Preface
This report is based on field research that was carried out by the Small Arms Survey and our Nigerian partners from September 2006 to April 2007. Consequently, the analysis presented here reflects the situation in Nigeria during this period. While the report does address some key events that took place after April 2007-the inauguration of the new president, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua; the initiation of peace talks in the Niger Delta; and the release of Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari from prison-these events are covered in far less detail. The findings in the report and the trends identified in terms of small arms proliferation, growing insecurity, and the important role of armed groups in security and politics continued to hold true through October 2007.
I. Introduction
There is overwhelming community sympathy for what they are doing . . . . [The militants] are seen as people who can stand up to the oppressors . . . I consider myself a person who can speak on these issues-our problems and protests . . . . But getting [to the MEND camp to negotiate the hostage release] and seeing 200 to 300 young men in uniforms, machines guns, rocket launchers and ammunition . . . I said, 'God, so we have come to this.'
-Ledum Mitee, Port Harcourt human rights campaigner (Robinson, 2006)
In the lead-up to Nigeria's April 2007 national and presidential elections, numerous signs emerged of growing popular discontent with the national political system and indications that the 2007 elections would mirror the violence of 2003. The shadow of the 2003 elections hung heavily over the country, while the 2007 electoral process faced a number of challenges.(1) Problems with voter registration raised concerns about disenfranchisement, whether intentional or not. The efforts of Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo to modify the Constitution to enable him to run for a third term drew accusations of authoritarianism. Tensions between the north and the south of the country persisted, as they have for years, and reflected the normal tendency of increasing in an election year. Growing unrest in the Niger Delta brought a rise in violent incidents and kidnappings. Although not as violent as many had predicted, the elections exacerbated political divides due to widespread accusations of fraud from voters and national and international observers alike. The elections did little to resolve the political tensions in the country.
These political tensions are compounded by the reality that Nigeria's economy has grown since President Obasanjo was first elected in 1999, and yet this wealth has been neither seen nor felt by the last majority of Nigerians. Nearly three-quarters of Nigeria's population live on less than one dollar a day (2) in a country that has earned oil revenues of at least USD 280 billion over three decades (Unegbu, 2003, p. 1), not including the past few years of high oil prices. Ethnic tensions, religious differences, limited economic opportunities, and numerous social and political grievances are all fuelling the unrest in Nigeria and contributing to flashpoints for violence. The challenges are immense, and Obasanjo's successor, the newly elected Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, faces the difficult tasks of healing a divided country, addressing legitimate economic grievances, and reforming the police and military. At the same time he must devise a political solution to the crisis in the Niger Delta and address the prevalent insecurity in the country.
This study aims to raise awareness of a number of issues relating to insecurity, armed violence, and the proliferation of illicit small arms in Nigeria since the return to democracy in 1999. To this end, the core of this report is divided into five sections. The first section looks at the causes of armed violence in Nigeria, including the context of the 2007 elections, the various dividing lines in Nigerian society, and the long-term challenge of economic development and the redistribution of resources. The second section discusses the circulation of illicit small arms, the availability of legal and illegal arms, the manufacture of craft weapons, and popular demand for small arms. The third section looks at armed violence in Nigeria, with the intention of providing a more nuanced understanding of the types of violence in Nigeria, the contexts in which violence is more likely to occur, and the nature of the perpetrators involved. The fourth section concentrates on the role of armed groups in Nigeria by first discussing the types of armed groups that operate in the country, and then focusing on the evolution of such groups in the Niger Delta region in particular. The fifth section presents an overview of the challenges the government faces in addressing armed violence and insecurity, and more closely investigates specific attempts by the government to tackle these problems in the Delta. The conclusion reviews the numerous challenges that the newly elected president now faces and must address in the coming five years to prevent further deterioration in the security situation in the country.
The following are among the key findings in this report:
- Politics is extremely competitive and elections are perceived as zero-sum contests. This has led to the increasingly militarized nature of politics, the use of violence as an electoral tool, and the inculcation of a culture of violence in society.
- Armed groups are not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. There are numerous groups of varying character and intent operating in the country. However, today's armed groups are better armed, better trained, and increasingly sophisticated in their actions compared to those of the past.
- The militarized nature of politics combined with the prevalence of armed groups has provided an easy marriage between politics and violence. Armed groups have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by being hired hands, and have now developed their own bases of economic support, thereby freeing themselves from their political patrons. This has led some groups to engage in and try to influence the political process themselves.
- Armed violence is not a random event. Acts of armed violence in Nigeria are purposeful in intent and directed at key targets, whether economic or political. Armed violence is about more than oil, religion, ethnicity, or politics. In essence, such violence is about access to resources, whether through committing crimes, playing on communal tensions, stealing oil, or winning elections. Without addressing the key issues of resource control and distribution, armed violence will persist. A political solution through dialogue will do more to address these issues than a military response.
- While Nigeria supports international instruments to limit illicit proliferation and has put in place national laws to restrict the ownership and use of licit small arms, these laws are poorly enforced and as a result largely ineffective in addressing illicit proliferation. The inability of the police to provide law and order in the country, and the resulting insecurity among the population, has led some individuals and communities to acquire small arms for protection.
- The security vote is an opaque budget line item that provides significant amounts of funding for 'security-related' issues, but which remains uncontrolled by requirements for disclosure. At best, this provides an easy source of money for corruption; at worst, it provides politicians with money that allows them to use violence as a tool of political influence and control by purchasing the services of armed thugs.
- The government's response to armed violence has been a mixed strategy of carrot and stick. The carrot-development programmes-has failed to deliver substantial economic benefits and development progress. The stick- an attempt to meet force with force-has provoked an escalation of violence rather than curbed it, generated popular support for armed groups, and led to an entrenchment of the positions of militants. The only solution to the rising armed violence in the Niger Delta is a political one.