Attachments
Executive Summary
Ever more frequent and severe droughts and floods are killing and displacing people in Somalia, with important implications for the conflict between the government and the Islamist insurgency Al-Shabaab. Amid the country’s devastating drought from 2020 to 2023, Al-Shabaab imposed harsh constraints on aid to areas under its control - and deliberately destroyed water infrastructure - stirring clan resentment. Outrage at the group’s actions helped drive a military campaign, beginning in 2022, that pushed the insurgents out of parts of central Somalia. That offensive has since stalled, however, leaving Al-Shabaab in charge of swathes of territory. Meanwhile, the country is struggling to get the funds and technical support it needs to prepare for weather shocks, water shortages and the like. With donor backing, the government should redouble efforts to strengthen the country’s climate resilience, provide services and water infrastructure in recaptured territory, and, where necessary, reconsider its ban on contact with Al-Shabaab so that communities can negotiate access to humanitarian relief and reliable water supply.
Somalia is among the countries most vulnerable to climate change in the world. Serious weather shocks are hitting more often, harming livelihoods and economic growth. The 2020-2023 drought and later flooding highlighted the plight of millions of Somalis who rely on seasonal rains to grow crops or raise cattle. In the years to come, Somalis will continue to battle rising temperatures, erratic precipitation and biodiversity loss linked to climate change and deforestation.
Neither drought nor climate change created Al-Shabaab or caused Somalia’s instability, but both are now reshaping the conflict. From its origins as the enforcement wing of the Islamic Courts Union, a group of clerics who brought relative order to much of south-central Somalia after the central state collapsed in 1991, Al-Shabaab has positioned itself as an insurgency and the de facto governing authority in areas under its control. Over the years, overstretched Somali and partner forces have hunkered down in urban locales, while Al-Shabaab has established firm footholds in rural areas, above all in the south and centre of the country, where it has staged attacks on African Union forces, Somali troops and public officials.
As these rural areas succumb to the effects of climate change, Al-Shabaab has sought to capitalise on droughts by using access to water as a means of putting pressure on local people. But recent events have shown that this strategy can backfire. Frustration with Al-Shabaab’s demands for money and recruits, as well as its violent collective punishment for non-compliance during the drought, fuelled an uprising by clan militias, with which the Somali federal government allied to launch an offensive in August 2022. A number of desperate residents fled areas under Al-Shabaab’s control, bringing the group into discredit, causing its revenues to fall and heightening its exposure to attack from land and air. In response to the uprising, Al-Shabaab has made half-hearted efforts to deal with the harmful effects of climate change, on occasion building water infrastructure in a bid to curb local discontent. It has also taken rudimentary measures to protect the environment, like digging irrigation canals and reservoirs, banning logging and planting trees.
Despite initial gains, the offensive has been disappointing. The federal government is struggling to persuade locals in areas recaptured from Al-Shabaab that it can serve them better. With the help of international partners, it will have to step up local service delivery and look for ways to curb Al-Shabaab attacks, especially those on supply routes for humanitarian aid.
Mogadishu should do more to build resilience to extreme weather throughout the country.
While it does so, Mogadishu should do more to build resilience to extreme weather throughout the country. Somalia sorely needs adaptation measures such as sand dams, solar-powered irrigation and flood defences to reduce its climate vulnerability and improve the lives of its people, whose incomes mostly rely on agriculture or pastoralism. Ensuring that aid, basic services and support for climate adaptation measures reaches all Somalis amid conflict is no easy matter. But the government has signalled its interest in building climate resilience, and initial funding has been secured. In October, the Green Climate Fund approved a $95 million project for Somalia that, among other things, aims to revitalise degraded land and rebuild water infrastructure. It will also allow the Somali government to show prospective donors that its efforts to cope with future weather shocks are serious. Its reputation may well be on the line. Ranked among the world’s most corrupt countries, Somalia is dogged by perceptions of widespread graft.
Getting investment into areas controlled by Al-Shabaab will pose some of the hardest dilemmas. In those parts of Somalia likely to remain under the militants’ rule for the time being, the government should allow community leaders to engage with Al-Shabaab before and after extreme weather events or, at the very least, refrain from interfering with them. At present, elders may face arrest for meeting or signing agreements with Al-Shabaab. Even so, some Somali communities have negotiated access to water or pressed militants into lifting blockades, with local NGOs or private contractors stepping in to provide essential services. Without a doubt, there are dangers in local dialogue with Al-Shabaab, which has repeatedly destroyed basic infrastructure and provides no guarantees that it will honour any agreement. But even if negotiations under these conditions are far from ideal, they may nevertheless be one of the few options communities have for securing aid and preparing for future climate shocks.
Should the government choose to engage with Al-Shabaab in the future, the sides might also find common ground in attempts to alleviate climate stresses. By putting the emphasis squarely on delivering vital services like water, even in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, the government could show that its priority is meeting Somali citizens’ needs. It could build trust with militants and pave the way for including climate policies on the agenda of dialogue seeking an end to the conflict.
If the sides agree to a political settlement, or even if Mogadishu weakens Al-Shabaab to the point of irrelevance, the problem of climate change will persist. Fresh emergencies could arise that other non-state armed groups may seek to exploit. Fighting climate change in Somalia is fraught with challenges stemming from conflict, disputed territorial control, scarce resources and corruption. Addressing the Somali people’s needs in the face of an often cruel climate will not only alleviate hardship but also weaken the sway of Al-Shabaab or other threats to the state.