Latin America/Caribbean Report No.10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Nine months after an armed uprising and international pressure forced President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to resign, the security situation in Haiti is worsening. The UN Mission, established on 1 June 2004, has deployed only two thirds of its authorised force and failed to disarm armed supporters of the disgraced leader and members of the equally disgraced disbanded army. If international intervention is not to fail for the second time in a decade and Haiti to become a failed state haemorrhaging refugees to the U.S., it is essential to start a serious disarmament process and a more inclusive political process that aims at building a national consensus, not merely holding promised but increasingly at risk 2005 elections.
In a year that was supposed to have been dominated by celebrations marking the bicentenary of their victory over slavery and colonisation, Haitians have had to contend with political violence, an abrupt change of government, and humanitarian crises resulting from two tropical storms. In early 2004, after several years of fruitless diplomatic efforts to bridge political polarisation, Haiti was again convulsed by political violence. Pressured particularly by France and the U.S., Aristide left the country on 29 February. His fall led to a dangerous reconfiguration of a fragile political landscape, including the alarming re-emergence of the former military and their civilian allies who had led a successful coup against him in 1991.
The UN Security Council authorised rapid dispatch of a Multinational Interim Force to stabilise the country and a follow-on peacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH. However, only two thirds of the prescribed force has deployed, leaving a security vacuum that has had disastrous consequences. A transitional government of technocrats led by former UN functionary Gérard Latortue as prime minister was quickly installed but it has been hampered by lack of a comprehensive political agreement. Mainly because it and MINUSTAH have not tackled disarmament of illegal armed groups, Haiti is drifting towards anarchy. The transitional government has failed to establish its authority in most of the provinces where former military are acting unlawfully as security providers. At the same time, armed Aristide supporters are asserting control of most of the capital's poor neighbourhoods and are increasing attacks on police and civilian targets.
At least 80 Haitians -- including eleven police officers (three beheaded) -- have been killed in unrest and often violent pro-Aristide protests that began on 30 September, the anniversary of the 1991 coup d'état. Most were shot in heavily populated Port-au-Prince slums where armed groups battled with the Haitian National Police, who have been accused of summarily executing young men in the Aristide strongholds.
Although the U.S.-led international force was in a strong position to disarm and demobilise rebel and pro-Aristide forces when it entered, very little was done. MINUSTAH has failed to implement the primary aspect of its mandate, to stabilise Haiti, and its inaction has allowed the former military to consolidate, making it more difficult to confront them in the future. With fewer than 3,000 demoralised, poorly equipped and poorly trained members, the police lack the capacity to restore order. It is urgent to increase the number of UN peacekeepers to the level set by the Security Council and to toughen their strategy for dealing with illegal armed groups.
The transitional government lacks a political base and appears increasingly fragile. The transition process is at stake, and urgent corrections are needed to bolster it. These include a broader political agreement, acceleration of the process to constitute an impartial police force and judiciary, and immediate disbursement of pledged funds for visible reconstruction and recovery projects.
Also essential is a broad national consultative process to set out the priorities, objectives and timetable for the transition and steer the transitional government's policy until an elected successor takes office. Ideally this would start with local and departmental consultations, leading to a national conference with representatives from all political sectors and civil society groups. MINUSTAH should facilitate this with the participation of other international actors. The reconciliation process must go beyond Aristide's party (Fanmi Lavalas) and the former opposition to encompass other social, economic and regional groups. The objective should be to broker a pact among all Haitians that would constitute an inclusive agenda at least until elections in 2005. The holding of those elections should be considered as a principal item of the transition agenda, but not the only one.
The international community hopefully will draw the right lessons from the last, failed intervention so it can help the country move forward at last on the path of democratisation and development. They include the need to engage on security and development for a lengthy period -- at least a decade -- including a genuine process of inclusiveness, building of state capacity in public education and health, and support for urban jobs and sustainable agriculture.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To Haiti's Transitional Government:
1. Pursue urgently an end to violence and destabilisation, by seeking MINUSTAH help to:
(a) implement an immediate nationwide disarmament and demobilisation program for all illegal armed groups, including former military;
(b) arrest and prosecute those engaged in trafficking and possessing weapons illegally and financing armed groups; and
(c) enforce agreements already negotiated with the former military (FAd'H), starting with the return of occupied police stations.
