Report Authors
Sonnia-Magba Bu-Buakei Jabbi and Salia Kpaka
(Extract)
2. Executive Summary
Sierra Leone is a small West African country endowed with substantial mineral, marine and natural resources that, properly utilized, could have provided its four to five million citizens with one of the highest standards of living in the world. Due to more than four decades of over-centralized power, institutionalized corruption, mismanagement of resources and the marginalization of a large proportion of its population from the decision-making process, this potentially rich country not only became extremely poor but literally ceased to function. It became what is referred to as a 'failed state'.
The country experienced the highest child mortality rate in the world. More women died at childbirth than anywhere in the world. Life expectancy fell as low as thirtyseven years. Despite being the first country in sub-Saharan Africa with a university and schools for both boys and girls, the literacy rate fell as low as fifteen per cent, the lowest in the world. By 1991, when civil war broke out, corruption had become so massive and institutionalized that the state had ceased to function and perform even its most basic functions.
In addition to the atrocities and destruction committed by the rebels, twelve years of civil war in Sierra Leone brought international criminal syndicates into our already corrupt society in pursuit of diamonds. The arrival of these syndicates fuelled, prolonged and intensified the war. Diamonds were exchanged for arms and ammunition, leading to what became known as 'blood' or 'conflict' diamonds. It took a global campaign by regional and global agencies, donors, international and national NGOs, and Sierra Leonean civil society to bring an end to the war in Sierra Leone and create sanctions against blood diamonds.
Reconstructing post-conflict Sierra Leone was a huge challenge: we had to rebuild an entire state. First, we realized that reconstruction had to deal with much more than just physical infrastructure and include the institutional reconstruction of the police, army, judiciary, public service and parliament. In assessing the institutions and structures that were needed for a functioning state, it was discovered that we did not meet the requirements of the standard post-conflict menu. Old systems had to be overhauled. Some old structures and institutions had to be reformed and, in some extreme cases, new ones created. We had massive bilateral donor support from the British government, who signed a ten-year memorandum of understanding and support with the government of Sierra Leone. There were other bilateral donors, including various European governments, the United States, Japan and China, and multilateral donors included the World Bank, UNDP, IMF, EU, African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank.
Moreover, the issue of corruption had to be dealt with. Massive corruption was one of the causes of this bitter conflict. For Sierra Leone not to revert back to war, we had to deal with institutionalized corruption. In addition, the fact that the entire government machinery had ceased to function for more than a decade meant opportunities had been created for things to be done in unaccountable and non-transparent ways. This had to be stopped and the right systems and procedures put in place.
The creation of a large UN peacekeeping force and the presence of hundreds of British Rapid Response Royal Marines provided the country with security forces at a very critical time. The British government took the lead in the reconstruction of most of the institutions of democracy and governance: reform of the public service, police, military, legal system, judiciary and the economy. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and the country's reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement process was led by the World Bank and supported by other partners. UNDP led the National Recovery process.
New structures and institutions like the National Security Agency, the Anti- Corruption Commission and the Ombudsman Office were created and supported by the British government. Expatriate staff were recruited to provide the required leadership or technical support to some of these institutions. British heads of the police and Accounting General Office were appointed. Many British military officers were appointed as technical advisors to the Sierra Leonean army. British intelligence officers were recruited to provide initial capacity and set up the National Security Agency's office. A British three star general was appointed Military Advisor to the President. The number two in the Anti-Corruption Commission was a British national.
Dealing with the emergency and humanitarian crisis was the biggest task we faced during and after the war, and this involved rebuilding the physical, social and financial structures of the entire country, bringing back and resettling refugees, and returning internally displaced citizens to their communities of origin. To address these problems and manage the process, the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation was created with support and assistance from the World Bank. After three years in operation its name and mandate was changed to the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA). This transformation from an ordinary commission to a social fund was intended to consolidate peace, bridge the gap between relief and development, and establish an institution that would become the driving force of development. The NACSA, unlike its earlier incarnation, deals directly with communities, focusing more on community participation and ownership, using specialist NGOs to provide substantial capacity building for communities.
