Informing humanitarians worldwide 24/7 — a service provided by UN OCHA

Pakistan

FAST Update Pakistan: Semi-annual risk assessment Dec 2005 to Apr 2006

Attachments

Risk Assessment:
Since December 2005, Country Stability fell down to a very low level compared to previous months. Accordingly, the curve of Forceful Events rose to new heights. Most of this destabilization in Pakistan has been caused by the events in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

In December 2005, paramilitary forces of the government of Pakistan launched an operation against the tribal leaders, sardars, of the Bugti and Marri tribes. The latter responded by armed attacks with their private armies during the last few months, targeted against symbols of the central government, such as railway tracks, gas pipelines, electrical power installations, military sites and checkpoints of the paramilitary forces. In the meantime, the tribal members under their leader Nawab Akbar Bugti have left the cities and are hiding in the mountains of Balochistan. From there, Bugti is directing the attacks of his armed people. At the same time, a new rebel group, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has emerged last year and is claiming responsibility for many of the attacks, including the bomb blast in Karachi in December 2005. The operation of the government, aimed at "re-establishing the writ of the government", took off after a rocket attack on President Musharraf during his visit to Kohlu, the center of the Marri tribe, on December 14. The reasons for this intervention also include Balochistan's vast gas and oil reserves, on which Pakistan's energy system is highly dependent. Furthermore, Pakistan's government has to prevent Taleban activities from the bordering Kandahar region in southern Afghanistan, and to keep control over its missile and nuclear testing ranges as well as other sensitive army installations located in Balochistan.

Negotiations for a political solution to the Balochistan crisis have been going on for a while but stopped now. President Musharraf is demanding a surrender of Nawab Bugti and the disarmament of the tribals. However, so far there is not any evidence of a decline of attacks or a political solution. Rather, an escalation can be observed: two days after the government announced the banning of the BLA on April 11, a home-made bomb carried by a suicide bomber exploded in a religious gathering in Karachi, killing almost 50 people and injuring many more.

The second source of trouble is the ongoing "war against terrorism" in the tribal belt of Waziristan in NWFP, again alongside the Afghan border. Here, the army operation has been going on for more than a year, but the aim "to flush out the foreign militants" seems still far out of reach. One has to keep in mind that the respective border is more or less unguarded from the Afghan side. Last year, a couple of "peace agreements" between the militants and the government were signed, but most of them could not withstand the social pressures of the tribal society. The local population is being alienated by the army actions and the "Taliban spirit" finds increasing favor among the tribals. Many of the traditionally loyal maliks either changed sides because of the threat of being executed or had to pay with their lives. Almost daily, there are reports about the execution of "American spies" or "Jews", whose bodies were found hanging from electric poles or decapitated. In South Waziristan, a type of local Taliban regime has been put in place without Islamabad being in any position to intervene. Meanwhile, in North Waziristan, the army operates to prevent a similar development. In spite of this local ray of hope, the prospects for the region are not bright: a settlement of the crisis is not in sight, on the contrary, further escalation is more likely.

(pdf* format - 233 KB)