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On 9 October 2024, Mozambique held general elections featuring three main presidential candidates: the Frelimo party’s Daniel Chapo, successor to outgoing President Filipe Nyusi; Venâncio Mondlane of the new Podemos party; and Ossufo Momade of the Renamo party. Allegations of vote tampering, restricted access for opposition representatives and observers, and the misuse of state resources marred the election process (DW 15/10/2024; IRI 11/10/2024; ICG 15/11/2024; EUEOM 22/10/2024). Though Chapo led early results, Mondlane alleged victory on 10 October based on parallel vote counts.
On 21 October, protests erupted after Mondlane called for demonstrations and a nationwide general strike (ICG 15/11/2024). The police’s heavy-handed response – including firing live ammunition at demonstrators; the targeted killing of two senior opposition figures, including Mondlane’s lawyer, who was preparing a case claiming electoral fraud; and the declaration by the National Election Commission on 24 October of Chapo as the winner with 71% of the votes– intensified the protests across the country, including in Beira, Maputo, Nacala, Pemba, Nampula, Zambezia, and Chimoio (ECHO 13/12/2024; ICG 15/11/2024; AI 06/11/2024; Crisis24 25/10/2024; Expresso 24/10/2024; BBC 20/10/2024). Mondlane subsequently went into hiding, although he has continued to incite protesters, through social media, promising to continue until the Frelimo party concedes the election (BBC 02/12/2024; BBC 04/11/2024; ICG 15/11/2024).
Between 21 October and 13 December, 275 protests and riots were reported, with at least 130 people killed, more than 2,000 injured (including by bullets), and almost 4,000 arrested and detained, including children (ACLED accessed 18/12/2024; Público 15/12/2024; HRW 24/11/2024). Protests have grown violent in urban centres, such as Maputo, Nampula, and Zambezia, evidenced by the increasing number of casualties, arrests from the riots, and violent clashes with the police, who have used live ammunition and tear gas (ACLED accessed 18/12/2024; Público 15/12/2024; AIM 04/12/2024; HRW 29/10/2024). After Cyclone Chido hit northern Mozambique on 15 December, Mondlane called for a temporary halt in the protests to mourn the victims. According to Mondlane, protests, which will be “life or death”, should restart on 23 December (Observador 16/12/2024 and 18/12/2024).
Since the protests began, economic disruption has been extensive and continues to worsen as general strikes shut down businesses and block key infrastructure. Protests that cause road closures frequently paralyse urban centres, including Maputo, Nampula, and Zambezia (ICG 15/11/2024; AJ 15/11/2024). Between 7–9 December, the state-owned Electricidade de Moçambique announced electricity provision restrictions in the south of the country, including Maputo, because of the protests (O País 09/12/2024; RFI 08/12/2024; Público 07/12/2024). Until 11 December, operations in Maputo port remained suspended since 6 November, affecting the flow of goods (Bloomberg 19/12/2024; BL 11/12/2024; Reuters 07/11/2024). The border with South Africa has also been temporarily closed on different occasions, most recently between 9–12 December, affecting crucial imports such as food supplies (Bloomberg 09/12/2024; DNoticias 09/12/2024).
Since the start of the protests, government crackdowns on free speech – including mobile network and internet shutdowns, press restrictions, and intimidation – have further fuelled tensions (AJ 15/11/2024). While foreign governments and human rights organisations condemn the excessive use of force, more opposition parties and figures, including the Renamo party, have joined the call to overturn the elections (RTP 04/12/2024; The Guardian 28/11/2024; HRW 24/11/2024). Protests have evolved from rejecting alleged election fraud to include broader demands for systemic reform, citing corruption, poverty, a lack of opportunities, and restricted freedoms under the Frelimo party’s decades-long rule (ICG 15/11/2024; AJ 15/11/2024).
Over the next one to three months, there is a very high probability of escalating civil unrest across the country, as neither Mondlane nor the Government appears willing to compromise. The unrest could worsen with the expected 23 December annoucement by the Constitutional Council of the verified election results, continued internet shutdowns and press restrictions, direct incitement to violence or extremism from either side, and increasing violent crackdowns and police brutality. An escalation could damage the economy and lead to a widespread breakdown in law and order, intensifying poverty, aggravating humanitarian needs (such as protection and food security), and further limiting humanitarian access, including for the humanitarian response to Cyclone Chido.