Summary
Sida and the Tsunami of 2004 is a study,
commissioned by Sida and conducted by the Center for Crisis Management
Research and Training (CRISMART), covering a number of basic organizational
aspects of Sida's response to the Tsunami disaster. It draws upon the
growing literature on public organizations in crises, and uses the Tsunami
disaster as a test case for core organizational functions to crisis management
and mitigation capacity.
This report begins with mapping out and specifying the questions needed to be addressed in order to describe Sida's response to the Tsunami consequences in Southeast Asia as well as the means employed in order to answer them. As Sri Lanka was particularly hard-hit by the Tsunami and because of Sida's engagement in the country, both prior to and after the disaster is high, Sri Lanka is the main case which this study focuses. Sida is also the main actor at the Embassy of Sweden in Colombo. The report builds on basic knowledge of Sida's mission, organizational structure and resources placed in relation to the tasks identified in the crisis management literature and its related analytical disciplines. A number of interviews have been used to navigate the Sida organization, and sharpen the focus on relevant issue areas. It is important to note that the conclusions in this report are circumscribed by the short time available to the authors, and that more can be done to assess the crisis management capacity of Sida.
The acute sense of urgency on the first days of the disaster was substantial, which we argue is the true meaning of 'warning'. We have claimed that this was partly due to extraordinary circumstances related to the proximity and involvement in the tragic events, a feeling shared by many Swedes. The challenge for the future is to replicate that organizational process and have everybody in relevant positions notified and briefed at an early stage.
One function that was crucial for Sida's actions, and that seemed to work only at the top of the organization, was the continuous process to have a common 'big picture' between the involved departments and units. The INFO representatives we interviewed reported intense contact with SEKA, PEO, and increasingly ASIA, during the first week. Others have testified that at the program officer level, information was much harder to come by, and the grinding tasks of responding to calls from the public and handling low-level external contacts were not prioritized. The supervision functions in certain divisions and departments were handicapped by absent senior personnel, which left the junior staff to largely fend for themselves and create their own information base. The report specifies ways of reinforcing what can be referred to as the 'intelligence function'.
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