Attachments
Authors: Ameneh Mehvar; Nasser Khdour
The largest forced displacement of Palestinians in the West Bank since 1967 has taken place in the first months of 2025, according to the United Nations:1 Over 40,000 Palestinians have been displaced, and the Jenin, Tulkarm, and Nur al-Shams camps are nearly emptied. This occurred as part of an operation launched on 21 January 2025 called Iron Wall — the largest Israel Defense Forces (IDF) military operation in the West Bank in decades — which initially targeted refugee camps in Jenin and Tulkarm before expanding to other areas, including Tubas and Nablus.
The operation was launched shortly after the ceasefire in Gaza went into effect (see map below), when Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, announced that the government had decided to add security in the West Bank as an official war goal.2 Israeli officials allege that militancy in the West Bank is part of a multi-pronged campaign orchestrated by Iran against Israel,3 and that it is necessary to curb the growing militant presence in the north, citing both the intensity of the fighting and the number of attacks originating from the area — some targeting Israel — as justification for the operation.4 However, the UN and other human rights organizations have criticized Israel’s heavy-handed approach in Operation Iron Wall, stating that its use of force is more suited to war than policing.5
Many pundits, including some in Israel, argue that the scope and intensity of the operation far exceed the actual threat.6 They suggest that rising tensions in the West Bank are linked to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s agenda to keep Israel in a state of perpetual war to ensure his political survival,7 and form part of the sweeping concessions he has made to pro-settler factions in recent years8 to maintain his coalition government. Indeed, settler leaders have applauded Operation Iron Wall, suggesting that it is the result of more than a year of lobbying Netanyahu to ensure that the IDF treats the West Bank the same way it treats Gaza.9
As the de facto local sovereign of the West Bank, the Central Command — IDF’s regional command overseeing all military units and directing other Israeli civilian entities in the West Bank — has controlled the area and upheld its relative status quo for decades. Traditionally, the Central Command has limited the use of force to what it deems necessary for operational needs and has applied it with a clear purpose. This approach was adopted based on the understanding that excessive force leads to security escalation in a complex environment where Palestinians and Israeli settlers live side by side.10
Yet, Iron Wall signals a shift in Israel’s military approach, involving more long-term and transformative measures that may go beyond immediate operational and situational needs: Above all, the operation appears to pursue the broader objective of fundamentally reshaping the topography of refugee camps.11 This risks eroding Palestinian Authority (PA) control in Area A of the West Bank12 — a zone that falls under nominal Palestinian self-rule according to the Oslo framework.
A data-driven look at Palestinian armed groups in the West Bank, focusing on those in Tulkarm and Jenin — hubs of armed resistance and focal points of the Iron Wall operation (see map below) — provides a more nuanced understanding of the security challenges they pose. While prior to the launch of the operation, these predominantly local, small Palestinian armed groups demonstrated a sustained capacity to engage IDF troops during raids, ACLED data indicate that their ability to conduct offensive attacks was curbed, albeit not fully neutralized, through intelligence-driven countermeasures. This indicates that Iron Wall is driven by objectives beyond immediate military imperatives, with long-term implications for security, governance, and the lives of thousands of Palestinians.
War-like violence by security forces degrades militant groups and reshapes refugee camps
Operation Iron Wall represents the latest and most extensive phase of IDF operations in the West Bank over the past three years (see graph below). The initial phase started with the launch of the Break the Wave campaign in March 2022 in response to a surge of armed activity in the West Bank in late 2021. Daily raids were mainly concentrated in the northern West Bank and relied on intelligence to target Palestinian militants and prevent future attacks.13 The most significant operation during this phase was a two-day operation dubbed Home and Garden14 that launched on 3 July 2023 in Jenin Camp. The operation saw the IDF launch the first airstrike on the West Bank since the Second Intifada.
