwindling public resources. Unprecedented flooding has now submerged as much as 7 to 12 per cent of the country’s landmass, further impeding the humanitarian response.
On 13 September 2024, South Sudan leaders agreed to extend by a further two years the transitional period established by the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (peace agreement). Their consensual decision reflects continued space for political dialogue in Juba, but also an admission that too little of the peace agreement has been implemented to facilitate free and fair elections, and to set the stage for the next phase of the country’s development. In broader terms, it also reflects the fact that few of the security and political elites at the heart of the peace process have much to gain from bringing it to an end.
As the prospects for democratic elections recede for another two years, the power to appoint almost every position in the Government and security sector, as well as to allocate public resources, remains firmly in the hands of elites in Juba. The President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) party and the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), in particular, have effectively used this control to weaken their opponents by encouraging defections and continually reshuffling almost every institution of the State. For those outside of this system, there are fewer and fewer alternatives to joining it.
In Central Equatoria State, for example, the government has effectively fragmented the National Salvation Front by courting several high-profile defections. The result, however, has been an intensified conflict with the remaining elements of the group, as well as increased predation on the civilian population as multiple groups now seek to sustain their own independent operations.
Regional engagement remains critical to the South Sudanese peace process, and the Kenya-led Tumaini Initiative has offered some hope of brokering peace with a number of remaining opposition groups. Existing signatories to the 2018 peace agreement have, however, objected to the creation of any additional agreements or institutions for fear these will only complicate the already fraught implementation process.
The country’s borders have also been tested by regional instability, necessitating several high-level political interventions. A significant number of armed soldiers from the Uganda People’s Defence Forces have been identified in at least three South Sudanese states, in violation of the arms embargo, while members of the Sudan Rapid Support Forces have also crossed the South Sudan northern border.
For the majority of the population struggling to survive an acute humanitarian emergency, it remains unclear whether South Sudan leaders can use the next two years to achieve what they did not during the previous six.