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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study focuses on four ethno-religious groups affected by displacement as a result of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) crisis: Turkmen Shias, Shabak Shias, Yazidis and Christians. The study explored the displaced groups’ decision to return to their location of origin or to stay in displacement by examining factors of: socio-economic characteristics; barriers to return and obstacles faced in displacement; and perception of own group, other groups in location of origin and host community in displacement. The study is based on a face-to-face survey with 1605 individuals, using a convenience sample in areas of displacement and return.
Key findings of the study are as follows:

Levels of education are similar across all groups except for Yazidis; 50% of the respondents of this group had not received any formal education.

Unemployment is widespread among both IDP and returnee households: 31% of IDPs and 23% of returnees say they are unemployed and looking for work. Unemployment is roughly similar among the groups (24%), except for Yazidis where 50% of IDPs are unemployed and looking for work. The finding that returnees have, on average, lower education levels than IDPs suggests that IDPs with higher education are returning at slower rates. Unemployment is roughly similar between Christians, Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia IDPs (24%). However, this level is significantly higher among Yazidi IDPs, with 49.6% of the interviewed Yazidi IDPs indicating that they are unemployed. Among returnee communities, Shabak Shia have the highest level of unemployment (30%).

Differences between IDPs' and returnees’ living arrangements in displacement: households staying in camps or with host families have returned at slower rates than those who rent accommodation. Turkmen Shia and Shabak Shia IDPs are more often hosted in religious buildings (25%). Yazidis are most often in camps (49%) or unfinished/abandoned buildings (20%).

The average Christian household size is smaller than the other groups (5 members) and that of Turkmen Shia the largest (9 members). Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia IDP families are more likely to have split up due to the return of family members: 7% and 8.3% respectively.

Both returnee and IDP households claim to have received various forms of humanitarian assistance, however aid was discontinued while in displacement for both IDPs and returnees. This suggests that cutting aid does not significantly affect the decision to either return or remain in displacement. The study also found that a move to return to the area of origin is not always associated with an improvement in living standards or income. A total of 25% of respondents claimed their income worsened after return, and 16.4% said their living standards deteriorated. Yazidis and Turkmen Shia were generally most positive about their household income and living standards after return. Interestingly however, nearly half of Christian returnees stated they perceived no significant difference between their lives in displacement and after return.

The main driver for IDPs to stay displaced is clearly better safety in the location of displacement (91%). Access to public services also plays an important role for over 73% of respondents. More specifically, with regards to access to services, a majority of IDP households (70%) are postponing or deciding against return because their children are enrolled in school. Many families appear unwilling to interrupt the education of their children for a chance to return home. A total of 40% of IDP households said that better work opportunities in displacement are a strong or very strong reason to remain. Also, 37% of IDPs express concerns about not being welcomed in their location of origin, with Christians being the group most concerned (112 out of 200 interviewed Christian IDPs).

Returnees report four major pull factors: missing home (95%), return of other people (76%) and family members (56%), improved safety situation in the location of origin (59%) and saving on living costs associated to returning to their habitual residence (51%). IDPs who own property return at faster rates.

Feelings of empowerment play a role in the decision to return. Returnees are more likely to say that they feel their group is more empowered than IDPs. Returns are more likely to occur, and at a faster rate, in locations where individuals feel their group is empowered or dominant in relation to other groups. IDPs are also more likely than returnees to report that they faced discrimination in their location of origin, again suggesting that those who have faced discrimination before are now less inclined to return.

Regarding satisfaction with return, a vast majority (87%) of returnees are not satisfied. The top three areas where returnees demand improvements are public service provision, security and economic opportunities (62%, 47.5% and 43% respectively).

IDPs mostly demand improvements regarding economic opportunities and public service provision in displacement. Additionally, some 13% (mostly Turkmen Shia) would like to receive official permission to remain in displacement. While 80% of Turkmen Shia plan to return, only 22% among Christian and 43% Yazidi IDPs plan to do so. Furthermore, 42.5% of Christian and 25% of Yazidi IDPs intend to move and settle abroad. On average, 27.4% of IDPs wish to remain and integrate in their current location.

As to long-term intentions of returnees, nearly all Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia plan to remain in their location of return. Among Christians and Yazidis, 39% and 25% respectively, plan to migrate abroad. Yazidi returnees appear more driven to migrate abroad by factors related to security than their Christian counterparts, who more often cite economic opportunities, public services and administration as reasons for their intention to leave Iraq.