This case study forms part of a broader GICHD study on national capacities and residual contamination and is based on both desk - top research and findings from a GICHD mission to Mali in March 2014. A full list of meetings held during th at mission is available in Annex I.
The purpose of the report is to document Mali’s experience of developing national cl earance capacities to address residual contamination and to identify and present good practices and lessons learnt.
Given the ongoing conflict in the northern part of the country, this case study focuses on capacity development of national mine action - rel ated stakeholders to manage mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination more broadly, rather than on developing national capacities to manage residual contamination specifically.
As a consequence of the armed conflict that erupted in northern Mali in January 2012, Mali currently fac es a contaminat ion problem of anti - vehicle mines (AV mines) , unexploded ordnance (UXO) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Contamination is primarily in the northern and central regions (see map below). As of March 2014 no reports have confirm ed the presence of anti - personnel (AP) mines.