With the onset of the war in Gaza, the IDF’s campaign entered a new phase as it stepped up its raids in the West Bank, increasingly employing war-like tactics such as the use of missiles and airstrikes. Since then, ACLED records nearly 120 Israeli drone and airstrike incidents, with 96 targeting Jenin and Tulkarm. Nevertheless, the operations remained targeted and limited in scope and length, and the majority of people killed were militants. The most intense operation during this phase was launched in late August 2024, when hundreds of IDF troops carried out a 10-day campaign, dubbed Summer Camps, in Jenin and Tulkarm following a failed suicide attack in Tel Aviv. In September 2024, then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said past operations had been “mowing the lawn” but that Israel would soon need to “pull out the roots” in response to rising attacks.15 At the same time, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz stated that the situation in Tulkarm and Jenin was “a war in every sense,” calling for the threat there to be dealt with “exactly” as in Gaza, including the “temporary evacuation” of Palestinians.16
Amid heightened fears of further escalation, and in a bid to demonstrate to the United States administration that Ramallah could maintain order in the West Bank, the PA imposed a siege on Jenin camp in December 2024 and engaged in dozens of armed clashes with Palestinian militants over the following six weeks. In mid-January, the PA struck a deal with armed groups in Jenin for specific militants to surrender their weapons and for the PA to operate freely in the camp and remove explosives.17
However, this fragile arrangement was disrupted by the launch of Iron Wall, which forced the PA to withdraw and reaffirmed Israel’s preference for direct military intervention. A large force of Israeli soldiers, border police, Kfir Brigade units, and commandos was deployed first to Jenin and then to Tulkarm, supported by helicopters and drones, with three further battalions brought in later as reinforcements.18 The violence that ensued led to February and March marking the highest number of violent incidents by Israeli forces in the three refugee camps in Jenin and Tulkarm since the start of ACLED data collection in January 2016.
Israeli forces quickly gained control over the three refugee camps, leading to a significant decline in the IDF’s military engagement with armed groups in the area, as militants have been killed, arrested, or have fled.19 As a result, the capacity of militant groups has been significantly degraded: Since 2 March, there has been no reported armed group activity in the camps — a lull that continues at the time of publication. Yet, the IDF has increased its violence on civilians: It has engaged in over 200 incidents of violence against unarmed civilians in the camps, mainly involving shots fired at Palestinian civilians during house raids without inflicting casualties.
Israeli troops have also conducted at least 50 incidents of controlled explosions and bulldozing of structures, roads, and other infrastructure in the camps. The IDF maintains that these demolitions followed the discovery of explosives laboratories, weapons, and observation posts.20 It has also stated that another goal is to broaden the roads to ease access for armored vehicles.21 According to local Palestinian officials, Israel has destroyed 800 of Jenin camp’s 1,050 buildings,22 while in Tulkarm and Nur al-Shams camps, nearly 400 homes have been destroyed and a further 2,570 partially damaged.23 In addition, approximately 30 kilometers of road network have been destroyed across the three camps.24 The IDF continues to issue demolition orders,25 and has carried out several demolitions in the month of April. Over one hundred days after the launch of the operation, Israeli forces remain stationed in the three refugee camps of Jenin, Tulkarm, and Nur al-Shams amid Israeli officials’ announcement of plans to maintain a military presence in the camps for at least a year.26
The Iron Wall operation is notable for the mass displacement it has caused. Nearly 40,000 Palestinians have left their homes, and the three aforementioned refugee camps in Jenin and Tulkarm are nearly empty.27 The scale of destruction and displacement in the West Bank is unprecedented since 1967 and surpasses the impacts of Israeli operations in the area during the Second Intifada. At that time, when Israel and large numbers of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were caught in a more direct and intense cycle of violence, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. The operation targeted the Jenin Camp, which was considered a hub of armed resistance and the origin of the majority of Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) suicide bombings.28 It lasted only 21 days and temporarily displaced a quarter of the camp’s residents.29
Who are the armed groups that were active in Jenin and Tulkarm ahead of Iron Wall?
The majority of violence involving Palestinians in the West Bank involves local armed groups. This pattern has remained consistent since the re-emergence of organized militancy in the region in late 2021 (for more on Palestinian armed groups in the West Bank before 7 October 2023, see this ACLED report). These local groups lack clear organizational and military structures and, instead, operate as loosely connected networks. Their members are primarily young people who live in close-knit communities with strong social bonds,30 driven largely by deteriorating conditions in the northern West Bank.31 These groups started emerging in late 2021, given the weakness of the PA in governing towns and refugee camps, its declining legitimacy due to failure to advance a realistic path to statehood, and its inability to protect Palestinians from rampant settler violence and the heavy-handed approach by Israel’s security forces. The most prominent faction, Katibat Jenin, was initially formed to protect six escapees from Gilboa prison in Israel in September 202132 — five of whom were affiliated with PIJ and one with Fatah.
