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Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Mid-Year Review of the Humanitarian Appeal 2005 for Occupied Palestinian Territory

Originally published

Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)
The CAP is much more than an appeal for money. It is an inclusive and coordinated programme cycle of:

a) strategic planning leading to a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP);
b) resource mobilisation (leading to a Consolidated Appeal or a Flash Appeal);
c) coordinated programme implementation;
d) joint monitoring and evaluation;
e) revision, if necessary; and
f) reporting on results.

The CHAP is a strategic plan for humanitarian response in a given country or region and includes the following elements:

a) A common analysis of the context in which humanitarian action takes place;
b) An assessment of needs;
c) best, worst, and most likely scenarios;
d) Stakeholder analysis, i.e. who does what and where;
e) A clear statement of longer-term objectives and goals;
f) Prioritised response plans; and
g) A framework for monitoring the strategy and revising it if necessary.

The CHAP is the foundation for developing a Consolidated Appeal or, when crises break or natural disasters occur, a Flash Appeal. The CHAP can also serve as a reference for organisations deciding not to appeal for funds through a common framework. Under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, the CHAP is developed at the field level by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Country Team. This team mirrors the IASC structure at headquarters and includes UN agencies, and standing invitees, i.e. the International Organization for Migration, the Red Cross Movement, and NGOs that belong to ICVA, Interaction, or SCHR. Non-IASC members, such as national NGOs, can be included, and other key stakeholders in humanitarian action, in particular host governments and donors, should be consulted.

The Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for the annual preparation of the consolidated appeal document. The document is launched globally each November to enhance advocacy and resource mobilisation. An update, known as the Mid-Year Review, is presented to donors in June of each year.

Donors provide resources to appealing agencies directly in response to project proposals. The Financial Tracking Service (FTS), managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is a database of donor contributions and can be found on

In sum, the CAP is about how the aid community collaborates to provide civilians in need the best protection and assistance available, on time.


On the political front, there have been improvements since the drafting of the 2005 Consolidated Appeal (CAP). In the high-level meeting at Sharm al Sheikh in February 2005 between Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the two stated their intention to try to end the more than four years of violence between the two sides. Since then, the major Palestinian militant groups have committed themselves to maintaining tahdi'a (calm) for the time being. The Israeli government's approval of the Disengagement Plan - to withdraw approximately 7,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip and 650 from the West Bank in August this year - is a further positive development.

As a result there has been a fall in casualties on both sides and a reduction in the number of house demolitions in the Gaza Strip. Movement restrictions around the West Bank have been eased by around 20% as of June 2005,(1) but more than 500 checkpoints and roadblocks on roads remain.

There is yet to be an overall improvement in the humanitarian situation. Access to health services and viable livelihoods is a major concern for communities located close to the Barrier. Impoverishment continues to grow, with about half the Palestinian population now thought to be in poverty in 2005, rising to 68% in the Gaza Strip.(2) Unemployment also remains high, with numbers increasing in the past two quarters.

The lack of real change in the humanitarian situation has meant that the planning scenarios outlined in the CAP remain valid.

As of 10 June 2005, 45% of the 2005 oPt CAP has been funded; a total of US$ 134,444,353 has been contributed or committed. The mid-year review led to a slight revision of some projects' budgets, bringing the total amount requested for 2005 to US$ 295,769,484. Thus, unmet requirements for the remainder of 2005 total US $ 161,325,131.

While the overall CAP funding level is approaching half of requirements, funding has varied greatly between sectors. Food Security (46% funded) and Economic Recovery / Infrastructure / Emergency Employment (51%) alone represent 81% of the funds received or committed, i.e. US$ 108,827,404. The water-sanitation sector also shows an above-average level of funding (56%). Other sectors have been notably under-funded: Education (2%), Health and Psycho-social Support (9%), Coordination (29%). Within sectors, funding of projects has also been uneven: in the Education sector, only 3 out of 11 projects have received funds; in Food Security, 4 out of 13 projects; in Health 4 out of 30 projects; and in Water-sanitation 3 out of 13 projects. This pattern could undermine the overall capacity of the CAP to address its priorities and result in an uneven achievement of objectives among sectors.

