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Iraq

The changing situation in Iraq: A progress report

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Introduction

The level of violence in Iraq has diminished sharply since it peaked in 2007. It is now reduced to the levels that existed at the beginning of the insurgency in 2004, and most of the violence related to the insurgency is now concentrated in Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah ad Din provinces in the center and north. Polls show that Iraqis only experienced half to one-third the levels of violence in February 2009 that they did in August 2008, and far lower levels than during the peak of the insurgency in 2007. The Sadr Militia -- the "Mahdi Army -- has fragmented into at least five factions and its inlfluence and capabilities have diminished sharply over the last year.

Iraqi public opinion shows broadly postive trends. This is particularly true in the Shi'ite south. An ABC poll conducted in February 2009 shows that Shi'ites see almost all trends as positive, and experience far less violence and crime than in 2007, and even compared to mid-2008. Some 70% of Shi'ites see a positive trend. The percentage that see security and military issues as the biggest problem in their lives has dropped from 58% in mid-2007, and 33% in early 2008, to 22% in February 2008. At the same time, the percentage that focus on economic issues as their main problem has risen from 41% in mid-2007 to 67%. State Department and Department of Defense surveys and studies support these conclusions.

US experts indicate that there is no question that the political struggle for power and resources continues and that the drivers of instability extend beyond the political wrangling of each party. The underlying sources of tension are exploited by the political parties and politicians to gain influence and popularity. The most significant drivers of instability over the next 12 to 18 months are the GOI budget shortfall, CF re-posturing, Kurd-Arab tensions, and multiple transitions of power due to elections. The threat of a resurgence of violence also remains. Furthermore, the GoI's current budget shortfall will likely have a cascading effect on all other drivers of instability. Constrained funding is already prompting program cuts in areas ranging from the manning and equipping of the ISF to the acquisition of needed power generation equipment and will impact the ability of the government to provide services and maintain the pace of reconstruction as national elections approach.

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