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Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2024 - Report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/548) [EN/AR/RU/ZH]

Attachments

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report, issued on 8 March 2024 ( S/2024/222 ), including on the provisions of resolution 2695 (2023) . Exchanges of fire across the Blue Line continued throughout the reporting period, in repeated breach of the cessation of hostilities and in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). While most exchanges of fire were confined to within a few kilometres on either side of the Blue Line, several strikes impacted much deeper into Lebanese and Israeli territory. On both sides of the Blue Line, fatalities were reported, with residential areas impacted and tens of thousands of civilians displaced. The continued escalation across the Blue Line underlined the imperative for urgent steps towards a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. From 21 February to 20 June, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) recorded 4,572 trajectories of projectiles fired in both directions across the Blue Line. Of these trajectories, 1,540 were fired from north of the Blue Line and 3,032 from south of the Blue Line. The highest number of trajectories was on 12 June, with 92 from north to south and 54 from south to north. Each trajectory may represent multiple projectiles. Almost all trajectories recorded were of rockets, mortar bombs and artillery shells. UNIFIL radars cannot detect some types of projectiles, such as air-to-surface missiles, tank rounds, portable anti-tank missiles or projectiles fired from light weapons.

3. UNIFIL detected rockets fired from north of the Litani River – and therefore outside the Force’s area of operations – on 14 occasions, with 131 trajectories in total detected, originating mostly from north-east of Burghuz (Sector East), as well as from the vicinity of Yuhmur and Wardiyah. On seven occasions, UNIFIL detected 65 trajectories in total from south of the Blue Line that landed just north of the Litani River. In addition, according to statements by the actors concerned or media reports, there were other strikes impacting north of the Litani River that UNIFIL could not independently verify.

4. In public statements, Hizbullah claimed responsibility for daily strikes from Lebanese territory against military installations of the Israel Defense Forces, as well as Israeli population centres and residential buildings reportedly used by Israel Defense Forces personnel. Hizbullah often stated that its strikes were in response to attacks by the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon. Hizbullah conducted several attacks simultaneously using artillery, anti-tank guided missiles, mortars, rockets and drones. Both the Israel Defense Forces and Hizbullah demonstrated increasing use of air platforms, with Hizbullah also utilizing advanced surface-to-air systems (see para. 18).

5. On multiple occasions, Hizbullah targeted Israel Defense Forces positions in the Israeli-occupied Golan, in particular at Kela and Yoav, with rockets or drones, as well as the Israel Defense Forces air traffic control base at Mount Meron with rockets and the Iron Dome batteries near Kfar Blum, Tel Na‘ama, Bet Hillel, Ramot Naftali, Yardena and Za‘urah with drones. Hizbullah also stated that it had targeted drone jamming systems at an Israeli naval site near Rosh Haniqra and the headquarters of the Ninety-First Division of the Israel Defense Forces in Biranit, as well as various brigades on multiple occasions. On 14 May, Hizbullah downed an Israel Defense Forces reconnaissance balloon between Rumaysh and Ayn Ibil (Sector West).

6. On 17 April, a total of 4 civilians and 14 Israeli soldiers were reportedly injured as a result of a combined anti-tank guided missile and drone attack that Hizbullah carried out against Israeli troops in Arab al-Aramshe. A contractor of the Israel Defense Forces reportedly died on 26 April following a Hizbullah attack on an Israel Defense Forces convoy near Ruwaysat al-Alam on 25 April. On 6 May, two Israel Defense Forces reservists were reportedly killed following a drone attack by Hizbullah near Metulla. Two Israel Defense Forces personnel were reportedly killed near Malikiya on 8 May and Hurfeish on 5 June, respectively.

7. On 27 February, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas stated that it had attacked an Israel Defense Forces brigade in Bet Hillel with rockets. On 21 April, it claimed responsibility for an attack on the Israel Defense Forces barracks at Shomera and, on 29 April, for an attack on the Israel Defense Forces 769th Brigade at Camp Gibor, near Qiryat Shmona.