2. Step up efforts to introduce the rule of law and ensure sufficient conditions of security and
stability for free and fair elections in 2005, and above all:
(a) accelerate recruitment and training of the Haitian National Police (HNP), including recruitment of women;
(b) improve screening mechanisms, with international help, to ensure that no ex-FAd'H members with records of human rights abuse, criminal activity or drug trafficking are admitted to the HNP and that current members with similar records are dismissed;
(c) work closely with MINUSTAH and civil society, including women's groups, to develop and implement a national plan to strengthen the justice system;
(d) implement an even-handed approach to justice showing that no one is above the law, regardless of political affiliation;
(e) ensure due process in the prosecution of all individuals implicated in human rights violations, including detained Fanmi Lavalas members, and where evidence cannot be produced release detainees; and
(f) conduct thorough investigations into the summary executions allegedly committed by HNP members.
3. Seek national reconciliation by:
(a) launching local and departmental roundtables to examine priorities, objectives and timetables for initial reconstruction efforts, and present findings and conclusions to a national conference on national reconciliation with international participation; and
(b) creating specific mechanisms for political and civil society organisations to engage in dialogue with the transitional government.
4. Hold local, parliamentary, and presidential elections in 2005, under conditions of adequate security, pursuant to rules and procedures that permit participation of all political parties, including Fanmi Lavalas, and implement programs in both urban and rural areas to promote awareness about the electoral process.
5. Expand the Council of Eminent Persons to establish a broad-based Conseil d'état as an advisory mechanism to enable a spectrum of political views to be considered before major policies are adopted.
6. Develop detailed reconstruction projects to make use of pledged donor funds, ensuring transparency and accountability.
To the UN and the Security Council:
7. Request the Secretary General to accelerate full deployment of MINUSTAH's authorised military and civilian strength and to advise whether additional forces -- especially more riot control police (Formed Protection Units) -- are required to achieve a secure environment.
8. Renew MINUSTAH's mandate for at least two years to provide the continuity necessary to stabilise the country.
To MINUSTAH:
9. Implement its mandate more aggressively, particularly with respect to disarming and disbanding illegal armed groups, with a clear timeline for completion before elections.
To Fanmi Lavalas and Other Political Parties:
10. Disown violence publicly, dissociate from any violent armed group, and declare readiness to participate in all initiatives for dialogue and reconciliation.
11. Utilise the Rio Group's offer of mediation to support political dialogue among Haitian political forces.
To the U.S. Government:
12. Pursue a pro-active, bipartisan Haiti policy, similar to the one that supported the transition to democracy following the Duvalier regime, prioritising rule of law, poverty reduction and inclusive democratic institutions.
13. Commit to a $1 billion ten-year program of development cooperation, in addition to humanitarian relief, with priority for the justice sector, public education, sustainable agriculture and health.
To Other Members of the International Community:
14. Disburse at once funds pledged at the July 2004 Washington donors conference to achieve an immediate impact on jobs and visible infrastructure reconstruction, and, with due attention to anti-corruption issues, ensure full Haitian "buy in" by not circumventing state institutions when working with NGOs.
15. Prepare to remain engaged in development aid for at least a decade.
16. Give MINUSTAH funds to enable it to strengthen the police academy, judicial training, gender training and vetting of both existing and new members of the police and judiciary.
To the Caribbean Community (CARICOM):
17. Recognise the transitional government, reintegrate Haiti as an active member, and actively assist it to strengthen democratic institutions.
To the Organisation of American States (OAS):
18. Finalise modalities for cooperation with the UN to support national reconciliation and strengthen governance, particularly to provide practical financial and political support to the Provisional Electoral Council for conducting local and national elections in 2005.
To the Government of Brazil:
19. Continue leadership of and major troop commitment to MINUSTAH and adopt a more pro-active strategy in implementation of its mandate.
To the Government of South Africa:
20. Insist that former President Aristide publicly urge his supporters to stop the violence, turn in their arms and cooperate with the political transition, including Fanmi Lavalas participation in the electoral process.
Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 18 November 2004
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