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Haiti

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti - Report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/41)

Attachments

I. Introduction

1 . The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2645 (2022), by which the Council decided to extend to 15 July 2023 the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), in accordance with resolution 2476 (2019) establishing BINUH, and to adjust the reporting requirements from 120 days to 90 days. The report includes significant developments that have occurred since my previous report (S/2022/761) and provides an update on the implementation of the BINUH mandate.

II. Political issues and good governance

2 . In the past three months, the political environment was shaped by three events: the adoption of Security Council resolution 2653 (2022), by which the Council establishing a United Nations sanctions regime for the implementation of travel bans, asset freezes and a targeted arms embargo against individuals engaging, directly or indirectly, with armed groups and criminal networks; the imposing of bilateral sanctions by two Member States against several high-profile Haitian individuals; and the request by the Government of Haiti for the deployment of an international specialized armed force to assist the Haitian National Police in addressing the insecurity resulting from the criminal action of armed gangs, as well as my proposal of the deployment of a rapid action force in response.

3 . Gang-related violence reached levels not seen in decades and remained the major threat to public security in Haiti. Armed gangs sought to expand their influence into neighbourhoods of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area that were considered relatively safe until recently. Turf battles between gangs have displaced tens of thousands of people in Port-au-Prince, with most of the affected living in spontaneous internally displaced persons sites. These, too, have become hotspots for violent crime, further challenging the capacity of the already overstretched national police.

4 . My Special Representative for Haiti continued to encourage constructive engagement between key stakeholders and political blocs to achieve a Haitian-led agreement. Direct talks held in early October between the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, and a prominent member of the Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (known as the Montana Group) ultimately did not make tangible headway. Later that month, civil society groups began consultations with political and business groups, industry associations and trade unions. The National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections was thus developed, listing the necessary steps towards elections. The steps include the establishment of a multi-stakeholder high transitional council; the creation of a government oversight mechanism; the full restoration of the Court of Cassation; the formation of a new provisional electoral council; and the undertaking of a constitutional review process, with a view to restoring democratically elected institutions within an 18-month time frame. A series of informal meetings and negotiations were held in Port-au-Prince and throughout the country in October and November to build support for the National Consensus document.

5 . On 6 December, the civil society groups leading the consultations issued their first statement as the “independent facilitation committee”, emphasizing the inclusive nature of the negotiations and their work to consolidate stakeholders’ proposals into a single document. The independent facilitation committee also called upon all political, civil society and private sector groups to overcome differences and agree, by the end of 2022, on the National Consensus document and work with the Government to move the country towards the restoration of democratic order. On 8 December, business leaders issued a statement similarly urging all stakeholders to work together to put the country back on track towards the holding of elections.

6 . On 21 December, the Prime Minister and a broad range of stakeholders, including some signatories of the Montana agreement, various non-aligned groups, civil society, religious groups, the private sector and a large political grouping calling itself “the historic compromise” signed the National Consensus document. The Prime Minister announced the launch of a series of multi-stakeholder discussions in January as a platform for signatories and non-signatories alike to develop a more detailed road map for the transition. For its part, the Montana Group leadership rejected the National Consensus document, labelling it a “manoeuvre” designed for electioneering purposes, at a press conference on 29 December.