The National Consultative Forum was then created for all stakeholders involved in the humanitarian and relief phase as well as post-war reconstruction. This became a clearing-house for who does what, when, how and where. It included the government, line ministries, national NGOs, civil society, police, military, humanitarian agencies, UN, World Bank and bilateral donors. It coordinated NGO activities, heard reports on health, education, water, sanitation, agriculture etc, and identified the purpose, coverage and depth of assistance needed across the country. Civil society groups were given the opportunity to ask questions, raise concerns and seek answers.
This process was replicated at the district level in interagency meetings. The Commissioner chaired meetings at the national level attended by the heads of all organizations operating in Sierra Leone. The Resident Coordinators of the Commission chaired district level meetings, which were also attended by district heads of agencies. These meetings helped avoid duplication of efforts and control wastage. It met once at week early in the emergency phase. This rate was reduced to once every fortnight when the situation improved and it now meets once a month.
Technical committees for each of the sectors were created for quality control, to agree on standards and design, and to ensure that the right types of materials were used. Staff took part in desk reviews, field appraisals, environmental impact assessment and general inspection. These are ad hoc committees put together only when required. They are a back-up to the Commission's in-house technical expertise, hired and paid for by the World Bank. The line ministries had been asked earlier in the process to submit standard required structures and designs for classrooms, health clinics, local courts and markets etc. Each structure reconstructed by contractors or implementing partners had to meet these accepted and standardized conditions agreed earlier on; the technical committees were created to ensure this was done.
Appraisal Committees Comprising the Anti-Corruption Commission, district recovery committees, line ministries, local government, NGOs, and other civil society actors are now being set up to look at the appropriateness of projects in addressing the needs of the community. The Appraisal Committees also assess whether the proposed project addresses poverty alleviation and environmental impact. Approval of projects below Le25 million (US $10,500) takes place at the regional level by the Appraisal Committees. Any amount above this - to a maximum of US $75,000 - has to be approved at the national level by a committee chaired by the Deputy Commissioner, comprising the Ministry of Development, local government, sectoral ministries and the FMPU. Any amount over US $75,000 also needs World Bank approval.
At the launch of the project the entire community must be informed of the total cost and the breakdown provided. The project's management committee must meet regularly and minutes of meetings must be sent to the community field staff of the NACSA, which monitors the progress of the projects. The NACSA created an internal Monitoring and Evaluation Unit that deals with physical checks on the projects, and verifies whether indicators stated on the project proposal are being met. This is normally followed by a line ministry evaluation visit for final inspection of the finished projects. After completing a project, the implementing partner or the contractor submits a project completion form that must be counter-signed by the community and sent to the NACSA, with a final financial report to the FMPU before closure of the project is authorized. Communities appoint their own contractors.
A National Recovery Strategy paper for Sierra Leone was prepared in 2001 with UNDP support. This provided an in-depth assessment of the total recovery needs of the entire country in all sectors. A National Recovery Committee was created, chaired by the Vice-President with representatives from all the ministries and heads of UN agencies involved in the reconstruction process as well as the NACSA Commissioner. They meet regularly to determine the progress of post-war recovery. A National Recovery Technical Committee was also created for the implementation process, and is chaired by the NACSA Commissioner and the Minister of Development. Recovery Committees have been created at district levels to guide, assist and address the recovery and reconstruction needs of each of the twelve administrative districts of Sierra Leone. They are also part of the Appraisal Committees at district and regional levels.
Under the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, community projects were identified, discussed and agreed by NGOs and communities. The Commission also had field staff across the country as well as various project managers in all twelve districts. Proposals were then submitted by NGOs on behalf of the communities. After processing the proposal, the Commission would give approval and resources were provided directly to the NGO and, in some cases, a contractor. There were instances when some of these projects were not discussed and approved by the communities or even implemented by NGOs. This led to the creation of thousands of local NGOs. Various corrupt practices were discovered and the implementation strategy was then changed to direct community financing.