Attachments
I. Introduction
1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report, dated 11 March 2022 (S/2022/214), including on the provisions of resolution 2591 (2021).
Outstanding obligations remain for both parties under resolution 1701 (2006). There was no progress towards a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.
II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)
A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
2. Heightened tensions persisted in the UNIFIL area of operations. On 25 April, UNIFIL radar detected one rocket launched from an area northeast of Qulaylah (Sector West), which landed south-east of the Israeli village of Shlomi. The Israel Defense Forces responded by firing approximately 50 155-mm artillery shells, which landed in Wadi Hamul and areas north of Alma al-Sha‘b (Sector West). UNIFIL was in continuous contact with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces throughout, to clarify the situation, facilitate a coordinated operational response and prevent further escalation. UNIFIL visited the site of the rocket launch later that morning with the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL observed three improvised rocketlaunching ramps, two with rockets still in place. No group claimed responsibility for firing the rocket. UNIFIL has yet to gain access to the areas of impact and has launched an investigation into the incident.
3. In identical letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me dated 3 May (S/2022/373), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations expressed “great concern” at the rocket fire, stating that “this attack compounds the already-tense situation on the ground and carries with it the potential for dangerous escalation, threatening the entire region”.
4. Separately, UNIFIL observed illumination rounds fired by the Israel Defense Forces, in response to what the latter asserted were suspicious activities. On four occasions over the reporting period, illumination rounds landed north of the Blue Line, close to Shabʻa, Ghajar, Hula, and Abasiva (all Sector East).
5. Instances of weapon pointing across the Blue Line also continued, requiring UNIFIL to interpose between the parties near Hula on 10 May and twice in Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) on 4 June. UNIFIL observed Israel Defense Forces firing into the air on seven occasions, near Hula, Mays al-Jabal and Majidiyah, after individuals in civilian clothes had approached the Blue Line. UNIFIL also observed several incidents of stone-throwing at the Israeli technical fence, in particular near Hula.
6. The occupation of northern Ghajar and the adjacent area by the Israel Defense Forces is a continuing violation of resolution 1701 (2006). While the Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, the Government of Israel has yet to respond. In identical letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me dated 20 April (A/76/817-S/2022/348), 12 May (A/76/831-S/2022/395) and 23 May (A/76/843-S/2022/420), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations referred to several instances of construction works by Israel in or near Ghajar as “acts of provocation” and “violations of the sovereignty of Lebanon and of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)“. Despite UNIFIL calling on the Israel Defense Forces to stop, the works continued.
7. On 22 April, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL of their intention to resume T-wall construction, initiated in 2018 (see S/2019/574, para. 5), from Shlomi to Hanita and from Zarit to Biranit, south of the Blue Line. Work started south-west of Alma al-Sha‘b on 26 April, with 776 metres of T-wall installed to date. Following interventions by United Nations headquarters and UNIFIL, the Israel Defense Forces committed to not undertake construction in the Lebanese “reservation areas” north of Shlomi and east of Alma al-Sha‘b and Hanita.
8. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. Between 19 February and 20 June, UNIFIL recorded 281 airspace violations, totalling 390 hours and 16 minutes in overflight time. Unmanned aerial vehicles accounted for 91.4 per cent of the violations. The remaining airspace violations involved fighter aircraft or u nidentified aircraft. In identical letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me dated 15 March (S/2022/229), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that “drones were recently launched from within the UNIFIL area of operations in southern Lebanon, infiltrating Israeli airspace” and that Israel “holds the Government of Lebanon accountable for these actions”. On 17 May, the Israel Defense Forces announced the following: “A Hezbollah drone crossed from Lebanon into Israeli airspace overnight. Our soldiers downed the drone after monitoring it throughout its flight.” UNIFIL is following up with the Israel Defense Forces for more information. Following reports that an Israel Defence Forces drone crashed in Lebanon, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces found remnants of a drone in Rumaysh (Sector West) on 26 May. UNIFIL has launched an investigation.
9. From 19 February to 20 June, UNIFIL observed 403 ground violations by Lebanese civilians crossing south of the Blue Line. These included 297 violations by shepherds and farmers, mainly in the Shabʻa Farms area, five violations by individuals accessing Shu‘ayb well near Blida and 103 violations by others. On 30 March, UNIFIL observed two Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers crossing south of the Blue Line in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal while taking photographs. On 7 April, an Israel Defense Forces contractor vehicle crossed the Blue Line in connection with maintenance works near Kafr Kila (Sector East). On 28 April and 2 June, the Israel Defense Forces apprehended Lebanese shepherds who had crossed the Blue Line near Shabʻa. On both occasions, the shepherds were returned to Lebanon the following day.
10. To help keep the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons, UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, maintained 16 permanent checkpoints and a monthly average of 119 temporary checkpoints and 283 counter-rocket-launching operations. In May, UNIFIL increased its counter-rocket-launching operations in areas in Sector East and Sector West. On 2 March, a UNIFIL helicopter patrol observed a firing range near Zibqin (Sector West), with individuals in combat attire carrying assault weapons. UNIFIL subsequently identified three similar firing ranges from the air in remote locations near Qantarah, Dayr Amis and Frun (all Sector West). UNIFIL helicopters observed small arms shooting exercises at the firing range in Zibqin on 12 May and at Zibqin and Dayr Amis on 2 June. On 6 June, UNIFIL observed 25 individuals in combat attire and carrying assault weapons participating in an exercise in Qantarah. In mid-March, the Lebanese Armed Forces agreed to the request of UNIFIL to facilitate joint visits to the locations; the dates for these visits are still to be confirmed.