Other groups later emerged inside other refugee camps and in nearby villages and towns after Israeli forces expanded their raids to these areas in pursuit of militants who had fled there.33 Yet others have formed in towns and villages affected by land seizures or expansion of settlements.34 While there has been a sharp increase in the number of these groups since 7 October 2023, their operations have remained highly localized. According to ACLED data, a majority of militant activity ahead of Operation Iron Wall occurred within or near their home regions (see map below), with most violent incidents taking place during Israeli raids.
In Jenin and Tulkarm, at least 18 new local armed groups have emerged since 7 October, increasing the total number of active groups from eight to 26. Of these, nine groups are affiliated with the PIJ, while another 12 self-identify as Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AAMB). PIJ and AAMB local groups are most frequently involved in violent interactions with Israel in Tulkarm and Jenin, participating in over 475 and 480 incidents, respectively, from 7 October 2023 until the launch of Operation Iron Wall.
Connections between these armed groups and the more traditional, organized factions vary. AAMB groups — at the forefront of armed violence — are believed to operate largely independently of Fatah’s political elites but still self-identify with Fatah and maintain informal connections with some local leaders. Some AAMB militants have either worked in the PA’s security forces or have kinship ties with security personnel. Meanwhile, PIJ local groups are explicitly recognized as affiliates by the organization’s leadership;35 their killed fighters are recognized as the organization’s martyrs. It is also likely that PIJ has provided funding for the purchase of weapons to these local groups.36 But there is little to suggest that the PIJ leadership is exercising direct military command and control over the activities of local groups.
Besides these local groups, seven other factions — among them Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Mujahideen Brigade — have also been active, though their activities have been relatively limited. Notably, Hamas’ involvement in violence in Jenin and Tulkarm has been much less than that of local AAMB- and PIJ-affiliated groups, with 115 events attributed to or claimed by Hamas between 7 October 2023 and the launch of Iron Wall (see graph below). Owing to Israel’s extensive military and intelligence presence in the West Bank that impedes the formation of robust military structures, Hamas has favored a cell-based strategy in the West Bank,37 where operatives have carried out a limited but impactful targeted attack on settlers and soldiers.
Nonetheless, Hamas endorses the expansion of armed activity in the West Bank, and its members have helped establish some local groups — for example, Katibat Tulkarm – Quick Response, a group that self-identifies as Fatah’s AAMB, which was co-founded by a Hamas militant. Hamas may have also provided local groups with financial assistance — possibly through encrypted apps38 — for acquiring weapons.39
Overall, the prevailing pattern of armed groups’ activities in Jenin and Tulkarm has been characterized by informal networks, flexible structures, and cooperation among groups based in the same locations, but often lacks a centralized leadership or coherent vision other than inflicting a cost on Israel.40
Armed group tactics evolve to respond to increasingly intense and expanded IDF raids
A significant share of militant violence in the West Bank occurs in reaction to Israeli military operations, when militants engage with Israeli troops raiding the camps, towns, or villages where they live. These engagements aim to inflict casualties or obstruct the Israeli operations.41 As the IDF expanded and intensified its operations, Palestinian armed groups also increasingly used more sophisticated tactics to counter Israeli troops, posing a challenge to the IDF’s freedom to deploy without encountering resistance.
Between 7 October 2023 and 20 January 2025, nearly 70% of militant activity in Jenin and Tulkarm took place during IDF raids or large-scale operations. When these groups first emerged, their activities had a limited impact on Israel’s incursions. Israeli forces could enter and exit these areas with relative ease to carry out arrests or target specific militants.42 Israel’s rapid raids typically involved targeted assassinations or encircling the location of wanted individuals until the mission was completed, either through arrest or elimination.
Over time, militant tactics have evolved, as groups have increasingly relied on homemade explosives and roadside bombs to minimize direct engagements with the Israeli military,43 which has considerably more technological superiority and firepower. ACLED records the first use of roadside IEDs by militants during an Israeli raid on the Jenin camp on 28 April 2023. Moreover, Operation Home and Garden in Jenin camp was launched in July 2023 after a roadside bomb hit an armored vehicle, injuring eight soldiers.44
Following the outbreak of the Gaza war on 7 October and the intensification of the IDF’s raids in the West Bank, there was a significant surge in the number and intensity of militant roadside bomb detonations (see graph below). Since then, ACLED has documented over 525 such incidents across the West Bank, with over 305 in Jenin and Tulkarm alone.
Militants have manufactured roadside bombs in various sizes and large quantities, with some weighing up to 40 kilograms and costing more than 200 US dollars each.45 They have refined their methods for planting these bombs, burying them as deep as 1.5 meters beneath the road surface,46 posing challenges to military bulldozers designed to detect and clear explosives. Roadside IEDs have also become capable of damaging armored Israeli vehicles and causing casualties. Since 7 October, four Israeli soldiers have been killed in roadside bomb attacks in Jenin and Tulkarm, while a further 27 have been injured.
Additionally, militants have used surveillance cameras to monitor Israeli troops and remotely detonate explosives.47 The narrow roads in the camps have also allowed militants to cover areas with fabric sheets, obstructing Israeli surveillance drones from monitoring their activities and locations.48
While these evolving tactics have increased the risks for Israeli forces during raids, they did not fundamentally shift the nature or scale of the militant threat, which remained largely localized, reactive, and limited in impact. This limited effectiveness is even more evident in the activities of armed groups beyond the context of direct Israeli military operations.
Militant activity beyond IDF raids has a limited impact
Outside the context of IDF raids, Palestinian armed groups have also carried out hundreds of violent incidents targeting civilians, settlements, and Israeli security forces. These incidents are not defensive in nature. Between 7 October 2023 and 20 January 2025, ACLED records nearly 340 such violent incidents in Jenin and Tulkarm. However, the vast majority — over 90% — did not result in any fatalities or injuries (see graph below).
Direct attacks on civilians were limited, and those that did occur — such as shootings at moving vehicles — led to eight fatalities and over 20 injuries during this period. Most other incidents, such as repeated gunfire toward settlements, appear to have been poorly coordinated actions, lacking clear targets or the potential to inflict significant impact.
Similarly, attacks on Israeli security forces have rarely led to significant casualties. The majority involved long-range gunfire at military posts and checkpoints, resulting in just one fatality and approximately 20 confirmed injuries among Israeli personnel. Many of these engagements lacked direct confrontations, arrests, or militant casualties, and often targeted the same sites repeatedly. This is likely because, given the dense presence of Israeli military checkpoints and patrols, it is extremely risky for militants to approach or infiltrate these positions undetected. Much of this violence, similar to gunfire directed at settlements, likely originates from relatively long distances within Palestinian villages or towns near settlements and checkpoints, and appears to be intended more as symbolic displays of resistance rather than efforts to inflict significant harm.
Palestinians linked to Jenin and Tulkarm have also carried out two attacks in Israel between 7 October 2023 and 20 January 2025, resulting in two Israeli fatalities (see map below). One attack was committed by an individual from Tulkarm with no known political affiliation, while the other attack was executed by a Hamas operative from Tulkarm. These attacks remain isolated incidents, as local armed groups typically lack the sophistication, resources, and planning necessary to conduct high-impact attacks inside Israel.
The limited impact of attacks perpetrated by armed groups outside of raids, coupled with the absence of a major escalation, points to a threat that was largely contained prior to the launch of Operation Iron Wall.
Israel’s broader aims and the unfolding consequences
Armed militancy in Jenin and Tulkarm — led by local groups that have grown in sophistication — has posed a security challenge for Israel in recent years, one that the IDF, until recently, sought to counter through frequent targeted raids and intelligence-driven operations.49 The scale of Operation Iron Wall, however, represents a significant escalation in Israel’s war on armed groups, raising doubts about its objectives. Most militant activity is localized, consisting primarily of violent clashes during IDF raids, with only sporadic high-impact attacks against either civilians or stationed security forces. Yet, the operation has employed methods far exceeding targeted counter-militancy measures, suggesting that its motives may extend beyond immediate security and operational concerns. Instead, Israel appears to be pursuing a broader objective of fundamentally reshaping conditions on the ground, with long-term implications not only for militancy but also for the lives of thousands of Palestinians.
