Attachments
Summary
On 12 September 2018, Salva Kiir, the President of South Sudan, Riek Machar Teny, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition and other rebel factions signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. Hopes that the accord might mark a decisive step towards ending the five-year conflict in South Sudan are inevitably tempered by a legacy of broken ceasefires and failed agreements, which make clear the many challenges that lie ahead in carrying out an ambitious agreement negotiated far from the humanitarian crisis, violence and instability still prevailing across most of the country.
Foremost among those challenges is a profound deficit of trust among almost all of the signatories to the agreement, which will shape a transitional period in which even minor incidents have the potential to cascade and thus jeopardize the fragile truce. The implementation of the agreement’s security arrangements will — as in the past — be critical to the success of the agreement, as will efforts to restore the chain of command amidst a multiplying number of armed factions.
The ongoing fragmentation of armed groups is driven in part by disagreement and dissatisfaction with the high-level political negotiations and the resulting peace agreement. A concurrent erosion of the chain of command, especially in the gr eater Equatoria area, fuelled by local grievances and competition for resources, has already challenged the ceasefire on a number of occasions and may ultimately threaten the agreement itself.
This dynamic has continued to visit violence and humanitarian suffering upon the population of South Sudan. Working closely with counterparts within and outside of the United Nations system, the Panel of Experts on South Sudan observed alarming levels of sexual and gender-based violence, food insecurity and grave human rights abuses, including against children. The ongoing obstruction of humanitarian access has further exacerbated the crisis, while a nearly complete absence of accountability continues to drive cycles of violence, including that directed against humanitarian workers, civil society and journalists. An urgent need to demonstrate tangible impacts from the high-level political process will be central to the credibility and sustainability of any negotiated peace.
While many of the challenges that have undermined previous agreements remain, the regional context in which the agreement will be implemented differs markedly. Sudanese and Ugandan leadership has emerged, supplementing that of Ethiopia, within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development framework, with negotiations taking place against the backdrop of improving regional relations. This has already resulted in increased regional political and security backing for the agreement, while also entrenching the parties’ economic interests in South Sudan in ways that may continue to shape the country’s political and economic landscape for years to come.
Competition for the country’s natural resources is still central to the conflict dynamic at both the local and national levels. Oil remains the dominant source of government revenue, although local competition for access to resources, including gold, hardwood and charcoal, also motivate armed confrontations that can assume national significance given the fragile political and security environme nt. The Panel detailed cases in which armed groups have profited from teak in both Western and Central Equatoria. Resources, in particular oil, are also increasingly relevant to the regional dynamic, with an increasing number of international companies ent ering the sector and a new cooperation agreement bringing Sudanese security forces to help secure and restore production in the Unity oilfields.
In adopting resolution 2428 (2018), the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the entire territory of South Sudan, while detailing exemptions to the ban in paragraph 5. Increased regional security backing for the peace agreement led the Panel to identify a number of violations of the embargo during the rep orting period. The Panel noted repeated violations of the travel ban by several designated individuals and continued to seek the cooperation of regional States and commercial banks to monitor the implementation of the asset freeze.
The present interim report describes the Panel’s findings from the first seven weeks of its work, completed in September and October 2018. The reporting period is considerably shorter than that covered in previous interim reports owing to the 45 -day mandate established in resolution 2418 (2018), delaying the start of the 2018/19 mandate while leaving the reporting timelines unchanged from the 2017/18 mandate. As a consequence, the Panel by necessity sought to identify, corrobor ate and report key trends and case studies rather than attempting to carry out a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of its mandate. It will continue to pursue the full implementation of its mandate as defined in the resolution prior to submitting its final report to the Security Council, which is due by 1 May 2019.