Attachments
In a letter dated 29 November 2024 from the President of the Security Council (S/2024/868), the members of the Council requested me to provide a comprehensive assessment of the current context and ongoing United Nations and international efforts in Haiti. Council members sought strategic-level recommendations with a full range of options for the possible role that the United Nations could play, considering lessons learned from past missions, political developments and the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti. The recommendations should take a long-term perspective to sustain security and stability, addressing the root causes of the country’s multidimensional crisis. The request included a reference to the letter dated 21 October 2024 from the President of the Transitional Presidential Council addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2024/765, annex) urging the transformation of the Mission into a United Nations peacekeeping operation.
The Secretariat conducted the assessment requested by the Security Council, with support from the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). Extensive consultations were conducted with Haitian stakeholders, including members of the Transitional Presidential Council, the Prime Minister, political parties, civil society and the leadership of the Haitian National Police. Further consultations included Security Council members, regional Member States, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), as well as the leadership of the Multinational Security Support Mission. The Secretariat heard a range of views regarding the potential future United Nations role in Haiti, including the possible transformation of the Mission into a United Nations peacekeeping operation that would facilitate immediate, robust and sustained international support in neutralizing armed gangs.
Current context
Haiti is still undergoing a fragile political transition following the assassination of the President, Jovenel Moïse, in July 2021. Progress on completing the road map for elections and the restoration of democratic institutions by February 2026, as foreseen in the governance arrangements of 11 March 2024, has been mixed. Transitional bodies have been established, including the Transitional Presidential Council, an interim Prime Minister, a Cabinet, the Provisional Electoral Council, and the steering committee for the National Conference, a mechanism to broaden citizen participation in identifying solutions to the crisis, including constitutional reform. However, disputes over power-sharing, although less frequent in the past three months, have slowed the implementation of the transition road map. Unresolved allegations of corruption against three members of the Transitional Presidential Council contribute to the erosion of public trust.
The protracted political transition has created space for gangs to challenge State authority. As highlighted in various reports of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to the Security Council, gangs have increasingly leveraged profits from organized crime – such as kidnapping, extortion and drug trafficking to gain financial independence. In some instances, many of them have moved beyond being mere proxies for economic and social elites. Gang attacks have also become more organized, reflecting greater planning, tactical sophistication and access to heavy weaponry. Major attacks in March and November 2024 across Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department illustrated this trend, as gangs exploited moments of political instability and showed ability to conduct large-scale, coordinated attacks. Violence is likely to escalate considerably during the upcoming electoral period, with gang leaders seeking to rebrand themselves as political actors to gain immunity and legitimacy.
Gangs primarily consist of boys and young men between 10 and 30 years of age and recruited from the most impoverished areas. Women and girls are coerced into relationships with gang members, and children serve as lookouts, couriers, human shields or fighters. Estimates suggest that children comprise between one third to one half of all gang members. Leaving gangs is rare, with defectors facing severe punishment and their families targeted in retaliation. No government or international partner currently supports children, young people and women seeking to leave.
Gang-related violence killed at least 5,601 people in 2024, over 1,000 more than in 2023. In December, a gang reportedly executed at least 207 people over several days, burning or dismembering bodies to destroy evidence. A massacre in PontSondé, Artibonite, where 100 people were killed in a gang attack on 3 October, illustrates the scale of gang expansion outside the capital and the need for greater police mobility and capabilities
Sexual violence by gangs remains alarming. Rape, including collective rape combined with mutilations or executions, is used to terrorize communities and expand the gangs’ territorial control. Weak judicial enforcement has translated into widespread impunity for such atrocities.
The West and Artibonite Departments, which account for over 40 per cent of the electorate, are the most affected by the gangs. Most of the capital (West Department) is now beyond State control, with gangs enforcing roadblocks and acting as de facto authorities. Violence and coercion have disrupted the provision of public goods and services, deepening grievances between communities and the State. State authorities, including police, have been unable to access or maintain a permanent presence in multiple gang-controlled areas for years.
Strategic infrastructure – such as electrical plants, factories, fibre-optic cables and fuel facilities – is a frequent target of attacks. The Port-au-Prince metropolitan area has grown increasingly isolated, as commercial flights to and from the country’s main international airport remain suspended following incidents of gunfire against aircraft in February and November 2024. Gangs also control all main roads into and out of the capital, effectively encircling the city.
The erosion of State authority is evident in the destruction of police infrastructure. As at 31 December 2024, Haiti had 412 police facilities, with 67 non-operational and of which nearly 70 per cent are in the West Department. Many are in gang-controlled areas or have been damaged by fire or demolished. Of the country’s 21 prisons, seven are non-functional, including the three largest, all located in the West Department, due to extensive gang-related damage. The Port-au-Prince and Croix-des-Bouquets courts of first instance have been rendered inoperable by gang attacks.
Hospitals and schools are also frequent targets of gang violence. Nationwide, only 28 per cent of in-patient health facilities remain fully operational, 54 per cent have closed, and 18 per cent operate at reduced capacity. In the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, 43 per cent of in-patient health facilities remain functional, but 38 per cent have shut down due to insecurity. Over 1,000 schools remain closed due to violence, depriving approximately 200,000 children of education as of January 2025. Since the assassination of President Moïse, internal displacement has surged, rising from 330,000 one year ago to over 1 million at present, as Haitians continue to flee gang violence. An additional challenge facing the country is the impending forced return of a significant number of Haitians, adding pressure to the volatile environment.
Escalating violence has severely hampered the international presence in Port-au-Prince. Security risks and inadequate mitigating measures have forced a significant temporary reduction in United Nations, diplomatic and non-governmental organization personnel. A single 14-passenger United Nations humanitarian air service helicopter remains the primary evacuation option, despite being struck by gunfire last October. Uncertain donor funding poses a major challenge to the continuation of this service. In January 2025, gangs opened fire on identified diplomatic vehicles, causing one fatality and injuring six.