As Israel systematically demolishes buildings and widens roads as part of a broader strategy to reshape the spatial character of refugee camps, it appears to be working toward integrating refugee camps with nearby cities,50 eroding their distinct identity, which for decades has held a political and symbolic value that has helped keep the issue of Palestinian refugees alive.51 Israel’s far-right has long demanded that the refugee camps — created for Palestinians displaced in 1948 — be dismantled.52 Now that these factions hold key positions in government, this political agenda is increasingly shaping military actions on the ground. The Israeli military’s prohibition on reconstructing homes and roads in the now-uninhabitable camps53 signals an intention to permanently displace residents54 and do away with the refugee camps.55
The destruction of dense urban areas in the West Bank — cutting the camps into segments and widening roads after demolishing buildings to ease the IDF’s maneuverability — resembles tactics used in Gaza, particularly in the north.56 Furthermore, similar to Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon — where, after 7 October 2023, the IDF has implemented a strategy of maintaining a presence on enemy ground to preempt new threats57 — Israel is establishing an increasing military footprint in Area A of the West Bank: Media reports indicate that Israel is planning to deploy dedicated battalions and establish permanent military and rapid deployment outposts in the Jenin, Tulkarm, and Nur al-Shams refugee camps.58 Reports suggest that the IDF may expand this approach to all refugee camps in the northern West Bank.59
Increased Israeli presence will further exacerbate the PA’s legitimacy crisis and weaken its authority, as thousands of displaced Palestinians grow increasingly disillusioned with its ability to safeguard their security and property60 while continuing security coordination with Israel.61 A weakened PA will further undermine any realistic prospects for the two-state solution, allowing Israel to evade meaningful concessions to the Palestinians while consolidating its control over the West Bank.62 A weak PA also aligns with the interests of Israel’s pro-settler factions, who strongly oppose the two-state solution, viewing it as a threat to their long-term goal of annexing the West Bank.63 The continued presence of the IDF in Area A of the West Bank would facilitate further settlement growth and deepen the geographical fragmentation of Palestinian territories. This includes neighborhoods like Jenin and Tulkarm, which traditionally experienced less settlement activity but have increasingly become targets for settlement expansion in recent years.64
The mass displacement from refugee camps in the West Bank, along with other measures implemented since 7 October 2023, is affecting the lives of thousands of Palestinians not involved in violence or militancy against Israel. These measures include the suspension of work permits for approximately 150,000 Palestinian laborers who had been commuting daily to Israel for work and the erection of nearly 900 checkpoints and gates outside Palestinian localities, which have severely restricted freedom of movement.
Despite the few hundred Palestinians65 who have engaged in armed violence against Israeli security forces and sporadic attacks on civilians, masses of Palestinians in the West Bank have not, in the past years, joined a Palestinian uprising similar in scale to the previous Palestinian Intifadas. The sense of collective punishment, coupled with record levels of land confiscation and the establishment of new illegal settlement outposts,66 may ultimately lead to further radicalization among Palestinians in the West Bank — sooner or later — unless Israel demonstrates a willingness to pursue a political solution to the conflict. Israel’s steady slide to the right,67 however, raises fears of a worsening cycle of repression and retaliation.
Ameneh Mehvar
Dr. Ameneh Mehvar is ACLED’s Middle East Senior Analyst. In this role, she leads analysis on regional conflicts and provides expertise to ensure the accuracy of ACLED’s data coverage, while also supporting the organization’s engagement with external partners and the media. Ameneh has expertise in Middle East security and foreign policy, with a focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Persian Gulf security dynamics. Previously, she worked as a political risk consultant in the private sector and has also gained experience in the public sector. Additionally, she has taught and conducted academic research. Ameneh holds a master’s degree in Middle East and Central Asian Security Studies and a PhD in International Relations from the University of St Andrews, Scotland.
Nasser Khdour
Nasser Khdour is the Middle East Assistant Research Manager at ACLED, where he has been working since 2021, initially joining as a Palestine Researcher. He holds a master’s degree in Strategic Studies from the Australian National University and another master’s degree in International Studies from Birzeit University. Before joining ACLED, Nasser had ten years of experience in international organizations and civil society projects. He is currently based in Basel, Switzerland.