by Benedict Rogers
Burma is one of the world's worst human tragedies. A beautiful nation, with talented people, rich in natural resources, it was once "the rice bowl of Asia". Today, it is one of the poorest countries in the world, ruled by a regime which does not just brutally suppress its people politically, but callously denies them humanitarian aid. The junta spends almost half its budget on the military, and less than $1 per person per year on health and education combined. The world witnessed the regime's astonishing refusal, and subsequent restriction, diversion and manipulation, of aid and access for aid workers following Cyclone Nargis. A similar pattern of criminal neglect is currently played out in Chin State, where a famine caused by a plague of rats has gone largely unreported and unaided.
In addition, the military regime is guilty of every possible violation of human rights. The junta has imprisoned more than 2,000 dissidents, and Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has spent over 13 years under house arrest. A campaign of ethnic cleansing, amounting to crimes against humanity and bordering on a form of genocide, is being conducted against the Karen, Karenni and Shan in eastern Burma, and gross violations continue in Chin, Kachin and Rakhine areas. The Rohingya Muslim people are targeted for ethnic and religious persecution, and denied citizenship despite having lived in northern Arakan for generations.
One would think that the scale of the crisis in Burma would cause people, within the country and in the international community, to put aside petty differences and unite. But instead, Burma's tragedy is compounded by the intensely polarised nature of the debate about Burma. This polarisation has led to a paralysis - giving the regime the upper hand. Its biggest strategy is divide-and-rule, and it has played it to great effect at every level. Small divisions between Burmese activists become huge rifts; petty squabbles among factions within each ethnic group have been widened by the regime, in some cases causing groups to fragment and some to do deals with the junta; and among the international community, the debate about sanctions versus engagement grows ever more weary.
It is not for me to comment more on the divisions within the Burmese and ethnic movements, except simply to observe that disunity are a problem. If the different Burmese groups could recognise that what they have in common, their desire for freedom, is infinitely more important than the small policy differences or personal rivalries they may have, then they will be much the stronger for it. If they had one umbrella group, instead of multiple alliances, their cause would be advanced. But it is the international debate that concerns me here.
Critics of sanctions are rearing their heads again in a significant way, and it is tiresome. It seems bizarre that after two of the worst years in Burma's recent history, some people are seriously proposing lifting sanctions. The regime put its character on full display when it beat and shot Buddhist monks peacefully demonstrating in September 2007. Its sham referendum on a new constitution last May was so blatant it was laughable. Its initial response to Cyclone Nargis - a failure to prepare people before the cyclone hit, and a deliberate denial and diversion of aid afterwards - should not be forgotten. And before the end of last year, several hundred dissidents were jailed, some for more than 65 years. Yet there are voices within the UN, NGOs and academia who say now is the time to end international pressure, normalise relations with the regime and legitimise the planned elections in 2010.
Advocates of sanctions such as myself have however not always got it right either. There has been an almost religious affiliation to sanctions, and a refusal to hear criticism. Sanctions have become a litmus test of devotion to democracy. Advocates of sanctions have tended to demonise opponents. I admit that this is wrong. While there are some critics of sanctions who have aligned themselves so much with the junta that they are not credible, there are some who cannot be easily dismissed as pro-regime. Some whose credentials in fighting for democracy are well-proven are starting to question the effectiveness of sanctions. Those of us who continue to believe in sanctions should listen to such people, and seek to find common ground.
I do not buy the argument that sanctions have not worked. It is too simplistic. It depends totally on what our definition of effectiveness is, and what timeframe we are working to. While we can agree on the obvious - that the current sanctions regime have not yet delivered the change we would like to see - there are several points to make. The first is that many of the sanctions in place are the wrong ones. I have always advocated targeted sanctions, aimed at the Generals and their assets. But it is only in the past year that the US has introduced targeted financial sanctions, and the European Union placed a ban on the gems and timber sectors. Until 2007, the sanctions in place were either too broad, or too symbolic. The EU banned investment in a pineapple juice factory, but continues to allow money to flow into the oil and gas sectors. But the junta is built on oil and gas, not fruit juice. And critics claim we have had 20 years of sanctions - but in reality, the only really tough sanctions were introduced in the past ten years, and particularly since 2003. So they need more time to work. Thirdly, sanctions are only one tool in the toolbox anyway. No advocate of sanctions that I know has ever suggested that sanctions alone will change the situation. They are an important ingredient in the policy mix - but they need to be used alongside other methods.
