Attachments
Andrew Lebovich
Recommendations
- Build trust and deeper connections within security force and government assistance to enhance situational awareness and ensure strong ties when political circumstances change.
- Formulate coherent security offers, responsive to the needs of partner governments, and avoid duplicating efforts among assistance providers.
- Privilege ongoing political engagement with Sahelian governments to maintain influence, while planning a long-term strategy for the region that incorporates lessons learned.
For a decade the European Union (EU) and the United States saw Niger as their most valuable and cooperative partner in the Sahel, but the military coup that struck Niger in 2023 changed that. As European states rethink their options in the Sahel, an understanding of what went wrong in Niger can shed light on how to rethink security assistance in the Sahel and in coastal West Africa.
‘Last man standing, last chance’ is how a European diplomat described Niger’s regional status less than two weeks before the coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum on 26 July 2023.
The French departure from Mali in late 2022 and Burkina Faso in 2023, along with increasing pressure on United Nations forces and the European civilian and security training missions EU Training Mission (EUTM) and EU Capacity Assistance Programme (EUCAP) in Mali, left Niger as the last stronghold for the EU and international community to maintain regional counterterrorism operations and influence with a willing partner. This shift raised concerns that the relatively better security situation in Niger, compared to its central Sahelian neighbours, was at risk should Niger falter in its security stance and commitments and, since the coup, many of the worst fears of European and American actors have come true.
Attacks have increased, with some of them disturbingly close to Niger’s capital Niamey. The Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP), the military junta which assumed control after the coup, swiftly cut ties with the country’s prior security partnerships, opting for a different direction that includes Russian trainers, equipment and possibly other security assistance, although there is no evidence that Russia had a hand in the coup itself. Thus far this presence is significantly smaller than in Mali, where Russian-financed mercenaries operate in significant numbers.
Most strikingly, French soldiers were ordered to leave the country within weeks of the coup. Following an unsuccessful meeting between a high-level American delegation and Nigérien junta leaders in March 2024, American forces were also pushed out, with their withdrawal to be completed by September 2024.