11. In addition to the above, UNIFIL observed unauthorized weapons in the area of operations on 85 occasions. All but the five incidents described below involved hunting weapons. On 11 April, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol saw an individual in civilian clothes with an automatic rifle in Taybah (Sector East). On 22 April, UNIFIL observed an individual in civilian clothes carrying a pistol in Sultaniyah (Sector West). On 25 April, UNIFIL observed two individuals in Bazuriyah (Sector West) with two pistols and a rifle. On 31 May, UNIFIL observed an individual in civilian clothes in Shama (Sector West) carrying an assault weapon. On 16 June, UNIFIL observed five individuals with two rifles in the vicinity of Ghajar. UNIFIL reported each incident to the Lebanese Armed Forces.
12. Pursuant to resolution 2591 (2021), UNIFIL maintained its high operational tempo and visible presence. There were 13,991 monthly operational activities on average, including 6,135 vehicular, air or foot patrols. Air reconnaissance patrols continued over areas where ground patrols have limited access, including private property, land contaminated by explosive remnants of war or anti-personnel mines, and wadis. UNIFIL continued to increase its community engagement walks, following their resumption in December 2021 (see S/2022/214, para. 11).
13. Despite repeated requests to the Lebanese authorities, UNIFIL has yet to gain full access to several locations of interest, including several Green without Borders sites and the aforementioned firing ranges. Since 30 April, UNIFIL has observed the installation of containers and prefabricated infrastructure at 11 locations north of the Blue Line with a vantage point of the Blue Line, in the vicinity of Yarun, Hula, Ayta al-Sha‘b, Blida and Rumaysh. At one location, a chain across the road leading to one of the containers impaired the access of UNIFIL to the Blue Line. In several cases, UNIFIL peacekeepers were warned against entering the areas. Local authorities have confirmed that some of the containers are on private land and that some belong to Green without Borders. Raising concern about this trend, UNIFIL has requested the Lebanese Armed Forces to facilitate unimpeded access to the Blue Line. The Lebanese Armed Forces have confirmed that they have raised this matter with the municipalities and given assurance that access to the Blue Line will be facilitated.
14. While UNIFIL freedom of movement was respected in most cases, the mission continued to encounter restrictions (see annex I). With reference to the identical letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me dated 15 March (S/2022/229), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated in identical letters addressed to the President of the Council and to me dated 4 April 2022 (S/2022/285) that “restraints on the ability of UNIFIL to access its entire area of operations … combined with repeated physical attacks on UNIFIL troops, prevents UNIFIL from discharging its mandate [and] allows Iran, by means of its proxy, Hezbollah, to continue its military build-up unhindered in southern Lebanon”. In identical letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me dated 31 May 2022 (S/2022/445), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations “categorically reject[ed] … the unsubstantiated accusations … in documents S/2022/285 and S/2022/373“.
15. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,372 vessels. The Lebanese Armed Forces inspected and cleared 368 of the 372 vessels that UNIFIL referred for inspection.
16. The Task Force temporarily operated with four vessels from March, following a delay in replacing one vessel, which created challenges in maintaining a consistent presence of three vessels at sea and covering all three maritime corridors. The replacement of the fifth vessel was scheduled for 28 June, returning the Task Force to five vessels.
17. On 6 June, the Israeli Navy warned a Task Force vessel patrolling the UNIFIL maritime area of operation in the vicinity of the Karish offshore natural gas field against approaching the area. Six Israeli fighter aircraft manoeuvred near the UNIFIL vessel, triggering supersonic booms and launching several flares. On 7 June, six Israeli fighter aircraft flew over the same vessel. The UNIFIL vessel also detected the electronic signature of a fire control radar in lock-on mode heading towards it. UNIFIL protested the incidents to the Israel Defense Forces.
18. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Navy continued preparatory steps for a partial transfer of Task Force responsibilities, including by conducting 285 training sessions and exercises covering common operational standards for commanding, monitoring and hailing activities.
19. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL continued their engagement within the framework of the strategic dialogue process. The model regiment headquarters in Sribbin (Sector West) was inaugurated on 13 June. An initial deployment of a company to the model regiment is to be drawn from existing troops outside the UNIFIL area of operations and would undertake joint training and coordinated operations with UNIFIL.
20. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 2591 (2021), UNIFIL provided the Lebanese Armed Forces with temporary, non-lethal material and logistical support in the framework of Lebanese Armed Forces-UNIFIL joint activities. In accordance with the memorandum of understanding between UNIFIL and Lebanese authorities (see S/2022/214, para. 17), UNIFIL provided 210,000 litres of diesel fuel, food items for 162,000 meals, medicines and medical equipment by the end of February 2022. Provisions were largely drawn from existing UNIFIL supplies and contracts.
21. With the bulk of support provided in February, the full impact of UNIFIL assistance was evident from March 2022 onwards. Joint vehicle patrols rose from 210 in January to 263 in March, 282 in April and 277 in May. In April, operations conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces rose to 18.3 per cent, compared with an average of 15.3 per cent during the previous reporting period. Further details are provided in annex II.
22. In identical letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me, dated 15 March (S/2022/235), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon conveyed a request from the Government of Lebanon for the continuation of material assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces in the UNIFIL area of operations for an additional year. The letters underscored the importance of such operational support in strengthening the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the framework of joint activities with UNIFIL.