Report Author
Kosovar Stability Initiative (IKS)
(Extract)
2. Executive Summary
In order to evaluate the success of the Kosovo National Integrity System (NIS), this survey refers to two basic criteria. The first one being the extent to which an institution was able to fulfil its overall mission, thus contributing positively to the overall integrity of the Kosovo's NIS. The second one looks more closely into how much each pillar was directly involved in fighting inefficiencies and corruption. In terms of the timescale considered, the study examines both the process of (re)constructing the institutions - and the role of the local and international actors involved - as well as their performance today, seven years after the end of the war.
Based on the above criteria, this report argues that the Media is the strongest pillar in Kosovo's NIS today. The print media have been a particularly active, vocal and dynamic body, representing a variety of views and holding different positions on Kosovo's political spectrum. They have also been one of the most persistent pillars in terms of reporting on and against corruption and other inefficiencies in the public and private sectors in Kosovo.
The Electoral Commission, the Office of the Auditor General, the Ombudsperson and the Police have also been relatively successful pillars from the point of view of their legal mandates and missions. However, this survey finds that their effectiveness in practice is limited because they are dependent on the functioning of other institutions, particularly the justice system.
In fact, this survey found that the Judiciary is the weakest link in the Kosovo NIS, which greatly undermines the work and coherence of the rest of the system. As this survey will argue, a dysfunctional judicial system - at best - renders the work of other institutions futile, such as is the case with the Auditor General in Kosovo. At worst, it facilitates the emergence of corruption by not keeping other important institutions, such as the Executive, in check.
The Legislature and the Executive themselves have also been relatively weak pillars of the Kosovo NIS. Closely influenced by party political dynamics and interests, these institutions have been weak in combating corruption and other inefficiencies within. Furthermore, in spite of their central position in the NIS, they have contributed little to fostering integrity in the other governmental institutions.
In short, this survey suggests that the Kosovo NIS is dysfunctional in two senses. First, while there has been some significant progress in developing a modern anticorruption legislative framework, the application of the law is often found wanting in practice. Second, the Kosovo NIS is dysfunctional also in the sense that the inefficiencies of some of its most crucial pillars continuously undermine the effectiveness of otherwise successful pillars. Thus, the main lesson emerging from the Kosovo example for future international involvements in post-war countries is that building a strong and effective judiciary from the beginning of the reconstruction process is crucial for ensuring a successful and self-sustainable NIS.