Attachments
I. Introduction
1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report, issued on 16 November 2023 (S/2023/879), including on the provisions of resolution 2695 (2023). Throughout the reporting period, exchanges of fire across the Blue Line intensified, with extended geographical reach, in breach of the cessation of hostilities and in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). While most exchanges of fire were confined to within a few kilometres of either side of the Blue Line, some strikes impacted much deeper into Lebanese and Israeli territory. On both sides of the Blue Line, fatalities were reported, with residential areas impacted and tens of thousands of civilians displaced. The repeated exchanges of fire in breach of the cessation of hostilities across the Blue Line underlined the imperative for urgent steps towards a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.
II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)
A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
2. From 21 October to 20 February, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) recorded 8,918 trajectories of projectiles fired in both directions across the Blue Line. Of these trajectories, 7,948 were fired from south of the Blue Line and 978 from north of the Blue Line. Each trajectory potentially included multiple projectiles. Most of the trajectories detected were from projectiles fired by artillery and mortars. UNIFIL radars cannot detect some types of projectiles, such as air-to-surface missiles, tank rounds, portable anti-tank missiles or those fired from light weapons. UNIFIL detected rockets fired from north of the Litani River – and therefore outside the Mission’s area of operations – on 2 and 7 November, 21 December and 26 January, with 26 trajectories detected, originating from north-east of Burghuz (Sector East). On 2 November, 5 December, and 26 January, UNIFIL detected 17 trajectories from south of the Blue Line, which landed just north of the Litani River. The highest number of trajectories, 308, was detected on 19 November.
3. In public statements, Hizbullah claimed responsibility for almost daily strikes from Lebanon against Israel Defense Forces positions or personnel south of the Blue Line. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas and Al-Quds Brigades of Palestinian Islamic Jihad also publicly claimed responsibility for attacks from Lebanon on northern Israel, including on 29 and 30 October; 2, 6 and 12 November; 10, 19 and 25 December; and 17 January. Al-Fajr Forces, the military wing of Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyah, and Sarayah al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyah also claimed responsibility for attacks on northern Israel, while the Amal Movement and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party acknowledged fatalities among their members. Several strikes from Lebanon impacted residential areas in northern Israel, with the most affected areas including Yuval, Metulla, Qiryat Shmona, Yiftah and Zar‘it. In a letter dated 28 December addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2023/1059), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “the gravity and volume of these attacks is unprecedented and includes the launching of hundreds of rockets, anti-tank missiles and mortar shells, the firing of gunshots towards Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions, personnel and Israeli communities along the northern border, and various drone infiltrations”.
4. The Israel Defense Forces issued almost daily public statements regarding their operations. It reported to have intercepted or found drones on at least 17 occasions, and to have thwarted an attempted infiltration of Israeli territory by militants on 14 January. The most impacted residential areas north of the Blue Line in the UNIFIL area of operations included Alma al-Sha‘b, Ayta al-Sha‘b, Aytarun, Jubbayn, Bazuriyah, Bayt Lif, Dayr Amis, Labbunah, Majdal Silm, Marwahin, Naqurah, Shihin, Tayr Harfa, Yarin, and Zibqin (all Sector West), and Blida, Hula, Kfar Kila, Markaba, and Mays al-Jabal (all Sector East). In identical letters dated 5 December addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/688-S/2023/966), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that Israel “persists in violating the sovereignty of Lebanon and to attack it by land, sea and air”.
5. From late October, the Israel Defense Forces intensified air activity and increasingly conducted strikes on specific targets. In this regard, on 21 November a drone struck a vehicle near Tyre (Sector West), reportedly killing several members of Hamas’s Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, including the group’s deputy commander in Lebanon. A house in Bayt Yahun (Sector West) was hit on 22 November, reportedly resulting in the killing of five Hizbullah members, including a Hizbullah Radwan unit commander, as well as the killing of a son of the head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc.
6. From 24 November to 1 December, there was a pause in the exchanges of fire across the Blue Line coinciding with the humanitarian pause in Gaza. Exchanges of fire across the Blue Line resumed on 2 December, with a shift from shelling and rocket fire to the increased use of aerial platforms. Increased aerial surveillance activity from both sides of the Blue Line, with attacks on surveillance devices, was reported.