8. The Israel Defense Forces issued daily public statements about their operations, against Hizbullah “terrorists”, “military buildings” or “military positions”, as well as residential buildings allegedly occupied by Hizbullah members. UNIFIL observed artillery strikes in which white phosphorus ammunition was used on at least three occasions: on 3 March near Dayr Amis (Sector West), on 3 April near Ayta al-Sha‘b (Sector West) and on 6 June near Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces conducted almost daily air strikes in Lebanon, including to strike Hizbullah commanders in the UNIFIL area of operations. The Israel Defense Forces struck a house in Juwayya (Sector West) overnight between 11 and 12 June, killing Hizbullah commander Taleb Sami Abdallah and three other Hizbullah members. Abdallah was reportedly the most senior Hizbullah figure killed since 8 October 2023. The following day, Hizbullah carried out the highest number of attacks since 8 October, claiming 19 operations. The Israel Defense Forces also increasingly struck Hizbullah members travelling in cars or on motorcycles. On 13 March, a senior Hamas operative, Hadi Mustafa, was killed in a drone strike by the Israel Defense Forces in Tyre (Sector West). On 29 March, the Minister of Defence of Israel, Yoav Gallant, stated, “I arrived at the Northern Command today to closely monitor another successful assassination of a commander in Hezbollah […]”. On 24 April, Gallant claimed, “Half of Hezbollah commanders in South Lebanon have been eliminated”. As at 20 June, Hizbullah had declared the deaths of 337 of its members since 8 October 2023, while other non-State armed groups in Lebanon acknowledged around 75 fatalities.

9. On 4 March, Hizbullah claimed that it had thwarted two alleged Israeli infiltration attempts near Ramiyah and Rumaysh (both Sector West). On 15 April, the Israel Defense Forces soldiers reported that four soldiers had been injured, one seriously, following an explosion “during operational activities” near the “border fence” in Tall Isma‘il.

10. As at 20 June, the Israeli authorities had reported 17 Israel Defense Forces fatalities in northern Israel since 8 October.

11. Residential areas and civilian infrastructure on both sides of the Blue Line were impacted. In May and June, bushfires occurred on both sides of the Blue Line following exchanges of fire. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that, as at 13 June, there had been at least 95 civilian fatalities in Lebanon, including 12 children and 30 women, 3 journalists and 21 health workers, since 8 October 2023, and that 95,228 civilians were displaced. According to Lebanese media, a family of three was killed in an air strike in Hula on 5 March; a pregnant woman and three Hizbullah reserve members were killed in a strike on a building in Khirbat Silm (Sector West) on 9 March; a woman and child were killed in a strike on a house in Hanin on 23 April; a family of four was killed in a strike in Mays al-Jabal on 5 May; and two children were killed in Nahariyyah, Sidon district, outside the area of operations, on 17 May. On 23 May, one individual was killed and three children were injured following a strike on a school bus in Kafr Dajjal, Nabatiyah district, outside the area of operations. In identical letters dated 29 May addressed to the President of the Security Council and me ( A/78/898-S/2024/416 ), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “This is the first time since the war began that a school bus has been targeted.” Two paramedics were killed in a strike in Blida on 22 February; three in a strike on a civil defence centre in Udaysah on 3 March; seven in an air strike on Habbariyah (Sector East) on 27 March; and one in a strike on an ambulance near Naqurah (Sector West) on 31 May. On 27 May, three people were killed following a strike on a motorcycle near the entrance of a hospital in Bint Jubayl (Sector West). On 1 June, a hospital in Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) and a public school in Hannawiyah (Sector West) were reportedly impacted by Israeli strikes. In identical letters dated 28 March addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ( A/78/835-S/2024/272 ), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “The deliberate killing of paramedics, destruction of relief facilities and denial of vital services to the civilian population by Israel are war crimes and a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law.” On 10 May, a contractor of a telecommunications company and a paramedic of the Amal-affiliated Risala Scout Association were killed in a drone strike on a mobile telecommunications station near Tayr Harfa (Sector West).

