By Mitra Naseh
As the global population of refugees increased to a record high 37.8 million as of mid-2024, a staggering 16 percent—nearly one in six—originated from Afghanistan, where they have fled several decades of civil war, persecution, and state collapse. Almost 90 percent of the world’s 6.1 million Afghan refugees live in neighboring Iran or Pakistan, with Iran hosting the largest share. In fact, as of mid-2024, Iran was the world’s largest refugee host, sheltering 3.8 million people, of whom 99 percent were from Afghanistan, alongside small numbers from Iraq and other countries. Over the past four decades of conflict and war in Afghanistan, Iran has remained a key destination for different cohorts of Afghans, many of whom subsequently left when home-country conditions improved, due to its geographic proximity and shared language and cultural ties—especially with Dari-speaking and Shia Muslim communities such as the Hazara ethnic group.
However, Iran has faced increasing strain hosting millions of humanitarian migrants, especially as it confronts mounting economic challenges. While the government’s response to earlier generations of Afghan refugees was largely welcoming, policies have grown more restrictive since the mid-1990s. Only about one-fifth of the 3.8 million people considered to be in refugee-like situations in Iran are actually registered refugees, and an additional 500,000 Afghans in the country are estimated to lack any legal status, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While the rapid influx of approximately 1 million Afghans shortly after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 prompted a new process for offering temporary legal status, it also hastened the government’s resolve to deport those without authorization. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans have been forcibly removed from Iran each year since the Taliban’s resurgence, and the government in September said that it planned to deport as many as 2 million Afghans lacking legal status by March 2025.
This article provides an overview of historical and contemporary forced migration from Afghanistan to Iran. It focuses on the various factors driving migration since 1979, as well as the Iranian policies that have gradually narrowed access to protection.
Current Demographics
In addition to the nearly 3.8 million refugees and individuals in refugee-like situations living in Iran as of June 2024, estimates suggest an additional 1.1 million Afghans resided in the country as of this writing. Approximately half of them held some non-refugee form of legal documentation, with the remainder believed to be living without authorization. Roughly 20 percent of the legally present humanitarian migrants are recognized as refugees with valid identification (known as Amayesh cards for Afghans or Hoviat cards for Iraqis) and the remainder—who likely arrived since 2021—rely on temporary documentation.
Afghans in Iran constitute one of the world’s largest urban refugee populations; over the years, 4 percent or fewer have resided in one of approximately 20 government-run settlements. Although refugees in these settlements receive rent-free housing and limited support from humanitarian organizations, the settlements are largely in remote areas and residents must obtain permission to leave. These restrictions limit access to livelihood opportunities, leading most refugees to remain in urban areas offering greater economic prospects.
Recent History and Policy Responses
Due to proximity and the historical forces that have shaped both countries, a considerable number of Afghans have long lived in what is now Iran. Forced migration can be split into five periods in the modern era, corresponding to different moments of unrest in Afghanistan and changing policy priorities in Iran.
The first major wave of forced migration from Afghanistan to Iran followed the Saur Revolution in 1978—a communist coup—and the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion to support the struggling communist regime. The invasion led to a decade-long war between Soviet forces and Afghan resistance fighters known as the Mujahideen.
This period coincided with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, during which the new Iranian government encouraged sheltering Afghans as an act of solidarity with fellow Muslims striving to preserve their faith against communist oppression. Some researchers, however, have suggested that Iran’s open-door and initially welcoming policy was driven more by practical necessity than religious solidarity, as the new government needed a labor force and had limited resources to control the border.
Whatever the government’s motivation, during this period Afghans in Iran were able to obtain “blue cards” which granted them the status of immigrants (mohajerin) and afforded them rights similar to those of Iranian citizens. Between 1979 and 1988, the number of refugees and other displaced people in Iran increased from 130,000 to nearly 2.9 million.
Soviet Withdrawal and Civil War: 1989-96
With support from the United States and other allies, the Mujahideen forced Soviet forces to withdraw from Afghanistan by 1989, and the communist government in Kabul eventually collapsed in 1992. An intense struggle for power ensued, leading to a brutal civil war from 1992 to 1996. This conflict caused extensive destruction in Kabul and other parts of the country, prompting a second major exodus to Iran.
In Iran, these migrants arrived shortly after the 1988 end of the Iran-Iraq war. During this period, Iran maintained its open-door policy and introduced additional regulations to support refugees’ integration. In 1990, for example, Iran’s High Council of Education passed a resolution to facilitate Afghan students’ admission into Iranian universities. By 1990, the number of refugees and individuals in refugee-like situations neared 4.2 million, prompting the government to gradually phase out the blue card system partly due to concerns that the increasing refugee population was straining the country’s resources.
