This research was conducted by Irina Mosel and Prof. Dr Leben Nelson Moro with support of the Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (CSRF) colleagues.
Executive Summary
Since fighting flared up in Sudan in April 2023, an estimated 8.2 million Sudanese have been forcibly displaced, out of which 1.7 million are hosted by neighbouring countries, including 588,711 people by South Sudan. At the same time, an estimated 997,743 ‘spontaneous’ returnees have come back from neighbouring countries to South Sudan between 2018 and September 2023 and significant numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (1,696,633) have also returned from within South Sudan. While the number of ‘returns’ has grown, an estimated 2,027,331 people remain internally displaced within South Sudan and 2,220,551 South Sudanese refugees remain displaced within the wider region.
People fleeing the war in Sudan or returning to South Sudan from neighbouring countries are arriving in South Sudan at a challenging time. Key aspects of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which was signed in 2018, have not yet been implemented, amidst pervasive violent conflicts at the local or subnational levels over land and other issues, a steep depreciation of the national currency and skyrocketing prices, continuous flooding and other climatic shocks as well as pervasive food insecurity across many areas of the country. At the same time, donor funding has been drastically cut and the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) is only 17% funded.
This research aims to provide actors across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors and donors, with a stronger understanding of the risks and opportunities associated with ‘returns’ and ‘integration’ in South Sudan, as well as highlight opportunities for conflict-sensitive (re)integration and early solutions activities. The research also highlights key lessons learned from previous returns and reintegration experiences that can inform current approaches.
Officially, ‘returns’ to South Sudan from a third country are not yet supported by the international community, as conditions in return locations are still deemed unfavourable for returns. At the same time, organisations and the government are currently responding to an emergency influx of people (from Sudan) as if it was partly a ‘return’ movement; yet, many of the building blocks that a successful return and (re)integration approach would entail are not yet in place. As a result, many people are partially supported as ‘returnees’, based on certain assumptions about ongoing connections to kinship networks and Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) in their ‘home’ areas. However, this focus on ‘returns’ without the corresponding reintegration and early solutions support risks not only increasing individual vulnerabilities but also drawing entire hosting communities into crisis conditions.
Key lessons from previous returns around how (re)integration – including urban (re)integration – programming could and needs to be concurrently initiated and support the absorptive capacity of communities in a conflict-sensitive way have not yet been applied. Current durable solutions initiatives are plentiful, however, these seem to not yet have been sufficiently connected to the current emergency response and are operating in parallel, often under different coordination structures. Due to lack of funding, ongoing initiatives are still largely concerned with previous groups of IDPs displaced by the 2013 and 2016 violence, as well as large numbers of vulnerable host communities, and have been unable to expand to include the significant numbers of new arrivals from Sudan and elsewhere into ongoing programming.
There are real risks with the current assistance model, which focuses on cash or food assistance at the point of departure and transportation support only, including that people will disappear into communities and will only be picked up by the humanitarian ‘system’ if there are large numbers of people returning to one place or if their area deteriorates to significant food insecurity. This is partly due to serious coordination challenges, massive funding cuts and a difficult operating environment that makes tracking people’s movements and widespread aid actor presence extremely challenging. The currently very limited support beyond transportation and initial food/cash assistance will likely result in those already vulnerable deteriorating significantly, while others, including vulnerable communities that are hosting returnees risk becoming future humanitarian caseloads due to increasing food insecurity.
Much of the reintegration burden falls on so called ‘host’ communities who themselves are extremely vulnerable, and often have a similar, and very recent history of displacement. They are forced to share the very limited food and existing services with the new arrivals, putting a huge burden on what are already very strained resources. At the same time, selection approaches – despite being needs-based – continue to single out particular groups of people for assistance rather than employing creative methods that can support whole communities to increase their absorptive capacity, while preserving important kinship and social assistance networks. This is already creating potential for conflict in many areas; yet, as resources shrink and areas become more and more food insecure, conflicts will likely be exacerbated even more. Categories such as ‘IDPs’, ‘returnees’ ‘refugees’ have long been criticised for not adequately reflecting people’s lived experiences. But they especially do not work in contexts like South Sudan with an omnipresent history of displacement across the different population groups. Individual or category-based selection in this context risks putting further strain on social relations and undermining people’s tenuous support networks that are often based on sharing and reciprocity between different members.
Increasing urbanisation trends will inevitably bring an expansion of informal or slum settlements that are not currently sufficiently in the focus of the response nor of ongoing solutions initiatives. Within towns, many people are joining relatives in the former Protection of Civilians (PoC) camps or other displacement sites, as they have nowhere else to go or land is unavailable in the town. However, in many of these sites humanitarian assistance has drastically reduced, meaning returnees are joining already overcrowded and volatile environments with significant food insecurity, and criminality. Youth gangs – though by no means new to South Sudan – are becoming an increasing problem not only in the former Protection of Civilian Sites (PoCs) but across many South Sudanese towns. There are indications that disillusioned youth in South Sudan are being joined by newcomers from Sudan, Uganda and elsewhere who are equally desperate.
Land unsurprisingly emerged as the key conflict issue and issue that is affecting returnees, IDPs and hosts alike. Conflict over land is not only happening at the individual level – over multiple allocation of land titles and land grabbing – but also among and between communities at the payam, county and state levels, as well as between South Sudan and its neighbours in numerous locations. Malakal town in particular is a complicated and potentially explosive set-up where multiple groups are claiming ownership rights, yet, one of these ethnic groups – the Shilluk – have not yet returned.
The durable solutions architecture is fractured and lacking a joint coordination space for exchange and critical thinking. While the national durable solutions architecture is not yet in place at the state level, area-based leadership coordinators are working on state-level roadmaps for solutions, though it is unclear how these will be connected to the national level, and, more crucially, donors or government planning and financing.