Speech by Mr Bruce Davis, Director General, AusAID, delivered at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on Thursday 27 October 2005
Introduction
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for the opportunity to address you today on the topic of aid and security after the Tsunami.
It is a pleasure to be able to contribute to ASPI's series of Defence and Security Luncheons.
Indeed, it is a measure of the holistic manner in which strategic issues are now understood in Australia that an AusAID representative would be invited to address a 'Defence and Security' forum on a topic of this kind.
It was not too long ago that aid and development lay firmly on the periphery of serious considerations of Australia's security and strategic interests.
Aid was often regarded as a somewhat ill-defined process of 'doing-good', a process which had little tangible impact on the strategic environment faced by Australia and its policy makers.
These times are now over__.
Today I would like to talk briefly to you about the alignment of the development and security agendas in recent years, and about the lessons that have been learned across the Australian Government as a result.
I will then move to a discussion of the Boxing Day Tsunami, the Australian response, and the differing impacts on existing armed conflicts in two areas of interest to Australia - Aceh and Sri Lanka.
And I will conclude by outlining the future directions of the Australian aid program, and the important role it will continue to play in building a strategic environment that favours Australia's interests.
Aid and Security
In recent years there has been a progressive alignment between the development and security agendas.
'Fragile states' - and by this I mean states that are either unable or unwilling to provide basic services to their citizens - have proven capable of incubating and sometimes exporting problems as diverse as disease; crime; people, gun and drug smuggling; and, potentially, terrorism.
In this context, we are obviously cognisant of Australia's position as a developed country surrounded by developing countries, many of which can be considered to be fragile states, or to have some of the features of fragile states.
Engaging with fragile states has thus moved to the forefront of our agenda.
Australia's robust whole-of-government engagement in Bougainville, Solomon Islands and elsewhere in recent years has led to significant lessons being learned across the Australian Government.
Within AusAID, we have made significant adaptations to the way we do business in order to operate more effectively with our whole-of-government partners. These partners include the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police, entities more conventionally considered to be engaged in 'security' rather than 'aid'.
At the same time, it is fair to say that our whole-of-government partners have also learnt substantially from their experiences working in the difficult environment of fragile states.
In these environments, the conventional concept of 'security' cannot be viewed in isolation. It is tightly linked to other variables including standards of governance and public financial management, the delivery of basic services, and of course, to levels of poverty.
As a result, I think we would now find across the Australian government a greater openness to more sophisticated definitions of security, definitions that range beyond physical security to include concepts such as food security, livelihood security and security of access to resources such as water and energy.
These are concepts that are familiar in the development lexicon.
This is because security is a prerequisite for development. Development action needs a stable foundation in order to be effective. Conflict and instability are powerful reversers of development gains and a primary cause of poverty.
It is also recognised that underdevelopment is itself a security threat. A country that cannot secure its borders is a threat to others around it. A government that is unable to provide basic health services to its citizens has no hope of dealing with the outbreak of a pandemic that would spread swiftly across national borders.
And finally, poverty and underdevelopment can be part of a pattern of grievances that leads to conflict and instability. Lack of economic opportunity, inequitable resource distribution, discrimination based on ethnicity or religion, poor governance, inadequate service delivery, the mismanagement or illegal exploitation of natural resources - all of these factors can be triggers for violent conflict.
The development challenges of our region are thus - to a significant extent - also challenges to our own security.
Theses challenges demand coherent forms of engagement that address not only the symptoms of state fragility - things like poor government services and outbreaks of violence - but also the causes of state fragility - things like unemployment, low government revenues, and the absence of respected legal and judicial institutions.
Fragile states require engagement from the perspective of both development and security.
This holistic approach underpins the Australian Government's approach to the development and security challenges of our region.
The Tsunami
Many, if not all of the countries affected by the Boxing Day tsunami suffered from a range of development and security challenges before the disaster struck.
Two of the most affected areas - Aceh and Sri Lanka - have long histories of violent conflict.
Yet in the months following the tsunami, the trajectories taken by the conflicts in these two areas have diverged widely.
Sri Lanka's protracted peace process is at its lowest point since the 2002 ceasefire, a fact exemplified by the assassination of that country's foreign minister in August.
In Aceh, by contrast, in the same month of August, the Government of Indonesia and the rebel Free Aceh Movement were signing a peace agreement aimed at bringing to a close almost 30 years of armed conflict.
I do not wish to overemphasise the role played by post-tsunami aid in driving these changes in fortune.
In the case of Aceh, many would argue that the primary factor underpinning the peace agreement was sheer weariness after 30 years of conflict, something that was compounded by the weight of the tsunami disaster.
It would also be premature to argue that the signing of the Aceh peace agreement signifies the end of a conflict that is thought to have cost the lives of over 15,000 people. The work of Paul Collier at the World Bank has indicated that a spike in violence is highly likely after the signing of any cease-fire agreement. This can occur as the result of retribution, spoiler activity, resource competition, or many other factors.
Nonetheless, the cases of Sri Lanka and Aceh add to a growing understanding within the international development community of the implications of providing emergency assistance in conflict or post-conflict situations.
Emergency assistance - and indeed aid more broadly - has the potential to become a powerful tool for resolving conflict. When delivered in complex political environments like those in Aceh and Sri Lanka, it also holds the potential to exacerbate tensions and lead to further violence.
