ReliefWeb

SUMMARY

The escalation of violence in Iraq in early June 2014 has resulted in the displacement of a large numbers of people living in conflict-affected areas, adding to over 1 million persons already displaced since January 2014, in a country with one of the highest level of internal population displacements in the world1 . In order to inform the humanitarian response to this displacement crisis, REACH is collecting primary data to address key information gaps on the vulnerability, intentions and needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Data has been collected at entry points to the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) and at household level in displacement sites and host communities across the KRI and northern Iraq, including disputed areas in Ninewa and Diyala governorates.

Findings from REACH assessments confirm the pressing humanitarian needs of the very large newly displaced population in Northern Iraq. The overwhelming majority of IDPs left their homes in a hurry and left assets behind, fleeing as a direct result of conflict in their neighbourhood or village. The majority also reported that they do not intend to return to their area of origin until the conflict ends or the security situation is restored to pre-crisis levels.

Given the continued escalation and the increasingly sectarian character of the conflict, many IDPs were pessimistic about their chances of return and uncertain about their future. This evidence points to a potential long-term displacement, which will quickly exhaust the current resources of IDPs and put a strain on their host communities.

The vulnerability of displaced people varies significantly and is influenced by several factors:

• While all IDPs left assets behind, some were able to flee their homes with some financial resources and/or had assets available in areas where they fled to. This is notably the case for wealthier urban dwellers who had cash savings in their homes. Those IDPs who had no access to financial resources are considerably more vulnerable, notably farmers who had contracted debts before the harvest season.

• Many IDPs are hosted by immediate or extended family or friends and benefit from their safety net.
  However, IDPs without family or friend support networks are more vulnerable, especially those residing in camps or collective shelters (schools, mosques, churches, empty buildings, etc.). Other IDPs are staying in rented accommodation or hotels, which is rapidly depleting their financial resources. Unable to find official employment, some have already experienced secondary or tertiary displacement as funds run out, which will become an increasingly common trend as their displacement continues.

• Some IDPs are able to enter the KRI, which is perceived as a safer area, while others are not. Those IDPs who are refused entry into the KRI tend to be more vulnerable. Their vulnerability is compounded by the fact that they often have to settle among local communities in disputed areas where resources such as water and electricity are coming under increasing stress.

The emergency response should take these factors into consideration, with an initial focus on lifesaving activities for the most vulnerable IDPs. Water and food were the priority needs identified for the most vulnerable. At the same time, efforts should be made to support IDPs with depleting savings in order to prevent their increased vulnerability in the medium to long term. The priority expressed by these IDPs is accommodation and particularly rental support. Finally, host community safety nets should be supported, especially where community resources are quickly depleting. With camps hosting only a small number of those displaced, host communities should be supported in adapting their services and facilities (including access to water, education, health, markets, etc.) to the influx of IDPs. Communities in contested areas are particularly vulnerable as they not only host some of the most vulnerable IDPs, but are starting to see a reduction in the capacities of their water and electricity facilities, which are reliant to areas currently controlled by Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs).