Attachments
Key findings:
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Violence is likely to escalate and spread in central regions of Mali over the next six months. The Malian state is likely to keep retreating, and grievances among local communities will deepen.
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People are likely to be displaced to neighbouring regions within Mali. It is also likely that people will move south, and to neighbouring countries such as Mauritania, Burkina Faso or Niger.
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A growing number of health centres are likely to close due to insecurity, restricting access to health services for affected population.
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Agricultural fields are likely to be burned during inter-communal clashes, reducing harvest and food availability. Food insecurity is likely to escalate among the newly displaced population who will likely have lost their livelihoods and will not be able to engage in farming activities.
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Displaced populations are likely to have limited access to drinking water, making the spread of waterborne diseases more likely.
Disclaimer:
Although the situation in Mali does not perfectly fit ACAPS’ methodology of risk analysis, we are highlighting it because we can foresee a significant deterioration in the next six months.
Violence increased in 2015 and 2016 in central Mali (Mopti and Segou regions) and accelerated in 2017. This is largely driven by the historical lack of state presence, and more recent spillover of the 2012 conflict in the north. Violent incidents include banditry, weapons trafficking, frequent clashes between armed herders and farmers, and attacks by Islamist armed groups on the Malian government, the army, and civilians believed to be cooperating Malian and international forces. The state’s presence continues to decline and armed groups’ capacity to perpetrate attacks is increasing. Violence in central regions of Mali is likely to intensify and spread further. With a population of 5.6 million in Mopti and Segou, five times the size of the north, this will have a large humanitarian impact. The border regions of Niger and Burkina Faso are also likely to experience a significant deterioration of the humanitarian situation.
Power vacuum and discontent
Violence in central Mali is driven by the state’s isolation of these regions, which has fueled resentment of the Malian state and encouraged people to join armed groups.
Economic and institutional challenges mean that the Malian state struggles to deliver public services throughout the whole country. It has historically allocated limited resources to northern and central regions of the country, which are economically important but highly vulnerable to frequent adverse weather conditions. Central regions have additionally suffered the consequences of armed opposition activity in other areas of the country notably the north. The Malian state has supported the creation of militia groups in central regions to counter this opposition, such as the Ganda Iso paramilitary group, which was founded in the mid-1990s in Gao, a northern region, but established training camps in Mopti region. Other militias supporting the underfunded and inefficient Malian army then used these camps to develop their capacity, notably in Sevare in Mopti region. The development of local militias, encouraged by the Malian state, has contributed to the gradual long-term increase in violence in central Mali. Despite their involvement in fighting non-state armed groups in the north, communities in central regions said they did not receive compensation and were marginalised from peace processes and negotiations with the Malian state over the distribution of power and economic development, and the reintegration of former fighters. Resentment of the state and government has grown.
From 2012, this situation worsened, as more resources were dedicated to counter insurgency in the north and implement the peace deal, at the expense of central Mali. Armed groups operating in the north expanded to central regions, exploiting the state’s weakness, and sporadic attacks weakened the state further, as more officials fled.
The absence of the state created an enabling environment for organised armed groups, as well as less organised criminal activity. The small remaining state presence was resented because of its ineffectiveness and longstanding corruption. The Malian army spread from the north to central regions in its pursuit of the armed opposition. It conducts operations against communities whom it believes supports armed groups. Malian forces committed human rights abuses against local communities, notably against the Fulani population, who were heavily represented in the armed group Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest/Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which was operating mainly in the north.
Most exactions – from both armed forces and other armed actors – are met with impunity. Local communities developed forms of self-governance and self-defence, and lack of official peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms contributed to an overall increase of levels of violence in the region.