FEWER policy brief: Situation in Chechnya Feb-Apr 2001

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Russian authorities and Chechen armed groups are both dissatisfied with hostilities simmering at a relatively low-level, with no tangible gains on either side. On the one hand, federal authorities appear to be strongly motivated to change the course of the guerrilla war by neutralising key Chechen field commanders, initiating the decommissioning of weapons, building a fully controlled system of power in Chechnya, and implementing popular social and economic reconstruction measures. On the other, forces controlled by Aslan Maskhadov may intensify hostilities to prove that they still have military power, popular support and material resources. Maskhadov will aim to renew the public acclaim he has received as a military leader and further consolidate the Chechen armed groups. These groups will be able to operate in the mountains and forests over the spring and summer, thus greatly facilitating continued resistance to federal troops and conducting acts of terror against pro-Moscow officials.

The situation in Chechnya is likely to worsen in the coming three months. Unless all groups seek an earliest possible political settlement, the conflict may re-escalate, leading to increased casualties, massive human rights violations and possible spillover effects.

KEY INDICATORS

INTERNAL FACTORS

Suffering and mass fatigue. Frustration in Chechnya is fuelled through continuing abuses of the population by both parties to the conflict. Human rights monitors estimate the number of disappearances to be between 9,000-10,000. Further, research indicates that over 90% of men are unemployed, suffer from chronic stress and post-war trauma. One-third of funds allocated for housing reconstruction is spent to maintain a minimum level of security and to help finance local policing groups in affected communities.

• The population is also frustrated by continuing arrests during the army's "screening" raids, widespread corruption at check-points, lack of accountability by military and civil authorities, and an extremely slow reconstruction process. Different estimates show that between 9,000-20,000 people have come through the so-called "filtration camps". These people have suffered humiliation, beatings and torture.
  
  
• Vengeance attacks by Chechen armed groups have already claimed the lives of over 100 pro-Moscow officials, militiamen and religious leaders at all levels.

Military preparations. Both the army and Chechen armed groups appear to be preparing for a military confrontation.

• Vladimir Putin's trip to Chechnya in April 2001 indirectly confirms that federal forces may be preparing for a fresh crackdown on Chechen armed groups. Their aim will be to demand capitulation by the so-called "irreconciliables" and attempt to arrive at a political settlement with the more moderate resistance factions.
  
  
• Local observers report that the leaders of Chechen armed groups have recently received significant financial support mainly for strengthening their fighting capability. At the same time, it is believed that re-grouping and concentration of forces is currently underway around Grozny, where new attacks are expected. On 12 April 2001, Maskhadov ordered the field commanders under his control to launch a spring counter-offensive.

Hostage activities. Both sides are trying to remove hostages and prisoners of war (POWs) or place them in a more secure environment, as reported by the POW exchange groups.

EXTERNAL FACTORS

Federal administrative reshuffle and greater power to hardliners. The threat of an administrative re-shuffle is an important destabilising factor at the federal level. The Federal Security Service is under increasing pressure to report tangible results by 15 May 2001 in conducting its "anti-terrorist operation" in Chechnya. Strong pressure on high-ranking personnel may result in the shifting of resources and power to hardliners in the federal government.

Influencing public opinion. Some analysts believe that by influencing key sections of the mass media, federal authorities hope to turn public opinion in favour of possible renewed action in Chechnya. Favourable public opinion means that the federal government can feel confident in relation to political risks associated with a renewal of hostilities. This is the case, although the current media policy increases the level of suspicion towards authorities within Russia and internationally. However, any new revelations of war crimes could throw the media situation off balance with serious political consequences.

Threat of economic recession. A shortfall in foreign currency due to a foreign debt repayment crunch in 2003 may lead to economic recession. The federal government appears to be preparing the population for such a threat. It is clear that if the conflict in Chechnya continues to be as resource-intensive in 2002 as it is now, it will have a severe impact on the country's economy.