Despite the political situation in the first half of 2005 remaining relatively calm, humanitarian needs are likely to continue beyond the next six months, predicating the need for another consolidated appeal to meet needs in 2006.


Humanitarian Context

Four years ago, poverty affected one in five Palestinians. Today, almost half the population lives in poverty, as incomes have fallen and Palestinians' assets have been exhausted. Living conditions have been further eroded by the substantial decline in the quality of health and education services and the inability of Palestinians to access them. Approximately 3,496 Palestinians and 1,044 Israelis have been killed since the conflict began in September 2000. The experience of continual fear and violence will have a lasting effect on both populations.

The deteriorating humanitarian picture in the West Bank is largely a consequence of both conflict and the 'closure' measures that were established by Israel since 2000 with the stated intention to prevent the number of suicide bombers from targeting Israeli civilians. The closures consist of more than 500 checkpoints and physical barriers that block roads(3). In addition, the construction of the West Bank Barrier has sharply limited the movement of Palestinians in its vicinity. In Gaza, Palestinian movement is tightly restricted at all border crossings and within the Strip by checkpoints and other military infrastructure.

Unless the movement of goods and labour is eased, the economic situation cannot improve and the humanitarian situation will worsen.

Political developments - cause for cautious optimism

The election of Mahmoud Abbas as PA President on 9 January 2005 following the death of President Yasser Arafat on 12 November 2004 was greeted by the international community as an opportunity for rekindling negotiations

between the Palestinians and Israelis. In the high-level meeting in Sharm al Sheikh in February 2005 between the PA President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the two stated their intentions to try to end the more than four years of violence between the two sides. Since then, the major Palestinian militant groups have committed themselves to maintaining tahdi'a (calm) for the time being. A further positive development on the political stage has been the Israeli government's approval of the Disengagement Plan to withdraw approximately 7,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip and 650 from the West Bank in August this year. These developments have had positive implications: a fall in casualties, a reduction in the number of house demolitions in Gaza and an easing of closure restrictions.

These positive steps, while welcome, remain fragile. The lack of any visible breakthrough in negotiations, in particular, concerning the West Bank, continued Barrier and settlement construction, and additional assassinations of Palestinian militants could trigger Palestinian violence. The firing of qassam rockets by Palestinian militants from Gaza into Israel may prompt further Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) incursions into Gaza, as settlement withdrawal in August draws closer. Meanwhile, localised clashes between Palestinian security agencies have been a feature of the past six months.

The four key areas of concern noted in the 2005 CAP remain relevant:

1. Impoverishment, growing vulnerability and aid dependency

Impoverishment continues to grow with about half the Palestinian population now thought to be in poverty in 2005, rising to 68% in the Gaza Strip.(4) Unemployment remains high, standing at 31.7% in Q1 2005, a level that is 10% higher than before the intifada.(5) Fewer than half of all men of working age and only 10% of women of working age are currently employed.(6) This has a detrimental impact on the young in particular - one in three persons aged 15-24 years and over half of those aged 25-29 years are not employed - creating a potentially fertile breeding ground for violence and extremism.

Chronic and new poor: A recent survey ofbeneficiaries conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP) suggests that the new poor(7) are more exposed to shocks than the chronic poor(8) because of the survival strategies they use. All poor households are vulnerable to shocks - varying from the impact of the Barrier and restrictions on access to land, markets and work, to illness and irregular rains. For the chronic poor, relief assistance assures their essential needs are met, even if other survival strategies fail, thereby reducing their vulnerability.(9) But new poor are unable to depend on food aid and are forced to rely more on a wider range of high-risk strategies in their attempt to continue being productive.

