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Author: Su Mon
Myanmar has been mired in conflict for decades, but its direction changed dramatically after the 2021 coup and the proliferation of new armed groups resisting military rule. ACLED records over 2,600 new non-state actors participating in Myanmar’s conflict since April 2021 — accounting for 21% of all ACLED-recorded non-state armed groups worldwide. Most of these groups or their forerunners were formed by anti-coup protesters who could no longer peacefully resist the military’s increasingly systematic detention, torture, sexual assault, and killings of protesters. While many individuals consciously fled the military’s subjugation for arms training in other parts of Myanmar, local defense forces also grew organically in communities at risk of military reprisals and attacks. These groups were formed by people from all walks of life: local politicians, national party members, public servants, students, farmers, and more. After six weeks of escalating military repression, including police snipers shooting unarmed youth in the head, the first battle between the military and an armed resistance group organized by civilians was reported in Sagaing region: on 26 March 2021, the residents of Tamu town defended their protest sites with single-shot hunting rifles. The subsequent proliferation of new armed groups formed by civilians under hundreds of different local banners is now often collectively termed the ‘Spring Revolution.’ The revolution has led to a new, fragmented conflict landscape in which the Myanmar military has struggled to check the advance of both new and old armed groups, and only retains control of the country through its unrivaled air power.
Prior to 2021, the military was in protracted wars with a smaller number of larger, well-established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), so-called because they also encompass their respective political wings. Most EAOs originally took up arms after political negotiations for power sharing and autonomy with the government of Burma and the military failed. EAOs primarily operate in the ethnic states of Myanmar, administrative territories named after some of the country’s ethnic groups, which all have international land borders. They have rarely operated in the six regions in central Myanmar which are predominantly populated by the majority Bamar (Burman) ethnic group (see map in the PDF). Before 2021, territorial exchanges between the military and armed organizations were rare. The military’s divide-and-rule strategy kept it in firm control of state power in most of the country, and the majority of armed conflict was in the ethnic states and border areas with these EAOs. But since 2021, increasing coordination and cooperation between established EAOs and the newer resistance groups has led to a situation where the military now controls less territory than at any time since it first forcibly took control of the country in 1962.
While short-term operational coordination between these groups has led to notable success, more advanced cooperation remains nascent and fragile. If such coordination does not deepen into cooperation, the kinds of further victories needed to force the military into negotiations or defeat are unlikely. This could result in a prolonged conflict where civilians continue to suffer from military repression and widespread displacement. Most EAOs and newer resistance groups share the common goal of overthrowing military rule, but their differing strategies and political visions can lead to competition and even open conflict between them. Shan EAOs, such as the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N), have a long history of vying for territory in Shan state, and tensions are high among some newer resistance groups in Chin state and Sagaing region.
This report unpacks the proliferation and realignment of armed resistance groups fighting the military since 2021, exploring how their fragmented position poses significant challenges and opportunities for conflict mitigation and resolution. First, it details the dynamics between resistance groups and established EAOs, including how their objectives and operations differ and align. Then, it discusses how limited cooperation among armed resistance groups prevents effective protection of civilians from military abuses, before delving into case studies of violent competition between groups in Shan state, Chin state, and Sagaing region. Finally, the report outlines the potential in the future for both coordination and competition between armed groups in Myanmar.