SCENARIOS

Time-frame: May-July 2001

1. Further intensification of hostilities and escalation of the conflict during Spring Summer 2001 (most probable)

Hostilities may be renewed in Grozny, Gudermes, Argun or around other cities. Sporadic Chechen offensives are most likely to be led by Ruslan Gelayev. At the same time, other groups may engage in diversions, subversive and terrorist actions throughout Chechnya. Federal authorities could use the hostilities to launch a counter offensive, isolate, arrest or liquidate the key field commanders and irreconcilable armed groups.

Federal troops are likely to succeed in localising hostilities and thereby prevent the involvement of the "neutral" population. However, the population will continue to be affected by sporadic acts of terror and assassinations by armed groups. Terrorist activities will result in retaliatory arrests, "screening" activities involving hostage-taking for ransom and other violations of human rights. Such acts of violence will further complicate the situation and block the settlement process.

However, it is likely that the federal centre will try to bolster "peace enforcement" efforts in a number of ways:

• through socio-economic reconstruction activities;
  
  
• through the concentration of administrative and socio-economic power at the level of the Administration of Chechen Republic and the Chechen government;
  
  
• by granting key positions in the Chechen government to people of non-Chechen ethnicity. However, this will lead to a significant dissatisfaction among certain parts of the pro-Moscow Chechen elite and local pressure groups; and
  
  
• by reviving discussions on Chechnya's special status within the Russian Federation in connection with the elections and efforts to establish a legitimate system of power in Chechnya.

2. Political settlement (probable)

Protracted war and socio-economic difficulties may trigger the growth of anti-war sentiments in Russia as a whole and in Chechnya. Any protests against the war will be perceived as a means for protecting the further democratisation of society.

The number of NGOs working for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the protection of human rights may increase with more public figures and statesmen supporting their activities. It is likely that NGOs and IGOs outside Russia will also become more active drawing international attention to the war crimes and human rights violations in Chechnya. Other groups will focus on humanitarian assistance and seek to mobilise support for a political settlement and reconstruction process. In such an atmosphere, continued military action will become politically unprofitable. This may prompt the federal authorities to explore other political options that would help arrive at a political settlement of the Chechen conflict.

3. Large-scale intensification of the conflict (less probable)

The guerrilla war may escalate and involve large-scale military action in Grozny, Argun and around other larger towns. Republican authorities and federal troops may, for example, be blocked and attacked in Grozny. Events and factors that may trigger or accelerate the conflict would include further discoveries of mass graves, shortages of funding for the federal army or assassinations of key pro-Moscow leaders.

The ensuing chaos and unrestrained violence will drive thousands of returnees back to Ingushetia, Daghestan and other neighbouring regions with large numbers of the male population in the republic joining Chechen armed groups. This will inevitably lead to a split in the federal political elite and result in mutually exclusive proposals either as: (a) negotiations to stop the violence or (b) a massive military operation to eradicate any resistance.

POSSIBLE RESPONSE DIRECTIONS

In a joint effort to facilitate the reconstruction process in Chechnya, the Peace Mission to the North Caucasus (PMNC), the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IEA/RAS) as part of the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), are organising a series of roundtables to help develop and implement an effective Chechnya Peace Reconstruction Initiative.¹

In December 2000, the first roundtable was held in Pyatigorsk (Russian Federation). It brought together Chechen community leaders; government representatives from Chechnya, the neighbouring regions and the federal authorities; and representatives of international organisations. It covered (a) long and short-term peace objectives; (b) risk indicators and challenges; (c) response directions and specific activities; and (d) strategic principles. A situation analysis and an overview of current and past projects in Chechnya was be added as well. It resulted in a preliminary version of the Post Conflict Reconstruction Plan (see, www.fewer.org).²

Three critical response issues were raised during this first roundtable:

• The need to initiate co-ordinated reconstruction of Chechnya;
• The need for a political settlement process led by the people of Chechnya themselves; and
• Strengthening of law enforcement, and protecting the rights of the civilian population.

Other issues identified include long term Peace Objectives and Risk Indicators and Challenges.

Long-term peace objectives

The long-term peace objectives established for the region are:

1. Strengthened rule of law and protection of human rights;
2. Meeting the basic needs of the population;
3. Adequate personal security for the Chechen people;
4. Economic development (particularly access to employment and education); and
5. Harmonious relations between Chechens and their neighbours.

