Attachments
Overview
The following overview has been generated using the information available up to March 26, 2026. It provides a synthesized summary and key insights into the crisis based on the most recent data accessible at that time.
Summary
The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel began in October 2023 following the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war and escalated significantly in September 2024 as Israeli military operations intensified across southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs. Although a ceasefire agreement came into effect on 27 November 2024, implementation has remained fragile and incomplete. Since the ceasefire, UNIFIL has recorded more than 10,000 air and ground violations, with at least 370 people killed and 973 injured attributed to these breaches. Israeli forces continue to occupy five positions inside Lebanese territory and maintain strikes, demolitions, and reconnaissance operations across southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, contributing to persistent insecurity and hindering returns.
Under the terms of the ceasefire, Israeli forces were expected to withdraw from southern Lebanon within 60 days, while Hezbollah was required to pull its fighters and heavy weapons north of the Litani River, with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL assuming responsibility for security in the buffer zone. The LAF completed the first phase of its deployment south of the Litani in January 2026 and has since advanced into a second phase that authorities estimate will require at least four additional months. However, Hezbollah has rejected disarmament north of the Litani, and Israel has warned it may escalate if disarmament is not achieved, maintaining a high risk of renewed large-scale operations.
Over the 14-month conflict period, more than 4,000 people have been killed and nearly one million were displaced at the peak of hostilities, while infrastructure damage is estimated at approximately USD 14 billion. More than 64,000 people remain internally displaced one year after the ceasefire, mostly in the south, with other estimates suggesting that up to 100,000 people are still unable to return due to ongoing security constraints and the continued Israeli military presence. The humanitarian situation is further compounded by the presence of approximately 1.3 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon according to Ministry of Interior figures. At the same time, large-scale voluntary returns to Syria are underway: since 8 December 2024, some 437,586 Syrians have departed from or via Lebanon, and UNHCR has inactivated 379,103 cases since January 2025 due to confirmed or presumed return.
Regional dynamics have further destabilized the situation. Following the US–Iran strikes that began on 28 February 2026, tensions sharply increased across the region, including along the Lebanon–Israel front. Hezbollah engaged in renewed cross-border rocket fire, prompting intensified Israeli retaliatory strikes across southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut. These developments unfolded against an already fragile ceasefire framework, heightening domestic political tensions within Lebanon and reinforcing the risk of broader escalation.
International pressure and diplomatic engagement have intensified in response to these risks. The United States has provided more than USD 237 million in security assistance, including USD 192.7 million to the LAF and USD 45 million to the Internal Security Forces, with recent legislation linking continued aid to measurable progress on disarmament and requiring a formal report by 30 June 2026. A tripartite Lebanon–Israel–US mechanism is holding meetings in Naqoura, chaired on the Lebanese side by Ambassador Simon Karem, aimed at monitoring ceasefire implementation and reducing tensions. France and Lebanon are co-hosting an international conference in Paris on 5 March 2026 to mobilize financial, military, and technical support for the LAF, while Egypt has proposed freezing Hezbollah’s weapons within a demilitarized zone extending north to the Awali River as a potential diplomatic off-ramp. Despite these efforts, the convergence of incomplete ceasefire implementation, unresolved disarmament, continued violations, and regional confrontation sustains a high risk of renewed large-scale hostilities in 2026.
Key Insights
1. More than a year after the November 2024 ceasefire, military tensions have escalated dramatically with UNIFIL documenting over 10,000 air and ground violations since the ceasefire began—a massive increase from earlier reports. At least 335 people have been killed and 973 injured since the ceasefire, with attacks between November 2024 and September 2025 killing 258 people (including 9 children) and injuring 812 (including 110 children). Recent strikes in Beirut in November 2025 killed 13 people, including 11 children. Israeli forces maintain five positions inside Lebanese territory, with the situation marked by continued airstrikes, heavy overflights, and targeted attacks on training compounds, boreholes, and infrastructure that hamper recovery and prevent safe returns.
2. The country continues to recover from conflict, with total economic losses estimated at US$14 billion (comprising US$6.8 billion in physical damage and US$7.2 billion in economic losses). Lebanon's economic crisis remains severe: the Lebanese pound has lost more than 98% of its value, the economy has contracted by approximately 45%, and over $124 billion in deposits remain frozen. Real GDP has declined nearly 40% since 2019, with around 44% of the population below the national poverty line and multidimensional poverty affecting over 70% of people. Recovery efforts are constrained by funding shortfalls—UNICEF has launched a 2026 appeal for USD 376.8 million to deliver humanitarian and stabilization assistance across health, WASH, education and protection sectors, while international actors are pressing for state monopoly over arms as a precondition for broader reconstruction support.
3. Approximately 82,000 people remain internally displaced (mostly in the south), with other sources reporting up to 150,000 people still forcibly displaced from their villages and warnings of potential displacement of about 110,000 in the south in the event of major escalation. Meanwhile, large-scale Syrian refugee returns are underway: since December 8, 2024, some 437,586 of the 1,260,240 Syrians who returned to Syria departed from or via Lebanon, and UNHCR has inactivated 379,103 cases due to confirmed or presumed return since January 2025. UNHCR launched a Voluntary Repatriation Programme in July 2025, and Lebanon's General Security began waiving exit fees, overstay fines, and re-entry bans for Syrians and Palestinian refugees from Syria on July 1, 2025. However, UNHCR cautions that returns must be voluntary and highlights challenges in areas of origin including limited services, damaged infrastructure, lack of civil documentation, and unexploded ordnance.
4. Food insecurity remains a critical concern, with 1.17 million people (21% of the analyzed population) facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+) between April–June 2025, including 55,000 in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Only 33% of households achieved an acceptable Food Consumption Score, and 82% employed moderate-to-severe negative coping strategies, with markedly poorer outcomes in Bekaa and Akkar. Nutritional indicators are alarming: only 3% of children 6–59 months met minimum dietary diversity, and only 8% of women of reproductive age met minimum dietary diversity for women (MDD-W)—meaning approximately 92% of women and 97% of children are living in moderate or severe food poverty. Child stunting has doubled since 2021 to 14% nationally (up to 19% among Syrian children), while 12% of pregnant women and 6% of lactating women are acutely malnourished or at risk.
5. Lebanon's political transformation continues following the end of more than two years of governmental vacuum. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam lead the new government, which has committed to comprehensive reforms and implementation of UN Resolution 1701. The LAF has completed approximately 90% of its tasks south of the Litani, with the second phase of deployment expected after the New Year. The government has tasked the LAF with producing a disarmament implementation plan by end-2025. However, Hezbollah has rejected disarmament, and Israel has warned it may escalate if disarmament is not achieved. The US has provided over USD 237 million in security assistance, with recent legislation linking continued aid to measurable disarmament progress and requiring a report by June 30, 2026. A tripartite Mechanism (Lebanon–Israel–US) is active, now chaired by civilian Lebanese delegate Ambassador Simon Karem.
6. As of October 2025, Lebanon's economy shows signs of fragile stabilization with projected growth of 4.7% for 2025—marking the first positive growth since 2017—supported by anticipated reform progress, tourism recovery, reconstruction efforts, and limited capital inflows. However, the unresolved financial crisis continues to impede large investments, with the banking sector facing estimated losses exceeding US$72 billion. The Bank of Lebanon has issued circulars preventing licensed banks from dealing with entities operating outside the formal banking system (e.g., "Good Loan"-type networks) due to sanctions risks. High fiscal pressures persist despite improved revenue collection and a balanced 2025 budget, requiring broader structural reforms and international financial support for long-term sustainability.