In 1992, following the collapse of Afghanistan’s communist government and amid renewed hopes for peace, Iran launched its first formal repatriation program through a tripartite agreement with UNHCR and the new Afghan government. This initiative enabled the return of 1.4 million Afghans, reducing the refugee population in Iran to around 2.5 million by 1993. The following year, Iran began formally recognizing Afghans as refugees, albeit with significantly restricted rights, as part of a broader policy shift aimed at prioritizing Iran’s own post-war reconstruction. From then until 1996, the registered refugee population in Iran remained relatively stable, fluctuating between 2 million and 2.5 million. As Iran focused on rebuilding after the war, however, its approach to these refugees increasingly became more cautious, laying the groundwork for policies that would further restrict rights and access to services.
The Taliban’s Rise: 1996-2001
The Taliban, an Islamist group with an extreme interpretation of Islamic law, emerged in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar during the country’s civil war. By 1996, the Taliban controlled approximately 80 percent of Afghanistan, including Kabul, and declared the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban’s rise to power triggered a third major period of refugees fleeing harsh restrictions on individual freedoms, especially targeting women and ethnic minorities such as Hazaras. The Taliban barred women and girls from attending school or working outside the home, and in 1998 massacred at least 2,000 Hazara civilians in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, according to groups such as Human Rights Watch.
This time, Iran’s response was far less welcoming. In 1995, just before the Taliban’s takeover, Iran imposed stricter controls on border crossings, allowing entry only to Afghans fleeing conflict-affected areas who could meet the criteria outlined in the 1951 Refugee Convention: having a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. Researchers attribute this shift to a combination of economic strain after hosting millions of Afghans for more than two decades, as well as growing demands from its baby boomer generation, mounting international sanctions—particularly on Iran’s petroleum and oil industry—and rising security concerns, as Iran was providing support to anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Additionally, by 1995 Iran had developed the necessary infrastructure to enforce stricter border policies, having overcome the resource limitations of the Iran-Iraq war.
Unlike before, newly arriving Afghans were predominantly admitted as temporary refugees, a status that allowed Iran to later more easily encourage—and sometimes enforce—repatriation, by claiming that Afghanistan was safe for their return. The evolving policy also led to increased investment in repatriation programs and the deportation of Afghans who lacked government-recognized documentation. Amid new arrivals and ongoing repatriation efforts, the refugee population in Iran remained steady, at around 2 million between 1996 and 2001.
U.S.-Led War: 2001-21
Days after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom to target and dismantle al Qaeda, the Taliban-sheltered Islamist militant organization that was responsible for the attacks, triggering the fourth major refugee wave. Although the military operation officially ended in 2014, the United States, NATO allies, and partner countries maintained a military presence in Afghanistan until 2021 under a UN Security Council mandate, with the stated aim of protecting NATO members from potential future terrorist attacks originating in Afghanistan.
In 2003, early in this new period, Iran introduced the Amayesh card system, which became the sole method for issuing temporary residence permits and identification documents to Afghan refugees. With the implementation of this system, the population of Afghans in Iran dropped from around 1.9 million in 2001 to under 1 million in 2003. The Iranian Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants’ Affairs (BAFIA) was charged with overseeing refugee issues in Iran, including Amayesh card registration.
Amayesh cards must be renewed, typically annually, and refugees must pay a renewal fee to maintain legal status. The renewal fee for a household varies based on its size, with additional charges applied for work permits. Since 2007, the system’s focus has shifted to renewals, making it increasingly difficult for new arrivals to obtain Amayesh cards, except in limited cases. While earlier waves of displaced Afghans were accepted as refugees on a prima facie basis, this policy shift instituted case-by-case review. Furthermore, since 2007 missing a renewal period has carried serious consequences, including potential loss of legal status and deportation.
In 2012, as NATO endorsed a strategy to transfer control of Afghanistan to the Afghan government, Iran expanded its repatriation efforts by joining a UNHCR-led effort to support voluntary repatriation, strengthen reintegration, and assist asylum seekers in destination countries. Around this time, the government also intensified efforts to deport Afghans without legal status, many of whom were seeking asylum but had been unable to obtain refugee status since 2007. In 2011, more than 18,500 Afghans returned to Afghanistan through the voluntary repatriation program, while around 150,000 were deported.
Following the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban swiftly regained control, leading to the collapse of the U.S.-supported government and sparking the fifth major wave of forced emigration of Afghans to Iran. Fearing persecution, many Afghans sought refuge, particularly those who had worked with international organizations and foreign governments or belonged to specific minority ethnic groups such as Hazaras. Thousands of Afghan women, apprehensive about the rollback of rights under Taliban rule, also fled. Estimates suggest that more than 1 million Afghans fled to Iran following the Taliban’s return to power, in the swiftest exodus of the country’s modern era.
These refugees and other migrants arrived under Iran’s most restrictive policies to date, against a backdrop of rising inflation, escalating poverty, and high unemployment, some of it linked to U.S.-led sanctions and the lasting impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which hit Iran particularly hard. Most Afghans entered without authorization, as Iran tightened border controls and drastically limited new issuance of Amayesh cards. In 2022, Iran launched a headcount and identification census for unauthorized Afghans, granting them temporary legal stay under the Conditional Protection Preparation Process. Although the short validity of these statuses has been extended multiple times, most recently until March 20, 2025, as of this writing the government had yet to establish a long-term plan for formally registering new arrivals as refugees.