In the face of a disaster on the scale of the tsunami, the pressing desire to focus on immediate humanitarian needs can obscure the layers of insecurity that pervade societies.
In the acute phase of the post-tsunami crisis, the focus was on providing life-sustaining assistance to survivors, and rightly so.
The assets and logistical capability provided by military forces after the tsunami were essential in ensuring humanitarian supplies were delivered swiftly. At the same time, the knowledge and judgement of experienced humanitarian workers were equally important in ensuring the appropriate relief was delivered to the areas and the people that needed it most.
In Aceh, the Australian Defence Force's knowledge of the region, its established partnerships with the Indonesian military, and its awareness of the sensitivities associated with the presence of foreign forces in Aceh, were vital to the Australian Government's efforts to meet humanitarian needs quickly and effectively. So too were the strong partnerships built between the civilian arms of the Australian and Indonesian Governments over many years.
In difficult circumstances, the coordination of the military and civilian arms of the Australian response to the humanitarian disaster in Aceh was strong and effective. Partnerships and personal relationships built in Indonesia and during previous deployments such as East Timor, Bougainville and Solomon Islands, were strengthened. Further lessons were learned on both sides, and roles more clearly defined.
As immediate humanitarian needs in Aceh began to be met, however, the focus turned to reconstruction and recovery programs. Further coordination was required as the functions previously carried out by the defence forces - medical, engineering and logistical - were handed over to civilians. In large part, this difficult process of transition was managed thoughtfully and smoothly.
This stage of a recovery effort brings the real nature of societal vulnerability and insecurity into sharp relief.
An overt focus on tsunami-affected populations, for instance, risked creating further tensions if non-affected populations perceive other groups to be receiving disproportionate levels of assistance.
While not wanting to oversimplify a complex situation, this appears to have been the case - at least early on - in Sri-Lanka.
While the tsunami itself appeared to draw people together, the response to the disaster reflected and accentuated pre-existing tensions . Tamil communities felt excluded, even obstructed in the relief effort. Communities affected by the conflict (rather than the tsunami) were not eligible for the same level of assistance provided to tsunami-affected communities. The peace process suffered as a result.
In time, these problems were recognised by the Sri Lankan authorities and international donors, and programs were adjusted accordingly. Australia, for example, is providing around $7 million this year through community development programs in conflict-affected areas, as well as support for mine action.
Nonetheless, there are lessons in the Sri Lankan experience for Australia's response to the tsunami in Indonesia.
One of these lessons is the need for us to target assistance not just to the areas and communities affected by the disaster, but also to take a longer-term approach to Indonesian development, one that strategically addresses Indonesia's broad development needs.
Aceh, the area most affected by the tsunami, is quite well resourced, with funding coming from a wide range of official and private sources.
Meanwhile there remains a high incidence of poverty and vast areas of need in other regions of Indonesia. Ignoring this fact is short-sighted and risks inflaming tensions within that country.
The stated objective of the $1 billion Australia - Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development is therefore to support 'Indonesia's reconstruction and development efforts, both in and beyond tsunami affected areas.'
In the nine months since AIPRD was announced, the largest commitments made have been towards reconstruction and rehabilitation work in Aceh.
We are currently exploring ways to directly support the peace process, including by expanding our assistance to conflict (rather than just tsunami) affected communities.
Simultaneously, however, separate allocations have been made from AIPRD to a range of longer-term development programs with an Indonesia-wide focus. These include doubling the number of aid-funded Australian postgraduate scholarships available to Indonesia, a program of partnerships between Australian and Indonesian government agencies directed at improving economic, financial and public sector management; a program to improve Indonesia's system of emergency preparedness and response; and an initiative aimed at boosting the productivity of smallholder agribusiness.
Large investments in essential economic and social infrastructure, particularly in eastern Indonesia, are also currently the subject of intense discussion.
These initiatives build on the strengths demonstrated and the lessons learned from the Australian government's program of regional engagement.
They draw on the economic, financial, and public sector management expertise of Australian Government agencies and AusAID's experience in the development of long-term programs of capacity building and institutional strengthening.
They concentrate on improving standards of governance and creating the enabling environment for sustainable, broad-based economic growth.
Above all, these initiatives aim to foster a strong, stable and prosperous Indonesia.
I'm sure it need not be reinforced to this audience that this approach is not just good development practice - it is smart strategic policy.
Conclusion
Ladies and gentlemen, the progressive alignment of the aid and security agendas will continue in coming years.
The coming White Paper on the Australian aid program, due for release early next year, will reinforce the important role aid will play in the Australian Government's response to the development and security challenges facing our region.
The White Paper looks set to maintain the aid program's focus on stimulating economic growth - the bedrock of prosperous and stable societies - with a particular emphasis on lagging regions.
It will outline an approach to building functioning, well governed states, recognising their importance to security in our region.
It will focus on encouraging regional stability and cooperation, both at national levels and regionally, so that adequate responses can be made to transboundary threats such as terrorism; drug, people and money trafficking; and potential pandemics, including HIV/AIDS and avian influenza.
And the White Paper will outline Australia's approach to encouraging human development. For as we know, supporting systems that deliver basic health and education services is a vital means of strengthening the legitimacy - and thus the stability - of governments in our region.
Aid will be only one part of an integrated Australian approach to the complex security challenges of our region.
It will nonetheless be an important part, and one which will continue to evolve to meet these challenges.
Thank you.