7. In what appeared to be targeted strikes, a Hizbullah commander was killed in Khirbat Silm (Sector West) on 8 January. A subsequent attack on a vehicle near his funeral procession in Khirbat Silm caused further Hizbullah casualties, with the Israel Defense Forces claiming to have killed Hizbullah’s south Lebanon aerial unit commander. Hizbullah acknowledged the killing of its member but denied he was in charge of its aerial activities. On 20 January, a vehicle on the road between Bazuriyah and Burj al-Shamali(Sector West) was struck, reportedly killing a Hizbullah member as well as a civilian. The following day, two vehicles near a Lebanese Armed Forces checkpoint in Kafra were hit, reportedly killing one Hizbullah member in the first vehicle and a civilian woman in the second. No one claimed responsibility for the strikes on 20 and 21 January.
8. Hizbullah claimed responsibility for attacking the Israel Defense Forces Mount Meron base with rockets on 6 January, in response to the killing of Hamas members in Beirut on 2 January (see para. 37 below), and for a drone attack on the Israel Defense Forces northern command headquarters in Tsfat on 9 January, in response to the abovementioned 8 January strike in Khirbat Silm.
9. On 17 January, Hamas claimed an attack on the Israel Defense Forces barracks in Liman with 20 rockets. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently struck Qulaylah (Sector West), which they claim eliminated a Hamas unit. Hamas publicly acknowledged two related fatalities. On 14 February, an Israel Defense Forces soldier was killed following an unclaimed rocket attack on the Israel Defense Forces northern command headquarters.
10. Residential areas and civilian infrastructure on both sides of the Blue Line were increasingly impacted, including in the vicinity of hospitals, schools and religious sites. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported as at 20 February at least 39 civilian fatalities in Lebanon, including 3 journalists, related to the exchanges of fire since 8 October 2023. Civilian fatalities were also reported in Israel. Within the UNIFIL area of operations, three children and their grandmother were reportedly killed by an Israel Defense Forces strike on their vehicle near Ayn Ata (Sector West) on 5 November. Hizbullah subsequently announced a strike on Qiryat Shmona, the first reported use of Grad rockets by Hizbullah against an Israeli town, reportedly killing an Israeli reservist. Two journalists and their driver were reportedly killed by Israel Defense Forces fire near Tayr Harfa (Sector West) on 21 November. There were strikes reported on a church in Yarun (Sector West) on 20 November, and, on 24 December, on a school in Taybah (Sector East) and in proximity to a monastery in Dayr Amis. South of the Blue Line, a church was reportedly struck in Iqrit on 26 December. There were also reported strikes proximate to a hospital in Mays al-Jabal on 1 January, and on ambulances on 11, 21 and 31 January in Hanin (Sector West), Kfar Kila, and Bayt Lif, respectively, with two medical workers reportedly killed on 11 January. A woman and two children were reportedly killed following a strike on Suwwanah (Sector West) on 14 February. A man and his elderly mother were reportedly killed in an anti-tank missile strike on a house in Yuval, northern Israel, on 14 January, later claimed by Hizbullah as targeting the Israel Defense Forces.
11. In a letter dated 28 December addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2023/1059), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that the “attacks have already led to the deaths of 5 civilians and 11 soldiers, and to the injuries of 41 civilians and 127 soldiers”, while “to date, approximately 50,000 Israeli civilians have had to evacuate their homes along the northern border for their own safety and are still internally displaced”. In identical letters dated 9 January addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (A/78/712-S/2024/36), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “We note that these repeated and continuous Israeli attacks have led to the displacement of more than 75,000 Lebanese civilians from their homes in southern towns.” He further stated that “Full and comprehensive implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) within an integrated package of explicit international guarantees … could bring about lasting security and overall stability”.
12. As at 20 February, Hizbullah had announced the deaths of 209 of its members since 8 October, while the Amal Movement had announced 11 fatalities and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad had announced approximately 25 between them.