Meanwhile, fewer than 900 Afghans voluntarily repatriated annually between 2021 and 2024, while deportations surged significantly. An estimated 485,000 Afghans were deported in 2022 and more than 650,000 in 2023. In 2024, Iran deported 750,000 Afghans and announced a plan to deport up to 2 million by March 2025.
Integration of Afghan Refugees
While Iran has long hosted Afghan refugees, naturalization opportunities are rare. Iranian citizenship is inherited from a parent, not by birthplace, leaving generations of Iranian-born Afghans without a path to citizenship. Moreover, until 2006 Iranian women were unable to confer nationality to their children, leaving those born to Iranian mothers and Afghan fathers without access to citizenship.
Iran is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, but the government’s opposition to various components of the convention have limited refugees’ integration. Its reservations on articles concerning the right to wage-earning employment and social security mean refugees must apply and pay for temporary work permits that restrict them to specific fields designated and periodically updated by the Iranian Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare. Refugees between ages 16 and 60 holding valid Amayesh cards can apply for these permits, but the narrow list of jobs—primarily in construction, agriculture, and some vocational trades—restricts their access to broader employment. As such, many refugees struggle to earn a sufficient living. A 2011 study of 2,034 refugee households in Iran, conducted by the author and others, found that nearly half could not cover basic needs with their income, a figure that has likely worsened amid recent economic pressures.
Moreover, Iran has progressively limited Afghan refugees’ access to subsidized services. Initially, Afghans benefited from subsidized health care, including hospital care, but this access diminished with the implementation of the Amayesh system, especially for those without legal status. However, since 2015, Afghan refugees holding valid Amayesh cards have been able to access universal public health insurance through a partnership between UNHCR, BAFIA, and the Ministry of Health. This insurance covers hospital stays and other services at designated facilities; enrollment requires a monthly premium that UNHCR often subsidizes for the most vulnerable.
Refugees in Iran have a right to primary education, and Afghans have had access to Iran’s free and subsidized education system for decades. However, until 2015 this right was not extended to Afghan children lacking legal status. Before 2000, those Afghans relied on “self-run” schools staffed by volunteers, which were banned by Iran in 2000 due to noncompliance with educational standards. In 2004, a government directive barred unauthorized Afghans from enrolling in Iranian schools, but the ban was lifted in 2015 by decree of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, allowing all Afghan children regardless of legal status to attend public school. However, a 2023 regulation has restricted enrollment of students lacking BAFIA documentation and has allowed schools to limit foreign students if resources are strained. Although education in public schools is free, families are often expected to contribute to expenses, which is burdensome for many Afghan households.
At the same time, Afghans face additional barriers to higher education. Since 2012, refugees wishing to attend Iranian universities must renounce their refugee status, obtain a valid passport from Afghanistan or another country, and re-enter Iran as international students.
Finally, Iran has gradually restricted freedom of movement and choice of residence for Afghan refugees. Since 2007, Afghans have been banned from living in specific cities and provinces designated as “no-go zones” or “no-go areas” for foreign nationals, unless they are residing in a settlement within one of these areas or are married to an Iranian national living there. As of September 2022, nearly two-thirds of the country’s districts were classified as no-go (see Figure 4). Afghans holding an Amayesh card or headcount slip must live in the province or settlement designated by their documentation. If they need to leave their province, they must request a temporary laissez-passer document from BAFIA.
Domestic Pressures Lead to Changing Posture
Iran has long served as a refuge for Afghans escaping instability and conflict, initially welcoming early waves of refugees and other migrants from Afghanistan. Over time, Iran’s approach has grown increasingly restrictive, driven by economic strains and security concerns. Mechanisms including the Amayesh card system and the Conditional Protection Preparation Process offer documentation and limited legal protection to Afghans, but they also impose significant restrictions, limiting refugees to certain occupations, barring them from no-go areas, and constraining their access to public services. Additionally, these systems have left an estimated 500,000 Afghans without legal status. These constraints reflect Iran’s challenges navigating its own economic pressures—exacerbated by international sanctions and soaring inflation—while hosting the world’s largest refugee population.
Anti-Afghan public sentiment has grown, fueled by political rhetoric and public discourse. As such, Afghan refugees face mounting barriers to integration. During the 2024 presidential election, candidates openly blamed Afghans for economic and social issues, with phrases such as “Expulsion of Afghans, a national demand” trending on social media and highlighting the surge in support for tougher policies. This sentiment aligns with recent policy trends, including increased deportations and restrictions on public assistance. Iran’s recent history has shown a growing tension between its capacity to support refugees and its internal socioeconomic challenges.
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