By AOAV on 21 Nov 2024
The vast Sahel region of Africa, stretching across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, has become a hotspot of violent insurgencies over the past decade. Salafi jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have capitalized on regional instability, launching attacks that have destabilized communities and challenged state authorities. Amid this turmoil, a revealing report titled “Stray Bullets: Ammunition Recovered from Salafi Jihadist Groups in the Central Sahel“ by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) sheds light on a critical but often overlooked aspect of the conflict: the role of diverted small-caliber ammunition in fuelling these insurgencies.
Conflict Armament Research, an independent organisation specialising in tracing illicit arms flows, conducted extensive field investigations between 2015 and 2023. Their teams documented over 15,000 rounds of ammunition recovered from various non-state actors in the central Sahel, with a significant portion linked directly to Salafi jihadist groups. The report is the first in a series aiming to understand how these groups acquire and utilize ammunition, providing invaluable insights into the mechanics of the ongoing conflict.
One of the most startling revelations from the report is that a substantial proportion of the ammunition used by these jihadist groups likely originated from the stockpiles of the very states they are fighting against. Specifically, at least 41% of the recovered ammunition between 2019 and 2022 was traced back to state security forces in Burkina Faso, Mali, or Niger. This marks a significant increase from the period between 2015 and 2018, where only 7% of such ammunition was linked to state custody.
Diversion from State Custody
The mechanisms of this diversion are complex. While some may assume deliberate collusion, the report indicates that much of this ammunition was obtained through opportunistic means—battlefield losses, raids on military installations, and theft during attacks on security forces. Salafi jihadist groups have become adept at exploiting vulnerabilities in state defense systems, turning state arsenals into their supply sources. For instance, the report details a 2019 attack on a Malian armed forces camp in Mondoro by Ansarul Islam, a group affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Investigators found that some of the ammunition used by the attackers had been manufactured in Bulgaria in 2018 and was likely diverted from Malian state custody within months of its arrival.
Even more concerning is the speed at which new ammunition is diverted. The report highlights cases where ammunition manufactured as recently as 2020 was found in the hands of insurgents by early 2022. This swift transition from production to illicit use underscores systemic weaknesses in stockpile management and security protocols within state forces.
In one case, cartridges produced in Serbia in 2020 were recovered from jihadist groups in Burkina Faso and Mali. Given the short time frame, it’s improbable that these rounds passed through multiple intermediaries before ending up with insurgents. Instead, they were likely diverted directly from state custody shortly after delivery.
Localised Opportunism, Diverse Supply Sources and Implications for Regional Security
The diversity of ammunition types and origins found in the possession of these groups suggests they are sourcing supplies from multiple channels. While diversion from state stockpiles is significant, there’s also evidence of ammunition originating from international transfers and possibly black-market dealings.
Ammunition from countries like China, Russia, Bulgaria, and even Nigeria was documented. In the Lake Chad area, for example, cartridges manufactured by Nigeria’s state-run Defense Industries Corporation were found with jihadist elements, likely seized during cross-border attacks.
The findings of the CAR report have profound implications for the security and stability of the Sahel region:
- Empowerment of Insurgent Groups: Access to military-grade ammunition enhances the operational capabilities of jihadist groups, allowing them to conduct more sophisticated and deadly attacks. This not only threatens state security forces but also endangers civilian populations.
- Erosion of State Authority: The diversion of state-owned ammunition reflects and exacerbates weaknesses in governance and military effectiveness. It undermines public confidence in the ability of governments to provide security and maintain control over national territories.
- Regional Destabilisation: The flow of illicit ammunition contributes to the spread of violence across borders, affecting neighbouring countries and potentially igniting broader regional conflicts.
Recommendations for Addressing the Crisis
The report underscores the urgent need for comprehensive measures to stem the flow of diverted ammunition and echoes AOAVs own recommendations:
- Strengthen Stockpile Security: Sahelian states must invest in securing their armories and transport systems. This includes implementing stringent inventory controls, improving physical security measures, and training personnel in best practices for ammunition management.
- Enhance Marking and Tracing Mechanisms: Establishing robust systems for marking ammunition and maintaining detailed records can aid in tracking and accountability. International cooperation is vital to trace the flow of ammunition across borders.
- International Oversight and Support: Arms-exporting countries should exercise greater due diligence to ensure their exports do not contribute to illicit proliferation. International frameworks like the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management can facilitate cooperation and capacity-building.
- Combatting Illicit Trafficking Networks: Regional collaboration is essential to dismantle smuggling routes and networks that facilitate the movement of arms and ammunition to insurgent groups.
The “Stray Bullets” report highlights a critical vulnerability in the fight against insurgency in the Sahel. The ability of jihadist groups to access state-manufactured ammunition not only sustains their operations but also symbolises a deeper challenge of governance and security sector reform.
Addressing this issue requires a multifaceted approach that combines immediate security measures with long-term strategies to strengthen state institutions. It also calls for international solidarity and support, recognising that the proliferation of illicit arms in the Sahel has global repercussions. CAR’s investigative work provides a stark reminder of the complexities surrounding arms proliferation in conflict zones. By bringing to light the pathways through which ammunition reaches insurgent groups, the report equips stakeholders with the knowledge needed to implement effective countermeasures.
For organisations like Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), the findings underscore the importance of advocacy and action in promoting responsible arms trade practices, enhancing security sector governance, and supporting efforts to reduce armed violence worldwide.