2. Fragmentation of Palestinian economy and society

In the West Bank, there has been an 11% reduction of closure barriers (more than 500 physical closure barriers as of April) since November 2004.(10) While this has eased movement in parts of the West Bank, as yet it has not been translated into a significant improvement in the humanitarian situation. There has been a reported increase in flying or random checkpoints(11) and the Barrier has replaced other closure obstacles on roads in and out of some communities.

Closures in the West Bank, Dec 2003 - Mar 2005

Palestinian employment patterns have been greatly affected by the increasing fragmentation of the West Bank and Gaza. For example, the number of people in waged work has fallen while there has been a rise in the number of unpaid workers in family businesses or in self-employment. These new forms of employment largely in agriculture and trade are short-term crisis responses. They signal an increase in informal work and a move out of the cash economy. Only with a significant improvement in access to markets can these activities become more sustainable.

Increasingly, farmers are buying local rather than imported goods as a step towards greater self-sufficiency, enhancing local production capacity and lessening dependence on Israeli supplies. Similarly, there is a greater involvement of women in the labour market who are likely to continue to work and improve their employment status. These examples should provide the guiding elements in linking humanitarian and development initiatives for the international community.

3. Needs in acute crisis areas

Two areas of note are:

West Bank Barrier communities: The continued construction of the West Bank Barrier remains a key humanitarian concern. Large areas of land continue to be requisitioned for the construction of the Barrier.(12)

Total number of acres requisitioned for Barrier construction in 2005(13)

The damage caused to land and property will hinder Palestinian development should the political situation allow for this. The Barrier has made entry to Israel for employment more difficult and has cut access of small businesses to lucrative markets for goods in Arab-Israeli communities.(14) Humanitarian organisations are concerned that Palestinians in the 'closed areas' - areas of the West Bank between the Barrier and the Green Line - who can no longer regularly access their agricultural land on the other side of the Barrier may leave the area because their livelihoods are no longer viable. Economic deterioration in Jenin district since the construction of the Barrier raises further concerns about the viability of West Bank communities once the Barrier is completed.(15)

The Gaza Strip: Humanitarian organisations are planning for the evacuation of settlers from Gaza under Israel's Disengagement Plan. Acknowledging the need to pre-position supplies in areas affected by the prolonged shutdown during the evacuation of settlers from Gaza,(16) the IDF has improved access for humanitarian workers in the past four months.(17) Nevertheless, humanitarian organisations remain concerned about access to health care in the event of an emergency, as well as access to tertiary care in Egypt and Israel for Gazan patients more generally.

In Gaza, where the restrictions on the movement of workers to Israel eased since February 2005, unemployment has fallen modestly.(18) Nevertheless, the poverty rate, which is expected to rise to 72% by 2006, is unlikely to change if disengagement is accompanied by the sealing of Gaza's borders to labour and trade, according to the World Bank.(19)

Both Barrier communities and the Gaza Strip highlight the vulnerability of the Palestinian economy, which lacks an internal engine of growth and is highly dependent on donor assistance and employment in Israel to generate growth.

4. Protection of civilians

Casualties: There has been a significant reduction in civilian fatalities in recent months. Since November 2004, the number of deaths and injuries has declined, particularly in February and March 2005. Since February, there have been no large-scale incursions into the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) and the major Palestinian militant groups have committed themselves to a tahdi'a (calm).