Risk indicators and challenges

The Risk Indicators and Challenges identified are:

1. Low morale and order among federal troops;
2. Alienation of the civilian population;
3. Profiteering from the war;
4. Widespread human rights abuses;
5. Inability to consolidate power on the part of the Chechen Republic Administration;
6. Internationalisation of the Chechen conflict; and
7. External financial support for Chechen separatists.

Critical priorities now are to actively promote economic development, dismantle the war economy, and promote security.

Response directions

1. Initiate and co-ordinate reconstruction efforts

Reconstruction of the Chechen economy and society will be decisive in bringing stability to Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Key priorities are:

• funding for the reconstruction of Grozny, housing, the agricultural sector and the petroleum industries;
  
  
• the return of IDPs, as the revival of the Republic's economy will be dependent on their return;
  
  
• instituting job-creation schemes, and health and education programmes;
  
  
• the Russian corporate sector and Chechen entrepreneurs must be encouraged to invest in major industries and the service sector; and
  
  
• establishment of co-ordinating bodies to facilitate investment and humanitarian support is important for the reconstruction process.

2. Initiate a political settlement process

A political settlement in Chechnya is essential. Public commitment to ending the conflict and the process of reconstruction is vital for a lasting settlement. Critical for the settlement process are two issues: (a) negotiations with armed separatist groups to end the violence; and (b) the definition of Chechnya's legal status within the Russian federation. This last issue cannot be subject to negotiations with separatists the Chechen people must take decisions on the country's status themselves.

3. Media and transparency of reconstruction and settlement efforts

It is essential that positive and constructive policies are adopted with regard to radio and TV broadcasting in and outside of Chechnya. Broadcasts should not only represent Chechen society externally, but should be oriented to the needs of the Chechen people. Such awareness raising can be used to help consolidate and encourage peace-oriented sentiments within Chechen society, and to help dismantle the anti-Chechen feeling within Russian society.

4. Ensure autonomy of Chechnya

A high degree of autonomy in the internal governance of the Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation should be underpinned by legal pluralism, co-existing centralised and local legal norms, membership of international organisations and unions and other options within the framework of modern federalism. In the immediate term, power in Chechnya should be consolidated in a single structure, reporting directly to the highest Federal authorities.

5. Meet basic needs and protect Chechen IDPs and refugees

The government of the Russian Federation should take steps to protect IDPs and refugees in the CIS countries. Those in need, either IDPs or Chechens remaining within the Republic, should be supported by targeted financial and humanitarian aid, pensions and benefits to victims of war, and return and re-integration programmes. Law and order must be upheld and the indiscriminate and unrestrained use of firepower must be stopped. Special rules and codes of conduct for soldiers and combatants in relation to the civilian population must be established and enforced.

6. Strengthen law enforcement and the protection of rights in Chechnya

The rule of law and a strong administration are needed to achieve stability in Chechnya. Equally important are traditional institutions, people's diplomacy and the establishment of a commission on blood vengeance conciliation. The war must be made unprofitable for warring parties through the reconstruction of the Chechen economy and through the provision of effective socio-economic solutions to problems of unemployment and poverty. The judicial system must be urgently restored in order to deal with criminality, and the population must be issued with passports or identification cards to allow for freedom of movement. Both these initiatives would help end the practice of hostage taking and provide for the protection of human rights and freedoms in Chechnya.

Strategic principles

Strategic principles for reconstruction in Chechnya include the following:

1. An integrated approach to reconstruction in Chechnya, involving the Russian Federal and Chechen local government, local communities, NGOs and international organisations.

2. The political settlement and negotiations with separatists should focus on the cessation of violence. The Chechen people themselves should determine the status of Chechnya within the Russian Federation.

3. Transparency and accountability in the reconstruction and political settlement process is critical.

Footnotes

¹ These activities form part of the project "aucasus Early Warning and Response Network: Strengthening Conflict Prevention Efforts in the north Caucasus", partly funded by the Community Fund, UK

² You can also contact the FEWER Secretariat in London or Moscow to request a copy of the Chechnya Peace Reconstruction Initiative.