Two myths about the pro-sanctions lobby continue to be put about the critics, both of which are misrepresentative and deeply destructive. The first is that they frame the debate as one of engagement versus isolation, and they describe themselves as 'pro-engagement'. But this is totally misleading. I am pro-engagement too. The objective is not the isolate the regime, but rather to draw it out and force it to enter dialogue. Pressure is the only language the regime understands. The idea that investment will open things up is not only naïve, it has been tried. Britain held trade fairs in Rangoon in the 1990s, and that did not seem to make the regime any nicer. No one I know wants to isolate the regime, and it is pro-sanctions campaigners who have led calls for the UN Secretary-General and Security Council to get involved, and the process recommended is all about engagement. So it is not a debate about whether to engage, but rather about what type of engagement - how, when, about what and with whom should we engage.
The second myth is that we oppose aid. This is manifest nonsense, but it continues to be put about. No one campaigned harder for increased aid to Burma by Britain's Department for International Development (DfID) than my own organisation, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, and the Burma Campaign UK. Our efforts resulted in pressure on DfID by the House of Commons to increase its Burma budget. It was DfID officials, backed up by so-called pro-engagement types, who actually resisted it. They did not want to increase the Burma budget. Ultimately, DfID responded to political pressure and doubled the budget. We campaigned both for in-country aid and cross-border aid to the displaced people. So please, don't tell me I am anti-aid. Like engagement, the debate is not about whether to provide aid, but how.
If the critics of sanctions agree to stop spreading such misperceptions, and advocates of sanctions cease demonising their opponents, there are still three remaining questions. Some of the most naïve critics of sanctions propose actually lifting them now, regardless of whether the regime offers any sign of progress. They portray themselves as bold fresh thinkers, but such an approach is sheer folly. To lift sanctions now, unconditionally, would send the regime the worst possible signal. The regime will have won, and they can have their rule - and their legitimacy internationally - sewn up. So I am vigorously opposed to such an approach. But more sensible critics of sanctions argue we should review specific measures, and question their effectiveness. I have an open mind on this. While I am totally opposed to lifting sanctions as a whole, there is merit in looking at each measure and asking how they could be improved. A debate about improving, sharpening, strengthening and more carefully targeting sanctions would be healthy. We might even find some areas of agreement between the two sides in the polarised debate. But we should ensure that such a debate is not timeless. A debate, within a specific timeframe, about how to sharpen sanctions must lead to an outcome. It should not result in a continuation of the current exhausting, pointless and endless debate that achieves nothing except further entrenchment and polarisation. And once the debate has been had, the issue should be parked and we should seek other creative means of bringing about change in Burma in addition to sanctions. Critics of sanctions should agree to stop dredging the issue up again and again, and advocates of sanctions might agree - provided we succeed in obtaining sharper, targeted, effective measures in place - to channel their energies into seeking other solutions. In fact, that is what sanctions advocates have already been doing, but their critics keep popping up with the sanctions debate. It is becoming an unhealthy distraction and consumes far too much emotional energy.
It will not be easy, but both sides in this debate need to move out of their respective camps. If we cannot engage with each other, how are we to have a hope of seeing the regime engage? There are voices on the fringes of both camps who deserve little respect and should be ignored. There are some with vested interests or outdated experience who are now irrelevant. But there are others who may disagree over certain approaches, but who should be treated more seriously. Common ground should be sought, and perhaps a division of labour agreed. There are individuals who have a particular role to play in, for example, quiet diplomacy with Asian neighbours, strengthening ethnic unity or building civil society, and they should not be written off. However, they do themselves no favours when they spend their time undermining the efforts of campaigners by vocally and publicly opposing not only sanctions, but any form of international pressure in defeatist tones. If such people were to focus on what they are good at, and keep their reservations about international pressure to themselves, they would earn much more respect. Similarly, if those of us who advocate pressure recognised more explicitly the value of other approaches, particularly in building civil society, strengthening ethnic unity and in lobbying countries in the region, we would advance the cause further.
There is in my mind no contradiction at all between pressure and engagement. If properly coordinated, they are two sides of the same coin. This was outlined in a paper published by The Burma Campaign UK a few years ago, called "Pro-Aid, Pro-Sanctions, Pro-Engagement". Our critics should read that paper, we should seek to understand our more sensible critics, and together we can try to break the paralysis that has come from the polarisation of the debate. Only when we combine our efforts, diverse but coordinated and complementary, will we have any chance of seeing change in Burma.
Benedict Rogers is a human rights activist working for Christian Solidarity Worldwide, which recently launched the Change for Burma! campaign. He is the author of 'A Land Without Evil: Stopping the Genocide of Burma's Karen people (Monarch Books, 2004). He has travelled 28 times to Burma and its borderlands, and is currently writing two new books on Burma.