Palestinian and Israeli deaths November 2004 - April 2005(20)

House demolitions: There has been a significant decrease in Gaza house demolitions. In 2004, 1,443 Palestinian buildings were demolished in the Gaza Strip resulting in the dispossession of 13,510 Palestinians. In 2005, there have been approximately 13 houses demolished in Gaza by the Israeli authorities up to 13 May 2005. In East Jerusalem, however, house demolitions have continued over the past months with 139 buildings demolished in 2004 and 26 buildings between January and May 2005.(21)

Proportion of West Bank House Demolitions in East Jerusalem (Sept 2004 - May 2005)

Gender: The high number of imprisoned men and of female-headed households, together with the sharp rise in male unemployment has led to women taking on new responsibilities for income-generation in addition to childcare, domestic and agricultural tasks. Women's work tends to be poorly paid or unpaid and can have an adverse impact on girls' education, as some women take their daughters out of school to fulfil domestic chores.(22) Women from large households in rural areas need to be targeted with opportunities for empowerment.(23)

Humanitarian Access: After an improvement in humanitarian access for ambulances and relief agencies at the end of 2004, reported incidents of delays and denials of access climbed modestly but did not reach the levels experienced in the first half of 2004.(24)

Incident Reports (January 2004 - April 2005)

(1) As of March 2005, there was an 11% decrease since November 2004. The trend since March shows further reduction, estimated now at 20%.
(2) World Bank, Stagnation and Revival: Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian Economic Prospects, December 2004.
(3) As of March 2005, there has been an 11% decrease, with a total of 605 obstacles remaining. However the trend since then shows further reduction, estimated at 20%
(4) World Bank, Stagnation and Revival, Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian Economic Prospects, December 2004.
(5) Adjusted rate. Data is compared with Q1 2000 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Labour Force data).
(6) The Situation of workers in the occupied Arab territories, International Labour Conference, 93rd Session, 2005, International Labour Office, Geneva.
(7) The new poor include those households that were previously getting by but which have been made destitute by closure-related income loss.
(8) The chronic poor include those, largely 'Social Hardship Cases', who were poor prior to the intifada, and who for the main part, receive food aid and assistance.
(9) WFP, Livelihoods, Shocks and Coping Strategies of WFP Beneficiaries in the occupied Palestinian territory, Baseline Survey; September - November 2004.
(10) For more detailed information, see OCHA, West Bank Closure and Access Update -- April 2005. This report shows that the majority of the closure obstacles that have been lifted existed in Jenin, Bethlehem and Hebron governorates.
(11) OCHA, Weekly Briefing Notes; Field visits. The increase in flying checkpoints is particularly apparent in Jenin, Tubas and Ramallah districts.
(12) The loss of agricultural outputs due to land confiscations and access restrictions is estimated to cost Palestinians approximately US$ 320 million. World Bank, Stagnation or Revival? Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian Economic Prospects, December 2004.
(13) Data is based on Barrier requisition orders, which are monitored by OCHA.
(14) United Nations Special Coordinator (UNSCO), Economic Adaptation and Fragmentation in the rural West Bank, (unpublished).
(15) OCHA, Humanitarian Update, April 2005.
(16) Communities affected will be those situated close to settlements, those along the evacuation route and in the enclaves of Al Mawasi in Gush Katif settlement block and Siafa in the northern settlement block.
(17) See Gaza Disengagement - UN Contingency Plan (May 2005)
(18) PCBS Labour force data Q1 2005.
(19) World Bank, Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and Settlements, June 2004.
(20) OCHA Weekly Briefings on the Protection of Civilians.
(21) Data from the Operation Support Officer Programme, UNRWA.
(22) UNSCO, Economic Adaptation and Fragmentation.
(23) UNFPA Situation Analysis, Chapter 3.
(24) OCHA Humanitarian Monitoring reports, January 2004 - April 2005.





3.1 Summary funding analysis
3.2 Scenarios
3.3 Strategic priorities
3.4 Sector response plans

  • 3.4.1 Emergency Infrastructure and Employment Sector
  • 3.4.2 Education
  • 3.4.3 Psychosocial Support
  • 3.4.4 Food Security
  • 3.4.5 Health
  • 3.4.6 Water
  • 3.4.7 Coordination, Awareness and Security






Note: The full text of this appeal is available on-line in Adobe Acrobat (pdf) format and may also be downloaded in zipped MS Word format.

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