13. Numerous Israeli strikes impacted areas north of the Litani River, including in the vicinity of residential areas of Jazzin, Nabatiyah and Sidon. In identical letters dated 15 February addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/781-S/2024/168), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that “a guided missile was fired from an Israeli drone towards a residential building in the southern Lebanese city of Nabatiyah, killing 10 persons, including women and children”. On 19 February, the Israel Defense Forces claimed responsibility for an attack on two industrial buildings near Ghaziyah, south of Sidon, after locating “an unmanned aerial vehicle from Hezbollah near Tiberias [in Israel]”. The Minister of Defense of Israel, Yoav Gallant, on 11 November, stated, “What we are doing in Gaza, we know how to do in Beirut.” The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, on 2 December stated, “If Hezbollah makes a mistake and enters into a broad war, it will be destroying Lebanon with its own hands.” On 12 February, Israeli Minister without portfolio, Benny Gantz, stated, “the one responsible for the fire from Lebanon is not only Hezbollah or the terrorist elements that carry it out, but also the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese state that allows the shooting from its territory. There is no target or military infrastructure in … Lebanon that is not in our sights”.
14. The Lebanese Armed Forces did not engage in the breaches of the cessation of hostilities, despite coming under fire. In identical letters dated 9 January addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/712-S/2024/36), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that there had been “34 Israeli attacks on Lebanese army posts”, including on 5 December, when “Israeli forces fired four shells directly at a Lebanese army post in the South, destroying the post, killing a Lebanese soldier and injuring three others”. On 5 December, the Israel Defense Forces stated that “IDF soldiers operated in self-defense to eliminate an imminent threat that had been identified from Lebanon. The threat was identified within a known launch area and observation point of the Hezbollah terrorist organization … The Lebanese Armed Forces were not the target of the strike. The IDF expresses regret over the incident”.
15. Several more Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were reportedly injured, including on 27 October, when a Lebanese Armed Forces convoy was hit during Israel Defense Forces shelling in the vicinity of Nabi Yusha‘ (Sector East). Following liaison and coordination by UNIFIL with the parties, the firing ceased and the convoy was able to move on. Separately, UNIFIL observed individuals using two Lebanese Armed Forces watchtowers located near the Blue Line to fire rockets into Israel on 16, 21 and 25 November.
16. On several occasions, individuals carried out attacks against Israel from the vicinity of UNIFIL positions, drawing return fire by the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL protested these actions endangering peacekeepers and UNIFIL premises in letters to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Israel Defense Forces, and initiated patrols around UNIFIL positions to prevent hostile activity.
17. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL recorded 1,816 violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israel Defense Forces, totalling 5,859 hours in overflight time. This represented a nearly nine-fold increase compared with the similar period for 2022/23. Uncrewed aerial vehicles accounted for approximately 73 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft 25 per cent and unidentified aircraft and helicopters less than 2 per cent. The number of detected air strikes increased considerably from early November. The highest number of air violations, 38, was detected on 15 November. UNIFIL protested air violations to the Israel Defense Forces. On several occasions, Hizbullah reportedly targeted Israeli uncrewed aerial vehicles with surface-to-air missiles.
18. UNIFIL observed one ground violation on 30 November in the vicinity of Wadi Khancha (Sector East), where eight civilians with two vehicles crossed south of the Blue Line to harvest olives.
19. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL maintained its high operational tempo and visible presence despite the daily exchanges of fire across the Blue Line. The Mission undertook an average of 14,133 operational activities each month, including 6,046 vehicular patrols, a slight decrease compared with the previous reporting period. A minimum of one woman peacekeeper was involved in 12.3 per cent of UNIFIL operational activities. UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, conducted an average of 2,052 Blue Line vehicle patrols and 605 counter-rocket-launching patrols, and maintained eight permanent checkpoints each month, including on the main northern entry routes into the area of operations. Foot patrols, market walks, temporary checkpoints and air operations remained suspended, except for a limited resumption of foot patrols in areas sufficiently distant from the Blue Line.