Attachments
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2785 (2025), by which the Council extended to 31 January 2026 the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), in accordance with resolution 2476 (2019) establishing BINUH. It covers major developments since the last report, dated 14 October 2025.
II. Political issues and good governance
Political developments
2. National authorities took steps to advance the political transition with the adoption of an electoral decree on 1 December, followed by the publication of the electoral calendar on 23 December. This calendar foresees the installation of an elected President and legislature early in 2027, one year later than the deadline established in the March 2024 governance arrangements. National stakeholders remain divided over the transitional governance architecture that is to lead the country to elections.
3. Amid the continued erosion of State authority resulting from gang violence, national stakeholders expressed concern over the feasibility of elections under the current security conditions, casting doubt on the process. Under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti, BINUH conducted outreach to political and civil society stakeholders to promote inter-Haitian consultation, reduce political tensions and maintain a focus on security and electoral preparations.
4. As the 7 February 2026 deadline for the scheduled end of the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate approaches, national stakeholders advanced various proposals for new transitional governance arrangements to ensure institutional continuity until an elected Government is installed. On 4 November, several groups originally represented in the Council, including Fanmi Lavalas, Organisation du peuple en lutte and Rassemblement pour une entente nationale, condemned the lack of progress on transitional priorities – security, constitutional reforms and elections – and called for new governance arrangements beyond the agreed deadline. On 12 November, a coalition of more than 200 political parties, including Les engagés pour le développement, Pitit Dessalines, Ansanm Nou Fò, Konvansyon Inite Demokratik, Plateforme Haïtien pour Haïti and Palmis Platform, released a plan calling for a two-person executive composed of a transitional President and a Prime Minister, elections by late 2026 and the restoration of democratic institutions by 7 February 2027. On 13 November, another group of political organizations, including Lajenès Kisa w Vle, proposed replacing the Council with a single transitional President leading a technocratic Cabinet to steer the country to elections by May 2026.
5. The Transitional Presidential Council held discussions with political parties and civil society to define conditions for elections and address governance arrangements beyond 7 February 2026. On 18 November, during the commemoration of the 222nd anniversary of the Battle of Vertières – the decisive battle of the Haitian Revolution – the coordinator of the Council, Laurent Saint-Cyr, called for a collective effort to overcome the crisis, cautioning that continued divisions would prolong instability and emphasizing the need to prioritize security, political dialogue, elections and stability.
6. Amid continued calls for a consensus-based governance arrangement beyond 7 February 2026, on 19 November the Congrès patriotique pour le sauvetage national recommended launching inter-Haitian consultations under national facilitation, with international support, to forge a new consensus on security and governance conditions for elections. Similarly, on 23 November several political parties, including Secteur démocratique et populaire, Inite and Fusion des sociaux-démocrates Haïtiens, called for an inter-Haitian dialogue facilitated by Haitian religious, academic and civil society figures, with support from regional and international partners. On 25 November, the Bureau de suivi de l’accord de Montana urged stakeholders to reject what it described as foreign interference and agree on a new transitional path towards security and social justice.
7. On 26 November, amid reported internal divergences over the perceived inability of the ministerial Cabinet to address the country’s security and socioeconomic challenges, the coordinator of the Transitional Presidential Council sent a letter to Council members urging them to maintain cohesion, foster dialogue, promote national unity and uphold their collective responsibility to expedite electoral preparations.
8. National authorities remained engaged regionally and internationally to advance the transition and mobilize international security support. From 8 to 12 October, Mr. Saint-Cyr travelled to Japan to discuss the transition and the restoration of democratic governance. On 4 November in Doha, he explored with the Government of Qatar enhanced cooperation, including support for the deployment of the Gang Suppression Force. Haitian officials also participated in a high-level meeting on Haiti convened by the Organization of American States on 12 November in Washington, D.C. On 2 December, during an official visit to Haiti, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, Albert R. Ramdin, met national authorities to review political and security challenges and stressed the need for inclusive and effective governance arrangements to conclude the transition.
9. BINUH continued its good offices and facilitation efforts in support of Haitian - led initiatives to advance and conclude the transition. During the reporting period, the mission broadened its outreach through engagements with more than 60 political parties, civil society organizations, women’s and youth groups, faith-based organizations and diaspora associations, providing a platform for stakeholders to discuss security, governance and electoral challenges. In meetings with the Prime Minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, and Mr. Saint-Cyr, including consultations on 30 October and 25 November, the Special Representative underscored the need to strengthen national security institutions, with the support of the Gang Suppression Force, promote interinstitutional cooperation and reinforce national consensus on the way forward.