Attachments
With the outbreak of war between Iran and the United States and Israel on 28 February, Pakistan finds itself at the brink of an escalating regional conflict. Its recently signed mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia raises the prospect that Iranian strikes in the Gulf could directly draw Pakistan into the fray. Meanwhile, Islamabad has urged Tehran to moderate its attacks on Saudi territory.
Closer to home, the conflict has brought with it a series of threats to Pakistan’s internal security. Most acutely, it has raised concerns of worsening militancy in the restive Balochistan province, which borders Iran and is the site of a decades-long separatist insurgency. More widely, it could heighten sectarian tensions between the country’s minority Shiite and majority Sunni populations.
Balochistan lies at the intersection of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, with separatist Baloch groups active across these borders, though mainly in Pakistan and Iran. The region is difficult to govern at the best of times: Its vast terrain and weak infrastructure compound security challenges. In this context, any instability within Iran could create openings for militant movement and arms smuggling across the border into Pakistan, further destabilizing an already worsening security environment. Should the US-Israeli coalition pursue a peripheral destabilization strategy involving the Baloch Sunni militant groups, Pakistan would also be wary of Iranian retaliation in Balochistan. Tehran has long accused Islamabad of failing to adequately crack down on some of these groups, and in January 2024, it carried out airstrikes targeting suspected Jaish al-Adl hideouts across the border in Pakistan.
At the end of January, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) launched phase two of Operation Herof, carrying out attacks and suicide bombings across the province and seizing control of Nushki city. This was one of its most audacious offensives to date. Security forces dealt with the fallout in February, launching retaliatory operations between 1 and 4 February, which reportedly killed over 70 militants. Despite this onslaught, BLA militants maintained their hold on Nushki city for five days. The increasing sophistication of BLA attacks — moving beyond their usual hit-and-run modus operandi — underscores their growing capabilities.
Away from the border with Iran, the killing of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei triggered deadly demonstrations across Pakistan on 1 March, with dozens of people reportedly killed in clashes with security personnel. Most fatalities occurred in the Shia-majority Gilgit-Baltistan region and in Karachi city, where US Marines opened fire after pro-Iran protesters breached the American consulate. These protests are unlikely to die down soon. Pakistan is also home to one of the largest Shiite populations outside of Iran, and its well-organized religious and political groups have a history of mobilizing in response to global events affecting the Islamic world. Reports of US troops forcibly intervening in Pakistan will only inflame tensions.
It is a volatile environment, and although support for Iran likely crosses sectarian divides, any perception of a crackdown on Shiite protesters could deepen existing fissures. This is a dangerous mix in a country where sectarian tensions have often spilled over into violence, with armed groups present on both sides. Large gatherings of Shiite protesters also present a clear target for Sunni militant groups, such as the Islamic State, which recently carried out a suicide bombing on a Shiite mosque in Islamabad and has actively stoked sectarian tensions. While Baloch separatism may remain concentrated in the peripheries, sectarian strife would impact the entire country.
See more of ACLED’s coverage on Pakistan and the live Iran crisis hub for daily updates on the conflict unfolding in Iran and the wider region.