Political
While Madagascar continues to remain
relatively calm, the past couple months have seen an increase in conflict
driven by non-government actors and a corresponding drop in country stability
not seen since early 2006. The rise in conflict in 2005 and 2006 was tied
to opposition activity and inflation, particularly in the rice and oil
sectors (see Madagascar Update 2=5F2005). Today the primary drivers are tied
to political posturing of primarily nongovernment actors, the government
clamp-down on opposition corruption, and energy. Political issues are closely
tied to the presidential elections of 3 December 2006 and the constitutional
referendum of 4 April 2007. The December elections were subject to both
domestic and international monitors and came off without any significant
events. Cries of voter fraud did not resonate with the monitors or the
population. The elections handed President Marc Ravalomanana a relatively
easy victory. As the improving trend in Domestic Government Events indicates,
efforts to neutralize potential sources of instability were successful
and all that remained was a claim by the Comité National pour l'Observation
des Elections (CNOE), the Catholic Church, and others that voter registry
remained an obstacle to unfettered participation. In the aftermath of the
elections, opposition voices were significantly weakened. President Ravalomanana
led support for the constitutional revisions and there was poor organization
to the "no" camp. The constitutional revisions passed 73.29 percent
to 26.71 percent with a low (for Madagascar) 42 percent turnout rate, which
was still higher than the turnout for the adaptation of the current constitution
(see Madagascar Update 1=5F2007). On 11 April, 28 opposition leaders, including
Roland Ratsiraka and former National Assembly President Jean Lahiniriko,
contested the referendum. On 16 April 2007, the opposition presidential
candidate and Toamasina mayor, Roland Ratsiraka, was accused of bribery
by the Court of Justice and subsequently arrested then jailed. Opposition
leaders accused the administration of using severe courts against challengers
while the administration attests to the independence of the judiciary and
the significance of the charges. On 18 April, Ratsiraka's supporters started
demonstrating in support of him in Toamasina. Seven people were arrested
for pillaging shops on 21 April and by 23 April authorities refused to
allow the opposition to demonstrate in favor of Ratsiraka. This downward
trend has reinvigorated ethnic or, more accurately, pseudo-ethnic tensions
in both Toamasina and the capital, Antananarivo (see FAST Quarterly Update
3=5F2004). On 19 April, Ratsiraka supporters in Toamasina threatened to push
ethnic Merinas back to their home region of Antananarivo. In April and
May the opposition held government demonstrations in the cities of Sambava,
Mahajanga and Tulear as well, resulting in the arrest of some fifty opposition
members in Tulear (home region of Jean Lahiniriko). Also opposition members
threatened several Merina families in the city of Tulear on 1 May. On 24
May, leaflets by anonymous authors were distributed demanding those of
coastal ethnicities leave Antananarivo. The opposition accused the president's
Tiako i Madagasikara (TIM) party of involvement in the leaflets while the
TIM accused the opposition of creating the pamphlets as a form of ethnic
manipulation. Meanwhile, demonstrations concerning the energy crisis in
Madagascar have taken political, industrial and socio-economic forms. In
Antsiranana, Mahajanga, and Tulear students took to the streets to protest
electricity shortages. Opposition support for student protests and the
arrests of students for encouraging ethnically-based riots in Tulear on
17 May further blurred the division of the energy and opposition issues.