Report compiled by the Burmese Border
Consortium
WHY THIS REPORT?
The first major influx of Burmese refugees into Thailand was in 1984 when about 10,000 Karen refugees crossed into Tak Province. Since that time, civil war has dragged on throughout the Border States and Divisions, as the Burmese Army has battled against the ethnic armies who formerly controlled these areas. It has been a war which the Burmese Army has always been winning, albeit gradually, and new ethnic refugees have continued to enter Thailand as territory has been lost and homes have been overrun. Since a major military offensive during the dry season of 1997, the Burmese Army has gained tenuous access and control of the entire border, and the armed ethnic groups which have no cease-fire agreements with Rangoon, no longer control any significant territory.
With the ethnic resistance "defeated" and their territory "lost" it might have been expected that the refugee flow would stop, or at least decrease. But it has not. Refugees have continued to enter Thailand until the present day. The total border camp population, including the three Mon resettlement sites on the Burma side, now totals around 143,000 and the rate of arrival has been remarkably constant since UNHCR registered the refugees in 1999, averaging just under 900 per month for the last three years.
From the stories told by new refugees and reports from the ethnic groups themselves, it has become clear that since 1996, the SPDC has been carrying out a major operation to secure control of this territory and to try to eliminate all remaining armed opposition. This has entailed the forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of civilians and the building of roads and military infrastructure for control purposes. The new refugees report fleeing the destruction of their villages, widespread forced labour and other human rights abuses.
It is the wish of the Royal Thai Government that no more refugees should enter Thailand and, although there is no formal plan, for some time there has been speculation about when and how those already in the country should be repatriated. Since the homes of many of the refugees have been destroyed and most people seem to agree that it would be premature to repatriate the refugees just now. Sooner or later though, the issue of repatriation will have to be addressed.
Before any refugee repatriation can take place it will be important to assess the conditions in the areas of return. Currently there is a shortage of reliable information. Relatively little research has been done into the nature of the relocation sites and although some estimates have been made of the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the border areas, these have generally been selective, and the situation has been constantly changing.
This report is the first attempt to make an up to date and comprehensive assessment of displacement in the border areas. The latest available data has been collated and as much information as possible has been gathered on the destruction of villages, the number of IDPs and the location and nature of the forced relocation sites.
The report does not draw any conclusions or make any recommendations. It does not comment on Royal Thai Government policy towards refugees from Burma nor offer any view on the political resolution of Burma's complex ethnic problems, of which the repatriation of refugees will be one issue. It does, however, provide information pertinent to these issues.
1. SUMMARY
Perhaps one million people living in the States and Divisions of Burma adjacent to the Thailand border have been displaced since 1996. At least 150,000 have fled as refugees or joined the huge "illegal" migrant population in Thailand. Countless others have moved away to other villages and towns in Burma.
This report estimates that at least 632,978 displaced people are still currently either living in hiding (approximately 268,000 people), or in more than 176 forced relocation sites (approximately 365,000 people), in these border areas. It also identifies 2,536 'affected villages', which are known to have been destroyed (usually burnt) and/ or relocated en masse, or otherwise abandoned due to Burmese Army (Tatmadaw ) activity.
Burmese Border IDP Populations
|
State
|
IDPs in Hiding or Temporary
Settlements
|
Number of Relocation
Sites
|
IDPs in Relocation
Sites
|
Affected Villages (destroyed,
abandoned, or relocated)
|
Total IDP Population
|
|
Tenasserim
|
6,598
|
39
|
58,296
|
139
|
64,894
|
|
Mon State
|
40,000*
|
40,000
| |||
|
Karen State
|
96,469
|
88
|
99,765
|
719
|
196,234
|
|
Karenni State
|
50,000*
|
9
|
6,850
|
200*
|
56,850
|
|
Shan State
|
75,000*
|
40
|
200,000*
|
1,478
|
275,000
|
|
Totals
|
268,067
|
176**
|
364,911
|
2,536
|
632,978
|
(* Extrapolated from available data.)
** plus 4 Wa relocation areas
Every attempt has been made to cross-check the information provided. Unless otherwise stated, the information comes from unpublished fieldwork, conducted by local groups working with refugees and Burma's IDP population, mainly in the form of detailed maps and tables. Published sources are listed under References. However, the figures are necessarily based on incomplete information, collected under extremely difficult and changing conditions. The actual number of relocation sites and residents, and of IDPs in hiding, is probably significantly higher than that estimated here.
The forced relocation of thousands of villages is a product of counter-insurgency activities carried out by the Tatmadaw, in the context of a fifty-year civil war, characterised by chronic and severe human rights abuses directed against the civilian population (the major exception being the 1999-2002 Wa relocations). Relocation site residents are frequently subject to extortion, and forced to work on government infrastructure projects. Those who choose not to enter the relocation sites flee their villages, and live in hiding in the jungle. The Tatmadaw launches regular patrols, aimed at seeking out these IDPs, destroying their temporary shelters and rice supplies. People forced to move to relocation sites now constitute the largest sub-category of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the report outlines the types, populations and whereabouts of these relocation sites.
Three main types of relocation sites are identified:
a) Large 'Relocation Centres', the residents of which have been forced to move from several outlying villages to one Tatmadaw-controlled location, often situated in the vicinity of infrastructure projects (e.g. car roads). Residents sometimes retain control over food stocks and access to farmland, although they are usually liable to various 'rice taxes', and subject to extensive forced labour. Many residents are unable to support themselves, and experience high rates of malnutrition, and numerous deaths have been reported. 'Relocation Centers' therefore often eventually dissolve - usually with the unofficial approval of local Tatmadaw and state officials. As these Centres are progressively abandoned, some residents return and attempt to rebuild their old villages; others adopt a life in hiding in the forest. In both cases, they are often subject to further bouts of forcible relocation.
b) Smaller 'Relocation Villages' are pre-existing villages that have not been moved in their entirety, although outlying houses and satellite hamlets are forced to re-settle on confiscated land in the village centre. Like the 'Relocation Centres', many 'Relocation Villages' are fenced in, and more-or-less tightly controlled by the Tatmadaw. Residents of 'Relocation Villages' are also often called upon to do forced labour, but usually have some opportunity to tend their farms.
c) Non State-controlled Relocation Sites, including those under the command of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), an armed 'ceasefire group', which between 1999-2002 forcibly relocated at least 125,000 people from northern Shan State to its Southern Command area, 400 Km to the south.
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