12. The most impacted population centres north of the Blue Line in the UNIFIL area of operations included Alma al-Sha‘b, Habis, Ayn al-Arab, Ayta al-Sha‘b, Mallul, Aytarun, Dayr Amis, Hanin, Jubbayn, Marun al-Ra’s, Marwahin, Naqurah, Ramiyah, Sarda, Yarin, Yarun (all Sector West) and Abbasivah, Bastrah, Blida, Hula, Kafr Kila, Kafr Shuba, Majidiyah, Markaba, Mays al-Jabal, Muhaybib, Rabb al-Thalathin, Wadi Khansha and Udaysah (all Sector East). In identical letters dated 13 March addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ( A/78/810-S/2024/235 ), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “Lebanon condemns in the strongest terms the continuous attacks by Israel against its sovereignty, territorial integrity and citizens, in flagrant violation of international law and international humanitarian law.”

13. Civilian fatalities were also reported in Israel. One civilian was killed and several more were injured on 4 March as the result of an anti-tank guided missile attack by Hizbullah on Margaliyyot. On 27 March, Hizbullah fired rockets at an Israel Defense Forces command facility and urban areas in Qiryat Shmona, reportedly killing an Israeli civilian. On 14 May, Hizbullah fired at Adamit and Arab al-Aramshe, reportedly killing a civilian and injuring five soldiers. In identical letters dated 10 June addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ( S/2024/450 ), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that, “since the beginning of the war, 17 soldiers and 10 civilians have been killed along the northern border and 242 soldiers and 78 civilians injured. In addition, 61,184 civilians were forced to flee from their homes.”

14. The most affected population centres in northern Israel included Malikiya, Avivim, Gesher Haziv, Goren, Hanita, Manara, Margaliyyot, Metulla, Misgav Am, Qiryat Shmona, Shlomi, Shomera, Shtula, Yuval and Zar‘it. In identical letters dated 19 April addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ( S/2024/324 ), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that Hizbullah has fired “thousands of rockets, anti-tank missiles, mortars and drones… towards Israel since 8 October 2023.”

15. The Israel Defense Forces continued to strike targets outside the UNIFIL area of operations, including Baalbek, Hirmel and Jazzin in the Bekaa Valley, and also in Nabatiyeh and Sidon districts. The Israel Defense Forces stated that they had killed a Hizbullah commander near Adlun (Sidon district) on 23 April and senior figures of Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiya in air strikes near Maydun (West Bekaa district) on 26 April and near Majdal Anjar (Bekaa district) on 17 May. On 25 March, a Syrian national was reportedly killed in an air strike on a vehicle in Suwayri (West Bekaa district). The northernmost Israeli strike into Lebanese territory was on 10 June, in the northeastern region of Hirmil.

16. The Lebanese Armed Forces did not engage in the breaches of the cessation of hostilities, despite coming under fire. On 4 June, two Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers were reportedly injured as the result of white phosphorus shell explosions in Markaba (Sector East). On 16 March, Lebanese media reported that a Lebanese Armed Forces position near Rumaysh was hit by Israel Defense Forces fire. Lebanese Armed Forces positions were reportedly hit near Ayta al-Sha‘b on 30 March and 29 May and near Bastrah (Sector East) on 4 June. On 9 March, near Ayta al-Sha‘b, a joint Lebanese Armed Forces-UNIFIL patrol was twice subjected to direct small arms fire. The Lebanese Armed Forces vehicle was impacted several times, but the UNIFIL patrol vehicle was not impacted. Subsequently, the Lebanese Armed Forces temporarily discontinued their participation in joint mobile patrols. Joint patrols resumed on 12 March. In identical letters dated 17 April addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ( A/78/854-S/2024/317 ), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that “Israel has attacked Lebanese army posts, checkpoints, patrols and surrounding areas more than 216 times”.

17. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty on a daily basis. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL recorded 1,551 air violations by the Israel Defense Forces, totalling 5,682 hours in overflight time – a 110 per cent increase over the same period in 2023. Drones accounted for approximately 79 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft for 18 per cent and unidentified aircraft for 3 per cent. The highest number of daily air violations, 31, was detected on both 22 and 25 February. UNIFIL protested the air violations to the Israel Defense Forces.

18. Hizbullah drones reportedly entered Israeli airspace in violation of Israeli sovereignty and resolution 1701 (2006), but UNIFIL is unable to confirm such violations. Hizbullah stated that it had downed Israeli drones over Lebanese territory with surface-to-air missiles on at least five occasions. On 16 May, Hizbullah claimed that it had carried out its first air attack by launching two missiles from a drone against the Israel Defense Forces in Metulla. In June, Hizbullah claimed, for the first time, to have launched surface-to-air missiles at Israel Defense Forces fighter aircraft in the airspace of Lebanon, and that it had done so on at least three occasions. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL did not observe any ground violations.

19. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL maintained a visible presence and a high operational tempo despite the exchanges of fire across the Blue Line, conducting a monthly average of 13,750 operational activities, including 5,999 vehicular patrols, a slight decrease compared with the previous reporting period. At least one woman peacekeeper was involved in 12 per cent of UNIFIL operational activities. UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, conducted an average of 389 Blue Line vehicle patrols and 542 counter-rocket-launching patrols each month. In addition, the Force maintained eight permanent checkpoints, including on the main northern entry routes into the area of operations. Foot patrols, temporary checkpoints, market walks and air operations remained suspended, except for a limited number of foot patrols in areas sufficiently distant from the Blue Line.

20. UNIFIL continued to encounter freedom of movement incidents (see annex I).* In several such incidents, the Lebanese Armed Forces helped to resolve the situation through dialogue with the individuals concerned.

21. Owing to the continued exchanges of fire and contamination of the terrain with unexploded ordnance and remnants of war, UNIFIL was not able to monitor locations of interests on a systematic basis. However, UNIFIL assessed that at least 38 locations of interest, including Green without Borders infrastructure, remained destroyed or damaged since 8 October (see S/2024/222 , para. 21).

22. UNIFIL initiated six technical investigations related to incidents of cross-Blue Line fire in the reporting period, concluding one. The Force initiated and concluded eight internal investigations related to projectiles landing in or near UNIFIL positions, attacks on UNIFIL personnel and restrictions of freedom of movement.

23. The Israel Defense Forces continued to occupy northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, while the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

24. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL, independently or in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, discovered unauthorized weapons on 17 occasions, mostly mobile rocket launching platforms and rockets. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed of all such weapons located and they disposed of them. In addition, UNIFIL observed hunting weapons on 65 occasions.

25. From 21 February to 20 June, the average percentage of UNIFIL operations conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, among the activities that could be conducted in close coordination, was 18.6 per cent, compared with 18.2 per cent for the previous reporting period (see S/2024/222 , para. 25).

26. The strategic dialogue process, focused on support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, including the model regiment, and the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy, did not progress significantly during the reporting period. As at 20 June, the Lebanese Armed Forces confirmed the deployment of 106 personnel, including 5 officers and 13 women, to the model regiment, down from 110 (see S/2024/222 , para. 26). The ground forces of the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL conducted 63 joint training exercises. UNIFIL engaged with several Member States with respect to provision of material support for a significant and accelerated deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces personnel to South Lebanon, as part of efforts to promote a return to a cessation of hostilities.

27. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,157 vessels. All 403 vessels referred for inspection by UNIFIL were cleared by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force also conducted maritime observation operations, with 13 hours of helicopter flight time. The Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy continued to gradually assume command functions for maritime interdiction operations, with support from the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. UNIFIL conducted 78 training activities with the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy.