In a recent interview, Deputy Defense Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz said he believes that peace operations in the Balkans can
provide lessons applicable to Iraq on post-conflict reconstruction and
security and the transition to democracy. If that is indeed the case, then
the decision of the Defense Department to close the only part of the U.S.
military devoted to learning lessons from previous peace operations seems
an odd action to take.
In late February 2002, RI learned that
the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) in Carlisle, PA, might be closed
as part of the Army Transformation process. The PKI was created in July
1993 to guide the Army's thinking on how to conduct peacekeeping, to analyze
the strengths and weaknesses of specific missions, and to promote Army
exchanges with international organizations involved in peace operations.
It was the only center in the U.S. military dedicated to building knowledge
of peace operations.
During March 2002, working with other organizations through the Partnership for Effective Peace Operations (PEP) policy working group and Members of Congress, RI made the case to the Bush administration and Army officials that the PKI should not be closed. RI President Ken Bacon, in a letter to Secretary of the Army White, said the institute's work had contributed to the success of peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo by making the Army better prepared for the missions. "Since its establishment, PKI has maintained an outstanding reputation among U.S. allies, the United Nations secretariat and within the U.S. government. Eliminating this function would be a setback in U.S. foreign policy. It would send a clear message that the U.S. has disengaged from peace operations," read a statement from the PEP.
The efforts to stop the closure of the PKI failed. In late May 2002, according to the PKI's director, the decision was made to close the PKI and transfer its functions to the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth. The PKI was expected to remain functioning until September 2003, at which point all functions would be transferred.
In April 2003, as the world watched, U.S. Marines stood by while looters rampaged through the streets of Baghdad, demolishing government offices and destroying valuable records that could have helped locate illegal weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear sites were also looted, leaving materials unaccounted for and endangering Iraqis as waste containers were used for drinking water. Hospitals and schools were ransacked of supplies, severely hampering the efforts of coalition forces and greatly adding to post-war costs.
Just as RI and many other organizations predicted, the Pentagon's refusal to properly plan for post-war Iraq created serious problems. Electricity supply is worse than before the war. Food and water distribution remains disrupted, in large part because of looting and lawlessness. Hospitals are unable to provide basic services due to lack of equipment and personnel. Ordinary Iraqis may be in their homes rather than in refugee camps, but everyday life is nonetheless horrible. While Saddam Hussein is responsible for the overall deterioration of Iraqi infrastructure, the inadequacy of the U.S. military's post-conflict planning has placed Iraqi civilians further at risk.
In this context, the decision to close the PKI is even more problematic. The Pentagon, however, is having no second thoughts. Indeed, a spokesman for the Center for Army Lessons Learned has said that it has no plans to accept the PKI's charge. "I can tell you that no functions from the Peacekeeping Institute are being transferred to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, nor are they being transferred to TRADOC [the Army's Training and Doctrine Command]," said spokesman Harvey Perritt. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also supports the closure of PKI, according to Lt. Col. Gary Keck, a Pentagon spokesman, making it clear the responsibility for this problem rests at the top.
The PKI was the only center in the U.S. dedicated to producing military doctrine regarding peace operations, including political-military coordination and the post-conflict handover to civilians. These are issues confronting the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan today. According to a recent Washington Post article, a U.S. military official in Iraq stated, "We're making it up with both hands. This isn't the operational climate we expected. We never expected such widespread looting, or such a general collapse of authority." The PKI was established precisely so that the military did not need to make it up, and would not be surprised by an operational climate that is strikingly similar to many other post-conflict situations the U.S. has confronted during the past 20 years.
The PKI advocated for closer international cooperation regarding peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction. As the U.S. seeks to secure commitments from allies for assistance with peacekeeping in Iraq, many of those allies are concerned the U.S. is dismissing peace operations. Success in Kosovo and East Timor has come from the lessons learned during failures in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and Cambodia, to name just a few. For the U.S. military, on the front lines of any post-conflict situation, the PKI has been a critical part of learning those lessons for success.
Refugees International, therefore, recommends that:
- President Bush reverse the decision
to close the Army Peacekeeping Institute.
- Members of Congress should insist that the U.S. military not only reconstitute the functions provided by the Peacekeeping Institute, but also expand its mandate to include other military branches and other agencies of the U.S. government.
Peter Gantz is Peacekeeping Associate for Refugees International.
REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL
1705 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
202.828.0110
202.828.0819 fax
RI@REFINTL.ORG
www.refintl.org