Attachments
Overview
The following overview has been generated using the information available up to January 5, 2026. It provides a synthesized summary and key insights into the crisis based on the most recent data accessible at that time.
Summary
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, which began in October 2023 following the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war, escalated significantly as Israeli military operations intensified in September 2024. Although a ceasefire agreement came into effect on 27 November 2024, the situation has remained highly unstable. UNIFIL has now recorded over 10,000 air and ground violations since the ceasefire, with at least 335 people killed and 973 injured attributed to these violations. Israeli forces continue to occupy five positions inside Lebanese territory, maintaining strikes and reconnaissance operations across the south. Recent strikes in Beirut in November 2025 killed 13 people, including 11 children.
As part of the ceasefire agreement, Israeli forces were expected to withdraw from southern Lebanon within 60 days, while Hezbollah was required to pull fighters and heavy weapons north of the Litani River, with the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL assuming responsibility for security in the buffer zone. The LAF has reportedly completed approximately 90% of its tasks south of the Litani, with the second phase of deployment expected after the New Year. However, Hezbollah has rejected disarmament, and the government has tasked the LAF with producing an implementation plan by end-2025. Israel has warned it may escalate if disarmament is not achieved, maintaining a high risk of renewed large-scale operations.
Over the 14-month conflict period, more than 4,000 people have been killed, nearly one million displaced at the peak, and damage to infrastructure is estimated at USD 14 billion. Approximately 82,000 people remain internally displaced, mostly in the south, with other sources reporting up to 150,000 people still displaced from their villages. The humanitarian situation is compounded by approximately 1.12 million Syrian refugees expected to remain in Lebanon, including roughly 120,000 who crossed into Lebanon in 2025. Large-scale voluntary returns to Syria are underway: since December 8, 2024, some 437,586 of the 1,260,240 Syrians who returned to Syria departed from or via Lebanon, with UNHCR inactivating 379,103 cases due to confirmed or presumed return since January 2025.
International pressure and diplomatic engagement have intensified. The US has provided over USD 237 million in security assistance (USD 192.7 million to the LAF and USD 45 million to the ISF), with recent legislation linking continued aid to measurable progress on disarmament and requiring a report by June 30, 2026. A tripartite Mechanism (Lebanon–Israel–US) is holding meetings in Naqoura, now chaired by civilian Lebanese delegate Ambassador Simon Karem. France is promoting international conferences to support the LAF, while Lebanon's foreign minister rejected an invitation to visit Tehran on December 10, highlighting frictions with Iran over the disarmament agenda.
Key Insights
1. More than a year after the November 2024 ceasefire, military tensions have escalated dramatically with UNIFIL documenting over 10,000 air and ground violations since the ceasefire began—a massive increase from earlier reports. At least 335 people have been killed and 973 injured since the ceasefire, with attacks between November 2024 and September 2025 killing 258 people (including 9 children) and injuring 812 (including 110 children). Recent strikes in Beirut in November 2025 killed 13 people, including 11 children. Israeli forces maintain five positions inside Lebanese territory, with the situation marked by continued airstrikes, heavy overflights, and targeted attacks on training compounds, boreholes, and infrastructure that hamper recovery and prevent safe returns.
2. The country continues to recover from conflict, with total economic losses estimated at US$14 billion (comprising US$6.8 billion in physical damage and US$7.2 billion in economic losses). Lebanon's economic crisis remains severe: the Lebanese pound has lost more than 98% of its value, the economy has contracted by approximately 45%, and over $124 billion in deposits remain frozen. Real GDP has declined nearly 40% since 2019, with around 44% of the population below the national poverty line and multidimensional poverty affecting over 70% of people. Recovery efforts are constrained by funding shortfalls—UNICEF has launched a 2026 appeal for USD 376.8 million to deliver humanitarian and stabilization assistance across health, WASH, education and protection sectors, while international actors are pressing for state monopoly over arms as a precondition for broader reconstruction support.
3. Approximately 82,000 people remain internally displaced (mostly in the south), with other sources reporting up to 150,000 people still forcibly displaced from their villages and warnings of potential displacement of about 110,000 in the south in the event of major escalation. Meanwhile, large-scale Syrian refugee returns are underway: since December 8, 2024, some 437,586 of the 1,260,240 Syrians who returned to Syria departed from or via Lebanon, and UNHCR has inactivated 379,103 cases due to confirmed or presumed return since January 2025. UNHCR launched a Voluntary Repatriation Programme in July 2025, and Lebanon's General Security began waiving exit fees, overstay fines, and re-entry bans for Syrians and Palestinian refugees from Syria on July 1, 2025. However, UNHCR cautions that returns must be voluntary and highlights challenges in areas of origin including limited services, damaged infrastructure, lack of civil documentation, and unexploded ordnance.
4. Food insecurity remains a critical concern, with 1.17 million people (21% of the analyzed population) facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+) between April–June 2025, including 55,000 in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Only 33% of households achieved an acceptable Food Consumption Score, and 82% employed moderate-to-severe negative coping strategies, with markedly poorer outcomes in Bekaa and Akkar. Nutritional indicators are alarming: only 3% of children 6–59 months met minimum dietary diversity, and only 8% of women of reproductive age met minimum dietary diversity for women (MDD-W)—meaning approximately 92% of women and 97% of children are living in moderate or severe food poverty. Child stunting has doubled since 2021 to 14% nationally (up to 19% among Syrian children), while 12% of pregnant women and 6% of lactating women are acutely malnourished or at risk.
5. Lebanon's political transformation continues following the end of more than two years of governmental vacuum. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam lead the new government, which has committed to comprehensive reforms and implementation of UN Resolution 1701. The LAF has completed approximately 90% of its tasks south of the Litani, with the second phase of deployment expected after the New Year. The government has tasked the LAF with producing a disarmament implementation plan by end-2025. However, Hezbollah has rejected disarmament, and Israel has warned it may escalate if disarmament is not achieved. The US has provided over USD 237 million in security assistance, with recent legislation linking continued aid to measurable disarmament progress and requiring a report by June 30, 2026. A tripartite Mechanism (Lebanon–Israel–US) is active, now chaired by civilian Lebanese delegate Ambassador Simon Karem.
6. As of October 2025, Lebanon's economy shows signs of fragile stabilization with projected growth of 4.7% for 2025—marking the first positive growth since 2017—supported by anticipated reform progress, tourism recovery, reconstruction efforts, and limited capital inflows. However, the unresolved financial crisis continues to impede large investments, with the banking sector facing estimated losses exceeding US$72 billion. The Bank of Lebanon has issued circulars preventing licensed banks from dealing with entities operating outside the formal banking system (e.g., "Good Loan"-type networks) due to sanctions risks. High fiscal pressures persist despite improved revenue collection and a balanced 2025 budget, requiring broader structural reforms and international financial support for long-term sustainability.